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Introduction---Overview
This is the second phase of a sequential national study of
federalism focused on identifying, evaluating, and ordering the
current state standards for admitting convictions to impeach. It
employs as the fulcrum for this analysis the standards during this
study period of the current federal rule on this issue. This study
like the first examines pertinent authority for a fifteen year
period, 1990-2004. Studies in patterns of federalism can be done
at various levels of authority.
State legislative standards
regulating the same issue can be compared and contrasted based on
pertinent policy concerns. State legislative rules can also be
compared and contrasted, employing as the point of departure for
the evaluation how the states' standards compare to the standards
of the federal rule, that served to some significant degree as a
source for the states to reconsider their rules.
The first of
these two studies in federalism focused on those issues. [1]
The
next
level
of
comparative
evaluation
is
the
interpretation of each states' rule's standards by that state's
supreme court, and the comparative effect of those interpretations
on the rankings of the state standards from most to least liberal
in admitting convictions to impeach. This is the focus of this
article.
Part one of this article summarizes the findings of the
first of these two sequential studies of how our federal system
regulates the admission of convictions to impeach. [2] Part two of
this article identifies and evaluates the decisions of the state
supreme courts interpreting rules which admitted convictions to
impeach on the same standards as the current federal rule. [3]
Part three identifies and evaluates the decisions of the state
supreme courts interpreting rules whose standards overall admitted
convictions to impeach more restrictively than the federal rule.
[4]
Part four of this article identifies and evaluates the
decisions of the state supreme courts interpreting rules whose
standards overall admitted convictions to impeach more liberally
than the federal rule. [5]
Each of these three parts of the article tracking the
outcomes of the three sets of state supreme court decisions during
the study period is organized to track the following major points
of analysis.
First, basic demographic outcome data from the
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decisions in each of the three types of rule states is identified
and sequenced. [6] Next, in each section, the data's significance
is identified and analyzed. [7]
The decision data is analyzed to determine the degree to
which state supreme courts in each category referred to and relied
upon the federal rule and the standards proscribed by that rule.
[8] Second and third, the decision data is assessed to determine
the degree to which state supreme courts in each category examined
the trial record to determine if the trial judge had made the
appropriate rule standard evaluation, and to determine the degree
to which each state supreme court in each category themselves
properly employed the standard(s) of their rules to determine the
admissibility of convictions to impeach. [9] Fourth, the case data
is assessed to determine how the three sets of courts defined and
evaluated for admission to impeach, convictions for crimes of
"dishonesty" or "false statement", and similar limiting concepts.
[10] Fifth, the case data is assessed to determine how the three
sets of courts defined and evaluated for admission to impeach,
convictions for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison
when that punishment term was the basis for at least preliminarily
qualifying a conviction for possible admission to impeach. [11]
Finally, each of these sections assesses the opinions of the three
sets of state supreme courts to evaluate how each set of courts
identified, defined, and evaluated the admissibility significance
of exclusionary policies, particularly unfair prejudice. [12]
The article concludes with a comparative evaluation of the
crucial findings from parts 2-4, and provides policy perspectives
concerning those findings. [13] Finally, in light of its findings,
the article recommends, as did the first study, wholesale changes
in the standards for admitting convictions to impeach. [14]
Changes which if implemented would create a single national
standard that barred use of conviction records to impeach.
A
standard that the article documents is more consistent with related
constitutional doctrines and the existing body of evidence,
particularly empirical evidence on the impact of admitting
conviction records to impeach. This is particularly true in light
of what this article documents is the overwhelming reality in most
of our state courts - wholesale and standardless admission of
convictions records ostensibly only to impeach, especially
defendants in criminal cases, which cause significant unfair
prejudice, and which in all but the rarest of cases are irrelevant
to prove propensity to lie, and in those rare instances are still
unnecessary to admit for that purpose.
2.1.1

Part 1 - Summary of Article 1 - The Federal
and State Rules Regulating The Admissibility
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of Convictions to Impeach
The first article began with an analysis of the origins and
evolution of the standards of the federal rule regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach - a change in that rule in 1990
prompted beginning the study period in that year. [15] The article
found that only nine states' rules mimic the current federal rule's
standards, despite the fact that the federal rule was touted as a
possible basis for reaching consensus on this issue. [16]
The article next focused in Part two on its primary research
and analysis findings.
It identified and ranked each state's
evidence rule regulating the admission of convictions to impeach
during the fifteen year period, 1990-2004.
The conceptual
premises of the rankings were explained. [17] The comparison was
organized by placing each states' rule in one of three categoriesidentical to the federal rule, more restrictive than the federal
rule in admitting convictions to impeach, or more liberal than the
federal rule.
The most significant and somewhat startling finding of that
article was that there were currently twenty-eight different
standards in the fifty states with regard to admitting convictions
to impeach. The article also found that despite the diversity in
the states' standards, nine of every ten of the fifty states' rules
at the beginning of 2005 still authorized the possible admission to
impeach most witnesses, including the accused, with a record of
conviction for crimes which by element analysis were irrelevant as
proof of a propensity to lie. [18] The second most significant
overall finding of this part of the article was that even when
state rules expressly or implicitedly recognize that conviction
records must be relevant to prove propensity to lie to be
admissible on that issue, almost all of them, like the federal
rule, negate that recognition by failing to define such limiting
concepts as "dishonesty" or "false statement". [19] Failure to
define such terms, opens the door to the possibility of broad
interpretations of the terms---eliminating any rational argument
that
conviction
records
for
crimes
qualified
by
these
characterizations constitute logical proof of propensity to lie.
[20]
Blame for this fundamental failure must be shared by the
drafters of the federal rule - who in the official commentary
discussed and expressed a preference for a narrow and policy based
meanings of these concepts, yet failed to so define the concepts in
the federal rule. [21]
Part three of that article began by identifying two major
consequences of twenty-eight different state rule standards
regulating the issue of admitting conviction records to impeach.
Both of these consequences impact most heavily the behavior of
members of the legal profession.
First, even evidence experts
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don't necessary know the current national state of the law on this
important issue, and second and more importantly, the practicing
bar is faced with the possibility of further variance in these
standards by state supreme courts' interpretations, and ultimately
the possibility of hundreds of variants at the trial judge level.
[22] Part three found that ultimately these consequences fall most
heavily on the rights, including constitutional rights, of
testifying party litigants, particularly the accused in criminal
cases. [23]
The article concluded that this was not a desirable
federalism pattern/outcome, especially since the federal rule's
enactment was viewed as a national opportunity for policy
reflection and perhaps consensus on this issue. This conclusion
was qualified by an acknowledgement that there could be a plausible
policy reason that could justify in a mature federal system this
much diversity.
The article identified and evaluated the five
possible and four plausible policy reasons for this pattern. [24]
The article offered proof that none of these reasons were
supported by empirical or any form of reality based evidence, and
therefore could not serve as legitimate policy justifications for
this pattern of federalism. [25] An element of this finding was
disproof of the hypotheses that no constitutional rights are
implicated by any or only a few of the current twenty-eight state
standards, authorizing the possible or mandating the admission of
convictions to impeach. [26]
Injury to the accused specific
constitutional right to an impartial jury and the right of the
accused and at least parties who testify in civil cases to minimal
substantive due process protection, are both threatened by most of
the states' standards. [27]
An element of this overall finding was disproof of the
hypotheses that there is empirical or any form of reality based
evidence that a record of criminal conviction is relevant(makes it
logically more likely) to prove propensity to lie. [28]
No
credible evidence supports this hypotheses, the existing empirical
evidence supports the conclusion that the hypothesized reason is
false, and their is widespread admission by lawyers and other
experts that a record of conviction is not relevant to prove
propensity to lie. [29] Admitting irrelevant evidence violates the
most basic evidence admissibility principal, and risks violating
the most basic substantive constitutional protection. [30]
An element of this overall finding was disproof of the
hypotheses that most or all of these twenty-eight current state
standards authorizing the possible or mandating the admission of
convictions to impeach were consistent with current major evidence
trends such as the "Daubert" doctrine. [31] The article concluded
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that most of these standards are inconsistent with Daubert's and
its progeny's call for critical evaluation and even reexamination
of the basis for admission of expert testimony. The article argued
that Daubert's premise that reliance on hunch and heuristics by
experts in other fields is subject to judicial scrutiny and
evaluation, in fairness, should be seen as a general call for a
reality check on the basis of admission of all evidence, even those
justified solely by the hunch and heuristics of the legal
profession. [32] As such, Daubert's basic concerns are a subset
and supportive of the basic evidence admissibility requirement of
relevance. [33]
There is more than just the appearance of
intellectual hubris on the part of lawyers and judges participating
in drafting and interpreting evidence rules in continuing to rely
on an unproven historical heuristic, while at the same time
ignoring empirical research supporting the conclusions that
conviction records while irrelevant to prove propensity to lie do
cause partial jurors and juries. [34]
An element of this overall finding was disproof of the
hypotheses that most or all of these twenty-eight current state
standards which do authorize the possible or mandate the admission
of convictions to impeach are consistent with the reality that
there is no or inadequate empirical or other evidence that
admitting conviction records ostensibly only to impeach testimony
will result in, or create a substantial risk of partial juror(s)
and juries. [35] The article identified multiple empirical studies
and their consistent and consensus findings were reported. Those
findings were that jurors and juries are prejudiced in deciding the
merits of cases by misusing conviction evidence for that purpose,
while disdaining use of such conviction records ostensibly for its
only authorized use as impeachment evidence. [36]
Finally, the article identified the crucial consequence of
disproof of all identified plausible reasons for the twenty-eight
state standards. Currently, nine of every ten of these state rules
regulating admission of convictions to impeach by opening the door
to the potential admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial
information, violates or threaten to violate national and state
constitutional rights to substantive due process and the right of
an accused to an impartial jury. [37]
The article proposed reform. [38]
It proposed that all
fifty states and the federal rule should abolish admission of
conviction records to impeach, especially where the unfair
prejudice that results is likely to be greatest-when the accused or
civil parties take the stand as witnesses. Hence all reference to
conviction records as a basis for impeachment should be
eliminated. Montana has adopted this ban for all witnesses, and
that ban demonstrates that such a ban can be implemented now. [39]
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In fairness, enhancing the likelihood of convicting persons with
records, and taking their property in civil cases are not adequate
counterweights to the admission of irrelevant evidence which
injures these persons constitutional rights. Nothing in substance
will be injured by the ban when the focus is upon the primary goal
of trials - the search for truth, because jurors will always be
skeptical of the veracity of the accused, civil parties, and any
witness who stands to gain or lose as a result of the outcome of
the trial. [40] Furthermore, when it is appropriate and necessary,
i.e. when a witness refuses to admit that he has previously lied
under oath, and their is a judicial determination that he has so
lied, the trial judge can instruct the jury of the fact that the
person has previously lied under oath.
There is never a
justification for reference to a record of criminal conviction, and
such a conviction record need not necessarily be the only basis for
a judicial determination that the witness has previously lied under
oath. [41] The article concluded that "Our federalism is one of
the greatest strengths of our system, it is not, however, an excuse
for ignoring our most basic constitutional and evidence law
policies".
We turn now to the focus of this article --- the impact of
the state supreme courts' interpretations of these rules over the
same very recent fifteen year period. Potentially the collective
impact of the work of these most important state courts could
ameliorate or exacerbate the current pattern of federalism gone
astray. What the article uncovers is a pattern of judicial anarchy
that greatly exacerbates the flaws in our federalism on this issue.
The one hundred and fifty state supreme courts decisions analyzed
in this article collectively have the effect of further opening the
door in the substantial majority of states to the wholesale
admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence, while also
creating the wide spread potential for drastic and unprincipled
discrepancies in the application of most of these states' standards
by the hundreds of state trial judges.
3.1.1
Part 2 - State Supreme Court Decisions 1990-2004 of
Standards to Impeach that Mimicked the Federal
Rules's Standards
8 of the 9 state supreme courts whose evidence rules were
identical to the federal rule, made eighteen pertinent admission of
conviction to impeach decisions during the period of this study,
1990-2004, and in sixteen of those decisions they affirmed lower
court admission decisions. [42]
7 of 8 of these state supreme
courts in 15 of these eighteen decisions(83%) sanctioned or
authorized the admission of one or more convictions ostensibly only
to impeach at least one trial witness. [43] 2 of these 8 state
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supreme courts in 3 of the 18 decisions(22%) sanctioned or ruled
that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach at
least one trial witness was or should have been properly excluded.
[44]
6 of these 8 state supreme courts in 12 of these eighteen
decisions sanctioned the admission of one or more convictions to
impeach the accused. [45] 1 of these eight state supreme courts
sanctioned or ruled in 1 case that two "felony" convictions
proffered to impeach the accused should have been excluded. [46] 5
of these eight state supreme courts in 8 of the eighteen decisions
sanctioned the admission of multiple convictions to impeach the
accused or that would have been admitted to impeach the accused
should he have decided to testify, and only one of these courts in
one decision decided to exclude multiple convictions of the
accused. [47]
2 of these eight state supreme courts in 3 of the eighteen
decisions between 1990-2004, the period under study in this
article, sanctioned or authorized the admission of one or more
convictions to impeach witnesses other than the accused.[48] 2 of
these eight state supreme courts in 2 of the eighteen decisions
during the period, 1990-2004, under study in this article,
sanctioned or ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly
proffered to impeach a witness other than the accused, including a
key agent of a civil party, should have been or were properly
excluded. [49]
To recap, in three of five decisions when the witness was
not the accused against whom prior convictions were offered to
impeach, state supreme courts interpreting standards identical to
those of the federal rule, sanctioned the admission of one or more
convictions proffered to impeach. In two of the three decisions
sanctioning admission, the witness impeached was a prosecution
witness, while in one of the two cases in which one of these state
supreme courts sanctioned exclusion of a conviction to impeach,
when the witness was not the accused, the witness was also a
prosecution witness.
On the other hand, when the accused was the
witness against whom convictions were offered to impeach, these
state supreme courts affirmed trial judges, and sanctioned the
admission of convictions to impeach in twelve of thirteen
decisions.
7 of 8 of these state supreme courts, in 13 of these 18
decisions(72%) either sanctioned a trial attorney's failure to
raise or rely on the argument that a conviction proffered to
impeach one of his witnesses was irrelevant, or the trial judge's
failure to even attempt to articulate why the conviction was
relevant to prove propensity to lie, or failed to make their own
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independent assessment of relevance, or
substituted its
characterization of the charge as meeting its criteria of
"dishonesty" or "false statement", or resorted to the historical
heuristic that all felonies per se were relevant and had some
probative value to prove propensity to lie. [50]
As a result,
these 7 supreme courts collectively sanctioned the admission of all
of the following irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie
convictions as impeachment evidence: armed robbery(multiple cases),
assault with intent to do bodily harm, attempted robbery, breaking
into a vehicle, burglary, carrying a concealed weapon, felony riot,
involuntary manslaughter, manslaughter, murder, rape, receipt of
stolen property, reckless endangerment, robbery, shooting with
intent to kill, shoplifting, theft, theft by check, unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle, and unlawful possession of a firearm. [51]
By rule in these states whose rule mimicked the federal rule,
irrelevant, and even marginally relevant convictions must be
excluded.
These state supreme courts for the most part ultimately
failed in most of these decisions to competently apply the
appropriate standard required by their identical rule, including
when applicable the correct balancing evaluation.
The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals strayed even further from basic evidence
principals and policies and the Oklahoma rule by not only admitting
irrelevant convictions to impeach the accused, but also sanctioning
in three of four cases the admission to impeach the accused with a
conviction for a crime similar to one or more of the charges
currently being tried. [52]
3.1.2
State Supreme Courts Whose Rule Mimicked the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in
Interpreting The State's Rule
Four of these eight state supreme courts expressly asserted
in at least one of their decisions during the period under study in
this article, 1990-2004, an intention to adopt the policy that the
interpretation of their rule authorizing the possible admission of
convictions to impeach may be guided by the official commentary,
definitions, and interpretations of the federal rule which their
rule mimics. [53]
Two of these courts, for example, relied on
federal precedent or expressly asserted that its definition of
crimes of "dishonesty" and "false statement" would be guided by the
definitions of those concepts suggested in the official commentary
to the federal rule. [54] One of the state supreme courts making
this assertion actually adhered to this reliance on the federal
rule interpretive guideline as a significant element in its basis
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of decision. [55] On the other hand, both the Oklahoma and South
Carolina Supreme Courts' reliance on the federal rule in one case
was inconsistent with a holding of those courts on this issue in
other decisions within just a few years of the decisions
acknowledging the propriety of relying on the federal rule. [56]

3.1.3 & 3.1.4
State Supreme Courts Whose Rule Mimicked the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 2 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Likelihood
that these Courts Examined the trial record to determine
if trial judge had made the appropriate Rule standard
Evaluation & Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard
to Evaluate and Determine the Admissibility of
Convictions to Impeach
In only 3 of these eighteen decisions(17%), did a state
supreme courts hold that the trial judge's admissibility decision
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected
error. [57] In 16 of these 18 decisions(89%), all eight federal
rule mimicking state supreme courts failed to competently perform
the evaluation required by the appropriate standard(s) of its rule
as the basis for review of the trial judge's decision, or to guide
its own decision making. [58]
Most egregiously, as already
discussed, seven of these courts failed in 74% of these decisions
to require trial judges or themselves to consistently adhere to the
most basic admissibility rule requirement, that evidence must be
relevant on the issue for which it was offered, here as proof of a
propensity to lie. [59] This was true despite the fact that in
several of the cases, the courts did make reference to and even
restated their states' rule standards. [60]
3.1.5
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 3 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Whether &
How These Courts Defined and Evaluated for Admission
Convictions for Crimes of "Dishonesty" or "False
Statement"
The rules in these jurisdictions authorize per se admission
of convictions characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement". [61] Yet neither the federal rule or the rules of
these states included specific definitions of these concepts,
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although commentary to the federal rule suggested a narrow
definition of these concepts designed to make convictions which
qualified for per se admission logically relevant as proof of
propensity to lie. [62] Hence the state supreme courts were left
with the obligation and the opportunity to define these terms for
the purpose of providing policy guidance to trial judges and lower
appellate courts. Yet none of these eight state supreme courts
during the fifteen year period of this study expressly acknowledged
the failure of the federal rule and their state rules mimicking the
federal rule to define "dishonesty" or "false statement".
Nor did
any of these state supreme courts expressly generally define or
even attempt to define during the study period "dishonesty" or
"false statement". In fact in only 6 of these eighteen decisions
did five of these eight state supreme courts focus on this issue.
[63]
Three of these state supreme courts held that convictions
for burglary, theft related crimes, and even robbery were
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty", thereby sanctioning the per
se admission of the convictions at issue, and signalling to trial
judges that these concepts should be broadly defined as a basis for
per se impeachment of any witness. [64] On the other hand, the New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that a trial judge had discretion to
exclude a prosecution witness' juvenile adjudication for what it
characterized as a crime of dishonesty or false statement, by
sanctioning evaluation of admissibility by resort to the evidence
code's residuary policy balancing exclusionary rule. [65] The Iowa
Supreme Court similarly, but based on an obvious conceptual error
in interpreting the standards of its rule, departed from the per se
admission of convictions characterized as involving dishonesty or
false statement by requiring a balancing evaluation to determine
admissibility, even after a conviction was so cast, thereby giving
unwarranted protection to an accused. [66]
3.1.6
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 4 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
Were Courts to Rule Standards When the Basis for
Admission of Conviction to Impeach was Preliminarily
that The Potential maximum punishment exceeded a year
in Prison
State Supreme Courts with an evidence rule that mimics the
federal rule, when the conviction is not for a crime of dishonesty
or false statement, and the alleged error is a cognizable issue on
appeal, by rule are required to review a trial judge's decision to
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assure that the conviction preliminarily qualifies as one for a
crime punishable by more than a year in prison, and that the
appropriate balancing test was employed and the appropriate
evaluation was done. [67] Six of these eight state supreme courts
in 12 of these eighteen decisions in which the admission to impeach
on this basis was at issue, almost never thoroughly examined the
record to determine if the trial judge had performed, nor evaluated
the quality of the trial judge's performance of the appropriate
balancing evaluation. [68]
Even more significantly, the courts
failed to undertake such an evaluation themselves.
First, as previously discussed, these courts in 11 of these
decisions failed to perform competently the first step in both
balancing evaluations, a minimally competent assessment of whether
the conviction at issue was even relevant to prove propensity to
lie. [69] The North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, presumed,
in direct conflict with the implications of its rule's standards,
that all "felonies" were relevant to prove propensity to lie, and
therefore the court did not make its own assessment of the
relevance of the crimes that were the basis of each of the three
convictions it sanctioned to impeach the accused. [70]
More
significantly, the decision signalled to all trial judges in North
Dakota that they too could forego the rule required evaluation of
relevance of a "felony" conviction as proof of a propensity to lie,
and simply assume not only relevance but probative value.
The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals went even further in nullifying
the rule imposed need to find that a conviction was relevant to
prove propensity to lie by holding that anytime the accused takes
the stand in his own defense, the prosecution may automatically
admit the number of times the accused was previously convicted of a
"felony", but not necessarily the name/nature of those convictions.
[71]
Additionally these two state supreme courts were joined by
the New Mexico Supreme Court in eschewing the policy analysis
required by their rules' balancing standards, and instead empowered
themselves to remake the rule, by resort to heuristic hunches that
the court had created. [72] The North Dakota Supreme Court, for
example, asserted that if the conviction is for a crime similar to
a crime currently being prosecuted that is a reason to exclude, but
if a conviction is for a dissimilar crime it favors admission. [73]
This is a significant conceptual error because while similarity
may increase the unfair prejudice that will result if it is
admitted to impeach, significant unfair prejudice results when even
a dissimilar conviction is admitted to impeach. [74]
The New
Mexico Supreme Court in evaluating the admissibility of a felony
conviction, not involving dishonesty or false statement, asserted
it had developed a six factor evaluation - (1) nature of crime in
relation to its impeachment value as well as its inflammatory
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impact, (2) date of the conviction and witness's subsequent
history, (3) similarities, and the effect thereof, between the
conviction and current crime charged, (4) a correlation of
standards expressed in rule 404, (5) the importance of the
"defendant's" testimony, and (6) centrality of the credibility
issue. [75]
These state supreme courts then compounded the risk that
trial judges now faced with the rule and its standards, and these
court created heuristics were more likely to reach disparate
results, by failing to establish uniform state-wide standards
adequately defining each of these factors, the significance of each
of these factors, nor the interrelationship and hierarchy among
these factors. Significantly, for example, none of these supreme
courts adopting this multi-factor analysis, have recognized that
neither the importance of the witness' testimony nor the importance
of the credibility issue are factors which add an iota to the
relevance---probative value of a conviction to prove propensity to
lie, but both independently and collectively increase the danger
that unfair prejudice will result from the admission of the
conviction. [76] Nor did they recognize that these two factors
were per se slanted towards favoring admission of convictions
against any party witness, particularly the accused, who chooses to
testify in a criminal case. [77]
State Supreme Court decisions in which review of the trial
judge's evaluation, and/or an independent evaluation of the factors
are made by definition provide better guidance to trial judges and
other lawyers. For example the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
at the beginning of this study's period of evaluation, 1990,
expressly found that it was error for the trial judge in admitting
only two of six convictions of the accused in a criminal case
ostensibly to impeach him, to choose to admit the only two
convictions which were for crimes similar to the crime currently
being prosecuted. [78] The court expressly found that such similar
crime convictions are more likely to result in the jury convicting
the accused based on a substantive propensity inference. [79]
3.1.7
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 5 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine The Quality of
These Courts Identification and Evaluation of Pertinent
Exclusionary Concerns/Particularly Unfair Prejudice
In these eighteen decisions, the state supreme courts almost
never examined the trial record to determine if the trial judge had
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followed the component of their rule required balancing evaluation
that mandated the identification and evaluation of the rule
identified exclusionary concerns implicated by the facts of the
case. Nor in these decisions did the courts as required by their
rule identify and evaluate themselves the rule identified
exclusionary concerns implicated by the facts of the case. Instead
of the systematic evaluation required by the rule, these courts for
example relied on more court created junk science heuristics to
denigrate the significance of implicated exclusionary concerns.
[80]
In summary these eight supreme courts in these eighteen
cases, proved that the adoption of the intended significantly more
restrictive than the common law current federal rule standards with
regard to impeachment via convictions, did not necessarily matter.
State Supreme Court Justices in these jurisdictions systematically
failed to review the trial record to determine if the trial judge
had identified and employed the correct one of three available
standards of the rule, and failed to independently identify and
apply these standards in their own evaluations.
Part 3

4.1.1

Substantive Points & Perspectives --- Studies
in Federalism Part 2 - 24 Jurisdictions with
Overall More Restrictive than Federal Rule Admission
Standards re Convictions to Impeach - State Supreme
Courts's Decisions - 1990-2004
Studies in Federalism - Overall More Restrictive
Rules than Federal Rule 24 States' Supreme
Courts Decisions 1990-2004 - Basic
Case Demographics & Outcomes

There were potentially twenty-four state supreme courts who
could have during the period of this study,1990-2004, interpreted
an evidence rule that overall more restrictively than the current
federal rule, admitted convictions to impeach. [81] 20 of the
twenty-four state supreme courts made seventy-one pertinent
admission of conviction to impeach decisions during the period of
this study, 1990-2004. [82]
15 of these twenty state supreme
courts in 39 of these 71 decisions(56%) authorized or sanctioned
the admission of one or more convictions ostensibly to impeach at
least one trial witness. [83] 15 of these twenty state supreme
courts in 32 of these 71 decisions(44%) sanctioned or held that
under their respective standards, one or more convictions proffered
to impeach at least one trial witness was properly excluded or
should have been or arguably should have been excluded. [84]
14 of these twenty of these state supreme courts in 31 of
these 71 decisions sanctioned the admission or authorized the
possible admission of one or more convictions to impeach the
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accused. [85] 11 of these twenty state supreme courts, including
seven courts which had also sanctioned the admission of convictions
to impeach the accused, in 14 of these 71 decisions sanctioned
the exclusion or authorized the possible exclusion of one or more
convictions to impeach the accused. [86]
9 of these twenty state
supreme courts in
17
of these
71 decisions sanctioned the
admission or authorized the possible admission of multiple
convictions to impeach the accused. [87] 4 of these twenty state
supreme courts in 4 of these 71 decisions sanctioned the exclusion
or authorized the possible exclusion of multiple convictions to
impeach the accused. [88]
5 of these twenty state supreme courts in 8 of these 71
decisions sanctioned a trial judge's admission of a conviction, or
ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach
a witness other than the accused, including civil parties, was or
should have been properly admitted for that purpose. [89] 9 of
these twenty state supreme courts in 18 of these 71 decisions
sanctioned a trial judge's exclusion of a conviction, or ruled that
one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach a witness
other than the accused, including civil parties, should have been
excluded. [90]
To recap, in 18 of 26 (69%) decisions when the witness was
not the accused against whom convictions were offered to impeach,
state supreme courts interpreting standards which overall
authorized admission of convictions for this purpose more
restrictively than the federal rule, sanctioned the exclusion of
one or more convictions proffered to impeach. When the witness to
be impeached was a prosecution witness, these state supreme courts
sanctioned the exclusion of convictions to impeach in 12 of 17(71%)
of those decisions. On the other hand, when the accused was the
witness against whom convictions were offered to impeach, these
state supreme courts sanctioned or authorized exclusion of
convictions to impeach in only 14 of 45(31%) of those decisions.
Despite the fact that these 20 state supreme courts were
interpreting rules with overall more restrictive standards than the
federal rule, in 31 of the 71 decisions(45%) included in this
study, 14 of these courts sanctioned the admission of one or more
irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie convictions to impeach a
witness by ignoring the trial judge's failure to even attempt to
articulate why the conviction was relevant to prove propensity to
lie, or failing to make their own independent assessment of
relevance, or by substituting their characterization of the charge
as meeting its criteria for involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement", or by reliance on the historical heuristic that all
felonies per se were relevant and had some probative value to prove
propensity to lie, or by reliance upon the even more illogical and
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unfairly prejudicial heuristic that if the accused claims he is
innocent at trial, evidence of a prior conviction for the same or
similar crime is relevant to prove the falsity of that claim. [91]
Included in the irrelevant to prove propensity to lie convictions
admitted by these courts were: aggravated battery, aggravated
assault, aggravated robbery, armed robbery, arson, assault with a
deadly
weapon,
attempted
murder,
attempted
robbery,
burglary(multiple times by multiple supreme courts), check
kiting/felony theft, confinement, conspiracy to commit murder,
conspiracy
to
commit
robbery,
criminal
sexual
assault/conduct(multiple times), delivery and distribution of
cocaine(multiple times), drug distribution, escape(multiple times),
immoral acts with a child, kidnapping, larceny, lewd conduct with a
minor(against the accused), misdemeanor theft, murder, possession
of a contraband substance(in multiple cases), possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a
firearm, rape(multiple times by multiple courts), receipt of stolen
property, robbery(multiple times), sexual battery, sexual contact
with a minor, shoplifting, theft(by multiple courts), unlawful use
of a weapon by a felon, and use of an automobile for purpose of
sale of drugs. [92]
The Connecticut Supreme Court went even further. The court
endorsed the tactic of "sanitizing" convictions not directly
probative" of dishonesty; ostensibly to mitigate unfair prejudice
to the witness, but in fact keeping from the jury the irrelevancy
of these convictions as proof of a propensity to lie. [93]
Furthermore, avoiding unfair prejudice to a witness as opposed to a
party is not one of the policy goals of the Connecticut or any
other state impeachment with convictions rule. There is evidence
in these cases that the only pertinent unfair prejudice, that to
the parties, is not mitigated by first telling the jury that an
irrelevant to prove propensity to lie "felony" convictions is
relevant only for that purpose, and then provide the jury with the
opportunity to speculate as to the nature of the crime which was
punishable by more than one year in prison. [94]
Jurors are
thereby freed by the court's doublespeak to draw, which they did in
these cases, and act upon the relatively obvious and logical
inference, that they are to use their common sense, and use the
fact that the witness is a convicted felon, currently accused of a
felony(perhaps the same "felony"), as a factor favoring his
conviction. [95]
Despite the fact that these twenty state supreme courts were
interpreting rules which were overall more restrictive than the
federal rule, did not prevent 11 of these courts in 19 decisions,
from sanctioning the admission of crimes to impeach the accused
which were identical or very similar to one or more of the charges
currently being tried. [96]
On the other hand, 8 of these
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courts(including four of the same courts which had admitted such
similar crime convictions) in 10 decisions during the study period,
held that similar crime convictions of the accused should have been
excluded as impeachment evidence. [97]
State supreme courts sanctioned such same crime convictions
even when the record proved the accused declined to testify, and
had expressly argued that the admission of such a conviction would
or did force him to forego testifying, even in instances when the
accused alleged that this result violated his constitutional
rights. [98] The Minnesota Supreme Court sanctioned this outcome,
even when a lower appellate court had ruled that admitting such a
same crime conviction, which would prevent the accused from
testifying, violated both the national and state constitutions
right to testify in his own defense. [99]
One of these courts
sanctioned the admission of multiple similar crime convictions in
part on the theory that the trial judge prohibited reference to the
specific names of the convictions. [100] One of these courts did
hold that the admission of a similar crime conviction ostensibly
only to impeach was likely to increase the risk that the resulting
unfair prejudice would influence the merits to the point that
justified the exclusion of the conviction. [101] The defense in
this case presented sufficient evidence to raise a serious factual
dispute of whether the accused was guilty of the current charge of
sexual battery. [102]
4.1.2
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Restrictive than the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in
Interpreting Their States' Rules
These state supreme courts did not consistently acknowledge
and identify how at least one or more of their standards for
admitting convictions to impeach was different than the federal
rule's standards, although on occasion, a court did expressly
assert that the standard by design rejected the standards of the
federal rule. [103] On the other hand, five of these state supreme
courts did compare and contrast their standards for admitting
convictions to impeach with the federal rule, and expressly
asserted an intent to rely on the federal rule and its legislative
history as guidance. [104]
At least two of these five courts
expressly adopted the policy of being guided by the federal rule
with regard to the definitions of categories of crimes qualifying
for possible admission to impeach, or with regard to the balancing
evaluation that its rule and the federal rule required before a
"felony" conviction could be admitted to impeach a witness. [105]
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One of these courts, however, failed to cite to the federal rule's
commentary which evaluated theft and found it was not a crime of
dishonesty and therefore lacked probative value to prove propensity
to lie. [106] Instead, the Maryland Court of Appeals, earlier in
the same opinion, had characterized theft as the embodiment of
deceit. [107]

4.1.3 & 4.1.4
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Restrictive than the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 2 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Number &
Percentage of the Cases in Which the Courts Examined
the trial record to determine if trial judge had made
the appropriate Rule standard Evaluation & The Number
& Percentage of the Decisions in Which the Courts
Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard to Evaluate and
Determine the Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
In 24 of these 72 decisions(36%), one of these twenty state
supreme courts held that the trial judge's admissibility decision
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected
error. [108] These twenty state supreme courts, only in a small
minority of the pertinent decisions during the study period took
the first analytic step in adhering to the restrictions in their
rules which were greater than those found in the federal rule, by
expressly reviewing the trial record to determine if the trial
judge was faithful to those restrictions. [109]
Even more
importantly, these courts in most of these decisions failed to
perform competent evaluations of their own rules, especially the
restrictions in their rules that made their rules less liberal
overall than the federal rule in admitting convictions to impeach.
[110] Most egregiously, as already discussed, seventy-five percent
of these courts in forty-five percent of these seventy-five cases,
failed to require trial judges or themselves to consistently adhere
to the most basic admissibility requirement, that evidence must be
relevant on the issue proffered, here as proof of a propensity to
lie. [111]
In perhaps the most startling example, of ignoring more
stringent exclusionary standards, the Georgia Supreme Court was
forced to acknowledge, but did not explain why it had erroneously
sanctioned in 1998 the admission of a felony conviction to impeach
the accused, despite the fact that its rule standard required
blanket exclusion of such convictions to impeach the accused unless
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he first placed his character at issue. [112]
Even this
acknowledgement of error, however, did not make reference to the
fact that in the interim the court had sanctioned prosecutorial
introduction of same crime conviction evidence against the accused
by merely resorting to the illegal and specious tactic of asking on
cross-examination if the accused had a character for the trait
reflected in the same crime conviction, and when the accused denied
the trait, admitting the conviction to impeach the denial. [113]
There were exceptions.
The outstanding exception was the
strong policy advocacy of its rule prohibiting the use of
convictions to impeach by the Montana Supreme Court. [114]
In
addition, multiple times the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the
performance of trial judges in admitting convictions to impeach.
[115] Most of these reviews, however, were triggered by flagrant
failures of trial judges to follow the standards of the rule, which
were the standards originally developed in decisions of the state
supreme court. [116] Review, however, did not necessarily mean
reversal for flagrant failures to follow those standards. [117]
In addition, 6 other of these twenty supreme courts, joined
the Illinois Supreme Court by ostensibly providing guidance for
their trial judges by restating the sequential evaluation protocol
required by its rule, or by expressly allocating the burden of
proof on this issue, or expressly requiring that every trial judge
place their rule evaluation on the record, or less effectively by
adding the court's own guidelines, or a combination of these
actions. [118] Four of these state supreme courts detailing their
standards and identifying and using protocols to apply/enforce
accurate application of their rule's standards, were among the six
of the twenty state supreme courts interpreting overall more
restrictive, than the federal standards, rules making decisions
during the study period, which did not admit a conviction clearly
irrelevant to impeach. [119] The fifth and sixth state supreme
courts not admitting irrelevant convictions during the study period
were those of Kansas and Montana. [120]
In the other three state supreme courts, review of whether
trial judges had adhered to the standard, and even express
articulation and employment of the standard by the supreme court to
guide its own review, did not assure, however, that a minimally
competent substantive evaluation/application of the standard would
be undertaken by the court or required of trial judges. [121] The
Washington Supreme Court nullified its own substantive standards
and procedural protocols simply by broadly characterizing crimes
for which an accused had been convicted as involving "dishonesty",
and therefore per se admissible to impeach. [122]
At times during the study period, the Connecticut Supreme
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Court seemed to completely abandon its standard in favor of a
sequence of rough heuristics. First, the court took the position
that convictions generally were inadmissible to impeach at least
the accused, but that felony convictions for crimes such as
larceny, that it thought implicated lack of veracity, were almost
per se admissible, and any felony conviction which were not, were
still admissible, but the name of the offense should be withheld
from the jury. [123]
The court seemed to be operating on a
sequence of not necessarily consistent hunches.
First, if a
witness has committed a serious crime that is not logically
probative of lying, the witness is a person of general bad
character, and therefore more likely to lie during testimony. The
jury should therefore learn of this conviction, but the jury should
not hear the name of the crime of which the witness was convicted,
because if they do, they will believe the witness is a specific
type of bad person, and focus on that, and this is unfair to the
witness, even if the witness is not the accused in a criminal case.
[124] This court's real standard thereby jettisoned both the state
rules' focus on logical relevance as a minimal admission
requirement, and an evaluation of unfair prejudice to the litigants
because the admission of convictions increases the likelihood of
non-merit based decision making by the jury.
The court also
endorsed employment by trial judges of unproven, heuristic-hunch
based factors in addition to rule factors for use in the evaluation
of whether a conviction should be admitted for impeachment
purposes. [125] Connecticut Supreme Court Justices, as was true
during the study period of justices on state supreme courts
interpreting overall more liberal standards than the federal rule,
endorsed the idea that the significance of the testimony of a
witness, increases the probative value of a conviction offered to
impeach. [126] Of course as a matter of logic, this is patently a
false inference to draw. Instead, the logical inferences are that
the introduction of the conviction will, given the significance of
the testimony, heighten the potential for unfair prejudice as the
basis for deciding the merits of the case, while leaving completely
unchanged the relevance/probative value of the conviction as proof
of propensity to lie. The Connecticut Supreme Court in its rule
required assessment of unfair prejudice eyeballed, minimized, and
underestimated the significance of unfair prejudice that results
when convictions are admitted to impeach. [127]
The court also
relied on another unproven heuristic, that all prosecution
witnesses with regard to this issue should be lumped together,
including the alleged victim of the crime, and that generally it is
unlikely that the introduction of a conviction of any prosecution
witness will result in any unfair prejudice to the government's one
fair opportunity to convict. [128]
The Illinois Supreme Court in several decisions during the
study period abandoned its rule standard's required balancing
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evaluation, and upheld the admission of multiple felony convictions
to impeach the testimony of the accused, despite the fact that all
of these convictions were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie.
[129] The court multiple times acknowledged that the record failed
to prove that the judge had expressly undertaken the sequential
evaluations required by its balancing standard, and failed to make
its own crime specific relevance/probative value assessment
required by its rule. [130] Instead the court asserted or merely
assumed that any felony conviction per se had some unspecified
quantity of probative value to prove propensity to lie, because
they were evidence of propensity to be of general bad character.
[131]
Of course no empirical or any other real evidence was
referred to in support of this totally specious conclusion.
The Illinois Supreme Court further departed from the
balancing evaluation required by its rule, by taking positions that
denigrated or eliminated the significance of exclusionary concerns.
First the court failed to make an assessment of the unfair
prejudice likely to have resulted when these convictions were
admitted. The court compounded this error of omission by an error
of commission-assuming that the unspecified unfair prejudice could
be mitigated by the fiction that a limiting instruction is likely
to dissipate that prejudice. [132]
Third, the court simply
abandoned even a semblance of following its own rule of law, by
endorsing the fundamentally specious heuristics that similar crime
convictions should be admitted to impeach when the accused claims
to be innocent at this trial, when he in fact was previously
convicted of the same crime, and that naming the offense underlying
that conviction reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. [133]
Obviously both assertions are conceptually flawed, and are
tantamount to negating the evidence rule barring propensity
evidence to prove substantive guilt.
As a result, the court
sanctioned in several decisions the admission of convictions for
crimes identical or very similar to crimes for which the accused
was currently standing trial. [134]
4.1.5
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Restrictive than the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 3 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Whether &
How These Courts Defined and Evaluated for Admission
Convictions for Crimes of "Dishonesty" or "False
Statement"
Fourteen(14) of the twenty state supreme courts who made
pertinent decisions during the fifteen year period of this study,
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were interpreting ten rule standards which were not only overall
more restrictive than the federal rule, but were also more
restrictive than that rule for all witnesses(8 standards and twelve
states) or the accused(two standards - one in each of two states),
with regard to admission of convictions to impeach on the basis
that the crime underlying the conviction was characterized as
involving "dishonesty", "false statement", or similar concepts.
[135] These states either excluded admission of such convictions
to impeach the accused or required exclusion or a balancing
evaluation before such convictions could be admitted against any
witness. [136] The rules in ten of these fourteen states included
express reference to the concepts of "dishonesty" and/or false
statement", and in the case of Vermont, the seemingly narrower
concepts of "untruthfulness" and "falsification". [137]
In the
fifteen year period of this study, 1990-2004, none of these ten
courts expressly acknowledged that their rule which was enacted or
amended in most of these states after the federal rule's enactment,
like that rule, failed to define the concepts "dishonesty" and
"false statement". Even more significantly, none of these courts
undertook to generally define these concepts, despite the fact that
even in these states these concepts were often liberally employed
by these courts as important factors favoring the admission of
convictions to impeach.
The Montana Supreme Court enforced its rule's ban on use of
any conviction to impeach any witness, including even convictions
for crimes properly characterized as involving dishonesty or false
statement. [138] The Montana Supreme Court, in the context of both
civil and criminal cases, made an express reference to that ban,
and asserted a policy preference to strictly enforce it. [139] The
Montana Supreme Court as well as the Hawaii Supreme Court which
excluded such convictions to impeach the accused, also held
however, during the period of this study, 1990-2004, that while a
witness cannot be impeached with a conviction, the witness can be
confronted with the underlying conduct when it is relevant to
proving a greater likelihood of lying. [140]
Six of the remaining thirteen state supreme courts which
were interpreting rule standards which were overall more
restrictive than the federal rule, and with regard to admitting
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement" to
impeach, but whose standards were less restrictive than the blanket
exclusionary standard of Montana, made pertinent decisions on this
issue during the study period. [141] Four of these six supreme
courts intermittently honored the more restrictive standard(s) of
their rules. [142]
Another of the six state supreme courts
conclusionarily characterized convictions as within its rule's
terms chosen as surrogates for an evaluation of relevance as proof
of a propensity to lie. [143]
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In addition, three of these six courts, despite being
required by rule to identify and balance exclusionary concerns,
failed in some decisions to even attempt to employ a principled
protocol to identify and evaluate exclusionary policies implicated
by the admission of convictions characterized as involving
"dishonesty" or "false statement". [144]
The Tennessee Supreme
Court, for example, even though it ultimately decided that the
convictions for crimes similar to current trial charges should have
been excluded, did not attempt to assess the potential cumulative
unfair prejudice of the prosecution's impeachment of the accused
and subsequent closing argument commentary focusing on that
impeachment.[145]
There were also decisions during the study period made by
the six state supreme courts interpreting rules which overall were
more restrictive than the federal rule in admitting convictions to
impeach, but which were as liberal as the federal rule(per se
admission to impeach) with regard to the admissibility to impeach
with convictions fairly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or
"false statement". [146] One of these courts made reference to its
precedent which is asserted had crafted a general definition of
"dishonesty" and/or "false statement." [147]
This shared standard which authorized per se admission to
impeach of all convictions so characterized, therefore gave these
six state supreme courts a significant incentive, if they wanted to
sanction the admission of convictions to impeach, to be extremely
inclusive in determining which crimes were crimes of "dishonesty",
"false statement" and similar concepts. 4 of the 6 supreme courts
interpreting this standard during the period of this study, 19902004, did just that. [148]
These four courts sanctioned
characterizing attempted robbery, burglary, "check kiting",
misdemeanor shoplifting, receipt of stolen property, robbery, and
theft, as convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement". [149]
None bothered to, but on the other hand in
reality none could, provide a rational explanation of how such
offenses were logically related to proof of greater propensity to
lie. [150]
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court for example which banned
admission of convictions to impeach based solely on the length of
the maximum period of imprisonment, characterized an accused's
conviction for theft of a bike as a conviction of a crime crimi
falsi, therefore dishonesty, and therefore admissible to prove
propensity to lie. [151]
The court's decision thus almost
completely circumvented the rule's closing of the door on the
admission of any felony conviction, by resort to a third level
specious inference that resulted in the forbidden admission of
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irrelevant evidence. The Delaware and Washington Supreme Courts
went so far as to declare all theft crimes to be crimes of
dishonesty, and therefore relevant to prove propensity to lie,
without even attempting to support this assertion with evidence or
logic. [152]
On the other hand, the Delaware, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and
Washington Supreme Courts, sometimes even in the same case when one
of these courts had yielded to the temptation, concluded that an
array of convictions for such offenses as drug trafficking, felony
marijuana possession, kidnapping, misdemeanor criminal mischief,
and possession of weapons were not eligible for per se admission
because they did not qualify as based upon offenses involving
"dishonesty" of "false Statement". [153] The Washington Supreme
Court expressly took the presumptive policy position that few
crimes which could not be characterized as within its broad
definition of involving "dishonesty" or "false statement" were
relevant-probative of veracity. [154]
4.1.6
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Restrictive than the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 4 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
Were These Twenty State Supreme Courts to
Their Rule Standards When the Basis for Admission
of Conviction to Impeach was Preliminarily that The
Potential maximum punishment exceeded 1 year in Prison
Eighteen of the twenty state supreme courts making decisions
during the study period which were interpreting rules which were
overall more restrictive than the federal rule with regard to
admitting convictions to impeach, also had a more restrictive
standard when the conviction offered to impeach qualified at least
for consideration for admission based on the fact that the maximum
sentence for such a conviction exceeded a year in prison, i.e. was
a "felony". [155]
The evidence rules of these states either
required exclusion of such convictions or employed a balancing
standard for at least one category of witnesses which was tilted
more towards exclusion then the federal rule's standard for such
witnesses. [156] The article next evaluates how faithful to these
restrictions were these eighteen state supreme courts in their
almost seventy study period decisions which determined the
admissibility of such convictions to impeach. [157]
There is strong circumstantial evidence that a substantial
majority of these courts were not faithful to their more
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restrictive standards.
The strongest such evidence which this
article has already disclosed, is that 14 of these 18 state supreme
courts in 27 decisions during the fifteen year period of this study
admitted, based solely or significantly on the fact that the
underlying crime was punishable by more than a year in prison,
scores of irrelevant to prove propensity to lie convictions, as
compared to 12 of the same 14 courts excluding such irrelevant
convictions in 16 cases. [158] The overwhelming majority of the
admission of such convictions sanctioned or authorized by these
courts were admissions to impeach the accused in criminal cases,
while the majority of the sanctioned exclusions prevented
impeachment of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. [159]
Irrelevant convictions were admitted in these cases even when the
appeal record provided a basis for concluding that the physical and
eyewitness evidence did not clearly establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. [160] Ironically, the Tennessee Supreme Court
who did not have a more restrictive rule than the federal rule
regulating the admission of "felony" convictions to impeach, in the
context of a factually disputed case in which the prosecutor
repeatedly made reference to the similar crime conviction during
closing argument, did inferentially find sufficient unfair
prejudice to reverse the conviction. [161] The court ruled that
the trial judge committed error by admitting a sexual battery
conviction to impeach the accused witness who was currently charged
with sexual battery, attempted rape, and attempted incest. [162]
The Texas, Arkansas, and Delaware Supreme Courts were
particularly flagrant in ignoring the most basic admission
requirement, and the first mandatory step in their rule required
balancing evaluation - that the evidence must be relevant to the
issue for which it is offered. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
wrote an opinion in which it made the most egregious conceptual
error of asserting that a felony conviction need not be relevant to
prove propensity to lie in order to impeach a witness. [163] The
Arkansas and Delaware Supreme courts simply sanctioned the use of
substantive propensity evidence ostensibly on the theory that a
person previously convicted of the same crime who now claims he did
not commit that crime this time must be lying--he did it before, he
therefore must by lying if he claims or wishes to claim that he did
not do it again during the current prosecution. [164] The Arkansas
Supreme Court recently signalled its endorsement of its right
simply not to follow its rule standard. Instead, the court made
reference to its own decisions which had held that the prosecution
has a right to impeach any accused who chooses to testify with any
felony conviction, including convictions which are similar to those
currently being tried, even if the conviction signals(apparently to
the jury) a unique perversion. [165]
8 of the eighteen supreme courts in 14 decisions were not
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even remotely faithful to their greater restrictions on admitting
"felony" convictions to impeach, often failing to state or giving
no more than the most perfunctory of lip service to the balancing
evaluation required by the more restrictive standard or its
implications for their interpretation task. [166]
These state
supreme courts evaluating the admission to impeach of "felony"
convictions, failed to identify, despite being required by rule, or
poorly evaluated the exclusionary concerns implicated by the
admission of such convictions to impeach, most importantly the
existence and magnitude of the unfair prejudice that was caused or
would have been caused by the admission of the conviction(s). [167]
Exclusionary concerns were ignored to the point that several of
these state supreme courts by fiat sanctioned de facto restoration
of the historical dominant common law rule which admitted almost
any felony conviction to impeach any witness. [168] Failure to
consider exclusionary concerns set the stage for all 8 of these
courts in 11 decisions to sanction the admission of "felonies" to
impeach the accused which were identical or very similar to one or
more of the charges currently being tried. [169]
In the few instances when these state supreme courts did
make policy driven evaluations of the relevance of a proffered
"felony" conviction as proof of propensity to lie, and of
countervailing exclusionary concerns as required by their rule
standards, it made an outcome determinative difference. [170] The
Washington Supreme Court was the only supreme court to make express
reference to the pertinent empirical evidence that proves the great
likelihood of inherent unfair prejudice of the merits anytime a
"felony" conviction record is admitted ostensibly only to impeach a
criminal defendant who opts to testify at his own trial. [171]
4.1.7

State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Restrictive than the Federal
Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data -- Part 5 - Summary

First, several of these twenty state supreme courts
signalled the hundreds of trial judges in their respective states,
that they would not carefully evaluate, correct, or set standards
to facilitate uniform interpretation and obedience to the overall
more restrictive than the federal rule admission of convictions to
impeach standards of their rules. [172] Second, despite the fact
these state supreme courts were interpreting evidence rules overall
more stringent than the federal rule they nevertheless admitted at
least two dozen different felonies, for which there is not a
scintilla of evidence, particularly empirical evidence, to support
the conclusion that a conviction for any one of them was relevant
to prove that the particular witness had a propensity to lie. [173]
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The more restrictive standards also did not prevent these state
supreme courts from sanctioning admission of similar or identical
crime convictions almost always ostensibly to only impeach the
testimony of the accused should he testify. [174]
More troubling is evidence, that the more restrictive
standards were not interpreted in an evenhanded fashion by these
state supreme courts. First, two of these courts, employing a rule
standard that favored the accused or was neutral, within the study
period, sanctioned exclusion of convictions to impeach a
prosecution witness, while sanctioning the admission of convictions
for the same crime when offered to impeach the accused. [175] In
1993 and 1998, just two years before and three years after its
decision sanctioning exclusion to impeach of all of the felony
convictions of a crucial prosecution witness, the Minnesota Supreme
Court sanctioned the admission of felony sexual misconduct
convictions to impeach two defendants charged with sexual
misconduct crimes, finding that they had probative value on the
issue of credibility because they gave the jury a basis to make a
determination of the appellant's credibility. [176] The Minnesota
Court in sanctioning the exclusion of the prosecution's witness'
convictions to impeach held that the admission of the convictions
could have led the jury to believe that the witness was a bad
person who deserved to be a victim, which amounts to influencing
the jury to make its decision on an improper basis. [177] This
obviously important policy consideration which is highly relevant
to an assessment of the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice
which would result from admission of a conviction(s) to impeach was
never mentioned by the court in its decisions which sanctioned the
trial court's admission of an array of felony convictions to
impeach the accused.
The court also employed several other
heuristics to justify exclusion of the prosecution witness
convictions.
Heuristics which were not employed in the cases
admitting felony convictions to impeach the accused. [178]
In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court compounded this
departure from its rule and standards it employed in evaluating the
admissions of convictions to impeach other witnesses by holding
that prior convictions could be admitted against an accused despite
the fact that the conviction and the current charges were for the
same crime, only differing in the degree of the crime. [179] The
court admitted the conviction ostensibly only to impeach on the
basis that the facts underlying the conviction differed from the
facts underlying the current charges. [180] In 1995, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, as was true for almost every state supreme court
which decided this issue, expressly recognized that the proper
normative approach was excluding reference to any underlying facts
when a conviction was admitted for impeachment purposes. [181] By
the end of the fifteen year period of this study, half(ten) of the
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states, whose state supreme courts made at least one pertinent
decision during the study period, and whose rules were overall more
restrictive in admitting convictions to impeach than the federal
rule, had their state supreme courts convert their state standard
to one which more liberally, than the federal rule, admitted
convictions to impeach. [182]
Part 4
5.1
State Supreme Courts and the Use of Convictions to
Impeach - Studies in Federalism Part 3 - 17 States
with Overall More Liberal Rules re Admission
of Convictions to Impeach-State Supreme
Court Interpretations
5.1.1

Studies in Federalism - Overall More Liberal
Rules than Federal Rule - 17 States' Supreme
Courts' Decisions 1990-2004 - Basic
Case Demographics & Outcomes

Seventeen state supreme courts during the period 1990-2004
were potentially to interpret an evidence rule that overall, more
liberally than the current federal rule, admitted convictions to
impeach. [183] 16 of the 17 state supreme courts with an evidence
rule that overall more liberally than the current federal rule,
admitted convictions to impeach, made 61 pertinent admission of
conviction to impeach decisions during the period of this study,
1990-2004. [184] 12 of these 16 state supreme courts in 50 of
these 61 decisions(82%) sanctioned the admission of one or more
convictions ostensibly to impeach at least one trial witness. [185]
7 of these 16
state supreme courts held in
11
of these 61
decisions(18%) sanctioned or held that under their respective
standards, one or more convictions proffered to impeach at least
one trial witness was properly excluded or should have been
excluded. [186]
11 of these 16 state supreme courts in 46 of these 61
decisions sanctioned the admission or authorized the possible
admission of one or more convictions to impeach the accused. [187]
3 of these 16 state supreme courts in 4 of these 61 decisions
sanctioned the exclusion, authorized the possible exclusion, or
held a conviction should have been excluded as a basis to impeach
the accused. [188] 9 of these 16 of these state supreme courts
in
23 of these
61
decisions sanctioned the admission or
authorized the possible admission of multiple convictions to
impeach the accused. [189]
3

of these

16

state supreme courts in
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4

of these

61

decisions sanctioned a trial judge's admission of a conviction, or
ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach
a witness other than the accused, including civil parties, was
admissible. [190] 6 of these 16 state supreme courts in 7 of
these
61 decisions sanctioned a trial judge's exclusion of a
conviction, or ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly
proffered to impeach a witness other than the accused, including
civil parties, was properly excluded or should have been excluded.
[191]
To recap, in only 4 of 11 (36%) decisions when the witness
was not the accused against whom convictions were offered to
impeach, did the state supreme courts interpreting standards which
overall more liberally than the federal rule admitted convictions
for this purpose, sanctioned the admission of one or more
convictions proffered to impeach. In six of seven of the cases
sanctioning exclusion, the witness protected was a prosecution
witness, while in two of the four cases in which a state supreme
court sanctioned the admission of a conviction to impeach, when the
witness was not the accused, the witness was a criminal defense
witness, and never a prosecution witness. On the other hand, when
the accused was the witness against whom convictions were offered
to impeach, these state supreme courts sanctioned the admission of
convictions to impeach in 46 of 50(92%) of their decisions.
Unlike with some of the states with overall more
restrictive rules than the current federal rule regulating
admission of convictions to impeach, all but two of these sixteen
state supreme courts were interpreting rules which authorized the
admission of irrelevant "misdemeanor" convictions, irrelevant
"felony" convictions, or both as a basis for impeaching all or a
category of witnesses. [192] It is therefore not surprising that
in 39 of these 61 decisions(64%), 11 of these 16 state supreme
courts sanctioned the admission of just more than 60 different
crime convictions, many of them multiple times by multiple courts,
to impeach one or more witnesses, all of which were irrelevant as
proof of propensity to lie. [193]
While intellectually
inconsistent with basic evidence admission standards, it is not
even shocking that two of these courts sanctioned trial judges
admission to impeach any witness, including the accused in a
criminal case, with convictions that these courts expressly
acknowledged were not relevant or at best only slightly probative
of "dishonesty"/propensity to lie. [194]
Included in the
irrelevant convictions admitted ostensibly only to impeach were
convictions for: aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated
kidnapping,
armed
burglary,
armed
robbery,
assault(multiple courts), assault and battery, assaults with
dangerous weapons(multiple times by multiple courts against the
accused), assault with a deadly weapon-a knife, assault with a
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dangerous weapon-a sharp instrument, assault with intent to commit
murder, including with a sharp instrument(multiple times), assault
with intent to rape(multiple times by multiple courts), assault
with intent to rob(multiple times), attempted burglary, attempted
rape, breaking and entering(multiple times by multiple courts),
breaking and entering, breaking and entering a home with a knife
with the intent to commit armed-robbery, burglary(multiple times),
car theft, conspiracy to commit murder,
cocaine trafficking,
criminal contempt, defacing a firearm, escape, delivery of cocaine,
delivery of a controlled substance, disorderly conduct, domestic
abuse-assault, driving to endanger, death resulting, driving under
the influence, entry into a building with the intent to commit a
felony(multiple times), illegal possession of a knife, illegal
possession of a sawed off shotgun, kidnapping, larceny(multiple
times), larceny of a motor vehicle, leaving the scene of an
accident, malicious wounding, misdemeanor trespass, misdemeanor use
of a weapon, seventeen unspecified misdemeanors, murder(multiple
times by multiple state supreme courts), narcotics, obstruction of
a police officer, personal and two corporate pollution related
convictions, possession of burglary tools, possession of a
controlled substance(multiple times by multiple courts), possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute(multiple times
by multiple courts), possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, receipt of stolen property(multiple times), rape,
robbery(multiple times against the accused), sale and delivery of
cocaine,
sexual
abuse(multiple
times),
sexual
assault,
theft(multiple times), threatening phone calls, trespass, unlawful
possession of ammunition, unlawful possession of a firearm, and
uttering a check. [195] 9 of these 16 state supreme courts in 23
of these 61 decisions sanctioned not only the admission of
convictions of crimes to impeach the accused which were irrelevant
as proof of propensity to lie, but which were also identical or
similar to one or more of the charges currently being tried. [196]
5.1.2
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's
Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in
Interpreting Their States' Rules
Two of these sixteen state supreme courts expressly adopted
the general policy of using the federal evidence rules as guidance
in determining if a conviction should be admitted to impeach, but
at the same time reserving to themselves ultimate authority to
determine their state's approach to this issue. [197] The Rhode
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Island Supreme Court, on the other hand, expressly asserted that
their rule was substantively different from the federal rule,
usually as a partial justification for admitting a conviction(s)
against the accused. [198]
5.1.3 & 5.1.4
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's
Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 2 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Number &
Percentage of the Cases in Which the Courts Examined
the trial record to determine if trial judge had made
the appropriate Rule standard Evaluation & The Number
& Percentage of the Decisions in Which the Courts
Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard to Evaluate and
Determine the Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
In 5 of these 61 decisions(8%), four of these sixteen state
supreme courts held that the trial judge's admissibility decision
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected
error. [199] In most of their decisions during the period of this
study, 1990-2004, these sixteen state supreme courts failed to
review the trial record to determine if the trial judge did more
than merely assert, but in fact had conducted the appropriate rule
/rule as interpreted by that court evaluation of whether a
conviction should have been admitted to impeach.[200] In most of
their decisions during the period of this study, 1990-2004, these
sixteen state supreme courts were not faithful to the standards of
their rules, and failed to competently
conduct their own
independent evaluation of whether under the standards of their
rules a conviction should have been admitted to impeach. [201]
Most egregiously, as already discussed, sixty-nine percent(11 of
16) of these supreme courts in sixty-four percent(39 of 61) of
these sixty-one cases, failed to require trial judges or themselves
to consistently adhere to the minimum admissibility requirement,
that evidence must be relevant on the issue for which it is
proffered, here as proof of propensity to lie. [202]
5.1.5
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's
Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 3 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine To what
Degree these courts Were Faithful to their More
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Liberal Standards for the Admission of
Convictions for "Misdemeanor" Not Properly
Characterized as involving "dishonesty" or
"false statement"
The federal rule prohibits the use of misdemeanor convictions
to impeach when those misdemeanor convictions are not properly
characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false statement". [203]
Ten of seventeen of these state supreme courts(and nine of sixteen
courts which made decisions during the period under study in this
article, 1990-2004), however, were interpreting rules which
authorized the potential admission of some such convictions against
at least a category of witnesses. [204]
This meant that seven
states, with overall more liberal than the federal rule admission
of convictions to impeach rules, were not more liberal with regard
to these irrelevant misdemeanor convictions. [205]
There were very few decisions by these sixteen state supreme
courts addressing this issue. The Louisiana Supreme Court and the
New York Court of Appeals did impose a balancing evaluation to
potentially limit their rules' per se admission to impeach of even
irrelevant "misdemeanor" convictions. [206] The imposition of the
balancing evaluation, however, did not prevent the New York Court
of Appeals, from subsequently sanctioning the admission of
seventeen unspecified misdemeanor convictions to impeach the
accused. [207]
Nor did the fact that their evidence rules'
mandated balancing evaluation, prevent the Rhode Island and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts from sanctioning the admission of multiple
irrelevant misdemeanor convictions to impeach the accused, by
placing reliance on the junk science heuristic that any and all
criminal convictions were relevant to prove propensity to lie.
[208] The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently chose to deliberately
ignore the fact that the trial judge made no genuine attempt to
perform the rule required balancing evaluation, including failing
to even mention the court's own array of balancing factors. The
court also failed to conduct a minimally competent evaluation
itself, and ultimately sanctioned the admission of multiple
misdemeanor convictions which were a quarter of century old and
irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie. [209]
The court
sanctioned continued adherence to the purely junk science and
meritless heuristic that any person with any criminal record is
more likely to lie when called as a witness. [210] Finally, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, joined the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
defacto substituting for the identification of exclusionary
concerns required by its rule's balancing evaluation, the illogical
inference that giving of a limiting instruction by the trial judge
was evidence that the trial judge did conduct the balancing
evaluation. [211]
A limiting instruction logically cannot
constitute evidence of a judge's conducting such an evaluation, and
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by itself only signals the possibility that the judge equated and
therefore substituted the limiting instruction for that evaluation.
Of the seven states interpreting rule standards at least as
stringent as the federal rule with regard to admitting
"misdemeanors" to impeach three of these state supreme courts
interpreting rules identical to the federal rule on this issue.
None of their rules defined "dishonesty" or "false statement", and
none of these supreme courts generally defined these concepts
during the period of this study. [212] During the study period,
however, one of the state supreme courts, without an express policy
evaluation, concluded that a guilty plea to the misdemeanor of
giving a false statement to a police officer was within the
definition of the rule's reference to crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement". [213] Another of these three courts, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, conclusionarily asserted that the two
misdemeanor offenses of reckless conduct and simple assault were
not crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement", and therefore were
inadmissible to impeach a prosecution witness. [214]
Finally, the California Supreme Court, one of four of these
sixteen states whose rule barred admission of all "misdemeanor"
convictions to impeach, appeared to remain faithful to this
standard, by asserting that a misdemeanor conviction record was
irrelevant to impeach. [215]
The California Supreme Court,
however, resorted to a junk science heuristic of eyeballing the
conduct underlying the misdemeanor theft in the case, characterized
it as morally depraved, and therefore by sheer hunch, concluded it
was per se relevant proof of propensity to lie. [216] Of course
the court cited to no evidence, and no evidence exist to support
this heuristic. Apparently the court consciously or unconsciously
recognized this reality, because it subsequently, in the very same
decision,
qualified
its
reliance
on
this
heuristic
by
characterizing it as in inference that is not so irrational that a
jury in a specific case may not draw it. [217]
5.1.6
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's
Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 4 - Study
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
Were These Sixteen State Supreme Courts to
Their Rule Standards When their Rules Also
More Liberally than the Federal Rule admitted
Convictions for "felonies"(Punishable by more
than one year in prison) Not Properly Characterized
as Involving "Dishonesty" or "False Statement"
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All sixteen of these state supreme courts interpreting
overall more liberal than the federal rule standards regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach during the study period, were
also interpreting a standard that more liberally than the federal
rule admitted or authorized the possible admission of convictions
to impeach solely because the underlying crime was punishable by a
maximum period of imprisonment of more that one year. [218]
Thirteen of these sixteen state supreme courts were interpreting
rules which authorized per se admission of even those felonies not
properly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement" to impeach all witnesses in both civil and criminal
cases, or in one of these states all witnesses in criminal cases,
and in a second state all witnesses, other than the accused. [219]
This means three states, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin
were interpreting rules whose standards imposed some form of
balancing evaluation, but in all three, a balancing evaluation
tilted more towards admission than at least one of the federal
rule's two balancing standards for such convictions. [220] The
article next evaluates how these state supreme courts in over fifty
of these sixty-one decisions evaluated the admissibility of
convictions to impeach based on the punishment for the underlying
crime exceeding one year. [221]
The three state supreme courts interpreting rules which
required some form of balancing were rhetorically faithful to their
rules by expressly acknowledging that the rules did require that
such a balancing evaluation be undertaken by trial judges. [222] A
majority of the other thirteen state supreme courts, seven, were
not at least rhetorically true to their states' rule standard(s)
because they adopted or continued to impose a balancing evaluation
in assessing if a "felony" convictions should be admitted to
impeach when the only basis for qualifying the conviction for such
admission was that the underlying crime was punishable by a maximum
term of more than one year in prison. [223] This means that a
total of ten of these sixteen state supreme courts were at least
rhetorically committed to requiring trial judges to conduct a
balancing evaluation before admitting "felony" convictions to
impeach. It also means that six of these state supreme courts were
expressly rhetorically faithful to their per se admission of any
"felony" conviction to impeach standard. [224]
The most basic reason for imposing a balancing evaluation
asserted by these state supreme courts was that a conviction should
not be admitted to impeach unless it is relevant---has probative
value as proof of a propensity to lie. [225] While relevance was
noted by these courts, it almost never was assessed directly as a
matter of logical nexus to the theory of its admission or its
correct definition as a fundamental evidence admissions standard.
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Instead, heuristics were substituted, or no analysis was undertaken
at all. [226] Among the other policy reasons offered by the courts
for imposing a balancing evaluation was that if felony convictions
which have little or no relevance as proof of propensity to lie are
automatically admitted to impeach, it risk causing unjust results,
and that the avoidance of unjust results was one of the overall
policy goals the evidence rules as a whole sought to achieve. [227]
Six of the ten state supreme courts which at least paid lip
service to the policy of evaluating admission and exclusion policy
factors, continued or adopted during the period of this study their
own multi-factor, heuristic balancing evaluation guidelines, both
with regard to the definition of such convictions as well as the
factors to be considered, and sometimes the priority to be given
the identified factors. [228] Among those factors were: the nature
of the crime-relevance to credibility, whether the crime involved
dishonesty or false statement, the date and hence the age of the
prior conviction and the witness's criminal record since the
conviction, the similarity between the crime that was the basis of
the conviction and any conduct underlying any of the current crimes
for which the accused is on trial, the disposition of the
conviction, how many times the prosecutor made reference to the
conviction of the accused, the danger that the conviction would be
used for substantive propensity purposes, the importance of the
witness' testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue.
[229]
Despite adoption or adherence to a rule required balancing
evaluation, and the identification of at least heuristics to guide
that evaluation, the majority of these 10 state supreme courts
simply abandoned this protocol substantively, and willy-nilly
sanctioned the admission of scores of irrelevant "felony"
convictions, multiple convictions, scores of similar crime and old
"felony" convictions, and failed to substantively define or give
any genuine consideration to exclusionary policies, especially the
quantity and quality of unfair prejudice that would have or did
result when these convictions were admitted to impeach. [230] They
accomplished this feat by a process which can be fairly
characterized as abandonment of the balancing evaluation, conjuring
up
relevance,
and
disappearing
exclusionary
concerns.
Documentation follows.
First, the three supreme courts required by rule to require
trial judges to conduct balancing evaluations as the basis for
authorizing the admission of "felony" convictions to impeach,
failed to require or conduct themselves the balancing evaluation
required by rule.
Since 1990, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
sanctioned the admission of every "felony" conviction, including
every very old "felony" conviction and every similar or identical
34

"felony" conviction to impeach or potentially impeach the testimony
of an accused in each of its decisions when asked to affirm a trial
judge's decision to admit convictions on behalf of the prosecution.
[231] The New Jersey Supreme Court simply adopted related junk
science heuristics that resulted in the assumption that all
"felony" convictions were relevant to impeach, and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court asserted that its rule, which expressly required a
balancing evaluation, nevertheless had language upon which the
court based the conclusion that any and all such convictions were
admissible to impeach any witness. [232]
There was a multiplicity of reasons for these three and most
of these other ten supreme courts to admit "felonies" to impeach
without any legitimate effort to adhere to the rule required or
self-imposed balancing evaluation. The New York Court of Appeals,
for example, was quite schizophrenic with regard to using
evaluation guidelines. Multiple times the court credited itself
for refusing to establish guidelines for its self-imposed balancing
evaluation. [233]
The Kentucky Supreme Court more expressly
encouraged anarchy by directly asserting that trial judges should
have discretion to identify factors each trial judge believed
pertinent to the determination of whether the admission of a
conviction to impeach would unduly prejudice the case. [234]
Unwittingly, therefore, the Kentucky court was increasing the
likelihood of a lack of uniform identification and prioritization
of the factors trial judges should employ in making the balancing
evaluation to determine if a "felony"conviction should be admitted
to impeach. [235]
The most fundamental way these courts conjured up relevance
to tilt the balancing evaluation towards admitting "felony"
convictions, was endorsed by 4 of the ten state supreme courts.
These four state supreme courts relied on the historical junk
science heuristic, or a closely related junk science heuristic,
that any criminal conviction proves willingness to disobey law or
subordinate the interests of society to the person's own selfinterests, and therefore such a person is more likely to disregard
the trial oath to tell the truth. [236] Four of the ten state
supreme courts, including two of the same courts, conjured up
relevance by simply endorsing and relying upon the closely related
"junk science" presumption that every such conviction has probative
value to prove propensity to lie. [237] A closely related junk and
anti-science heuristic employed by the California Supreme Court was
that admitting a criminal conviction "strips" the false aura of
veracity" from witnessess previously convicted of crime so that the
jury is not misled by their air of respectability. [238]
to

Of course no empirical evidence was offered by these courts
support these junk science heuristics, and the existing
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empirical evidence suggests jurors are more skeptical, even without
learning of prior convictions, of the veracity of witnesses with
much to lose as a result of the outcome of the litigation. [239]
Even more significant, is the fact that studies have also found
that when jurors learn that a witness was previously convicted of a
crime their negative emotional reaction to that person, produces no
significant lessening of their already skeptical view of his
credibility, but does produce, particularly if that person is a
party to the litigation, unfair prejudice, which causes the jury to
regret less returning an outcome contra to the interests of the
stigmatized witness. [240]
These courts also adopted a variety of meritless junk
science heuristics which depended on categorizing "felony"
convictions into a variety of subsets, which category label was
used by these courts to justify their per se or presumptive
admission to impeach.
The New Jersey and Rhode Island Supreme
Courts endorsed the meritless junk science heuristic, that the more
serious the crime underlying the conviction, the more probative of
the accused credibility. [241]
Of course these views are
tantamount to these state supreme courts endorsing use of
irrelevant "felony" convictions to prove propensity to lie, for
whatever use the jury chooses to employ them, including in almost
all of these cases in which the accused was also the witness,
significantly increasing the likelihood of a substantive verdict of
guilty.
The California and Virginia Supreme Courts endorsed the
closely related junk science heuristic that all crimes of "moral
turpitude" were worthy of admission or at least presumptively
admissible to impeach all witnesses, or all witnesses except the
accused, even if their definition of that common law concept was
vague and the meaning which could be discerned made the
categorization irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie. [242]
In four cases, the California Supreme Court relied on the junk
science heuristic that a "felony" conviction properly characterized
as one involving dishonesty, or any such theft conviction per se
involves dishonesty, and therefore either characterization made a
conviction per se relevant to prove propensity to lie. [243]
The Kentucky Supreme Court also broadly characterized,
without generally defining for this purpose, the concept of
dishonesty, concluding that attempted burglary was a crime of
dishonesty and therefore a conviction for this crime had plus
probative value as proof of a lack of credibility. [244]
The
Massachusetts' Supreme Court went even further when it asserted, in
conflict with the intuitions of almost all other state supreme
courts, that violent crimes are not only probative but especially
probative to discredit a witness' credibility. [245] These courts
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of course did not cite and could not cite to any evidence,
empirical or otherwise, to support the reality of these heuristics.
[246] Instead they simply repeated their own historical recitation
of these heuristics.
Three of these ten state supreme courts made the age of the
conviction a significant element of their balancing evaluation,
because these courts embraced the faulty premise that assumed such
a conviction per se had probative value as proof of propensity to
lie which could for the most part only be lost with time, i.e. when
the conviction became remote. [247] The Kentucky Supreme Court
asserted dual components of this heuristic. First, the court held
that the older the conviction the less probative was the conviction
on credibility---but the court did not identify why any "felony"
conviction was by definition relevant to prove propensity to lie.
[248] Second, the court asserted that the older the conviction the
more unduly prejudicial it becomes, on the surmise that the undue
prejudice it did cause becomes more difficult to dispel. [249] No
evidence was cited to support either element of this heuristic, and
in fact the heuristic finds no support in most actual studies of
jury behavior. [250] Decisions of the California, Kentucky, and
others among these ten state supreme courts, endorsing this
balancing factor demonstrated the standardless nature of this
consideration. When given the opportunity, six of these courts
sanctioned the admission to impeach of convictions which at the
time of the trial were more than ten years old, and in several
instances, decades old. [251]
These state supreme courts also conjured relevance by
compounding the previously identified heuristics, and converting
them into the heuristic that if one felony conviction was evidence
of a propensity to lie, multiple felony convictions was independent
relevant proof of the same character trait.
The Rhode Island
Supreme Court endorsed a junk science heuristic employed by trial
judges that all multiple convictions should be admitted, because
together the string of convictions over a period of years,
signalled a crime commission pattern that provided a basis for
inferring disobedience to law, that provided a basis to make a
second level inference that each and all the convictions were
therefore relevant to warrant admission to impeach. [252]
Two
other of these ten state supreme courts took the opposite path down
this same road to judicial anarchy, by intermittent resort to a
junk science admission favoring heuristic that because the trial
judge who had admitted one or more of these irrelevant "felony"
convictions to impeach, had also excluded one or more convictions,
and sometimes had also forbade cross-examination of the accused on
the details of the conviction(s) admitted, the judge must have
conducted a balancing evaluation/an adequate balancing evaluation.
[253] The California Supreme Court adopted another related, but
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equally meritless heuristic that when one or more of these
irrelevant "felony" convictions is properly admitted, the erroneous
admission of other such convictions, even if similar or identical
to the current charge(s), is harmless. [254]
Four of these ten supreme courts conjured up relevance of
convictions to impeach, not by directly attributing a propensity to
lie to the proffered "felony" conviction, but by instead placing
reliance on the anti-science twin heuristics that the greater the
importance of the testimony of the target witness, especially the
accused, the more important was the credibility of that witness,
and therefore the conviction should be admitted to impeach. [255]
As discussed previously, logically, these factors favor exclusion
of such conviction evidence, and not admission. [256]
Disappearing/Denigrating/Diminishing Exclusionary Concerns
Exclusionary interests were ignored or undervalued by these
ten supreme courts. [257] First, two of these courts resorted to a
procedural fiction-the meritless junk science heuristic that a
limiting instruction to the jury, with regard to the permissible
and
impermissible
uses
of
the
convictions
during
their
deliberations, was a significant factor diminishing potential
unfair prejudice [258] The Rhode Island Supreme Court went much
further with this factor, however, sanctioning a trial judge's
elimination of the sequential evaluations required by rule, and
substituting a presumption that any and all convictions were per se
admissible to impeach a witness provided that the judge gave a
limiting instruction as to the use of the conviction. [259] These
courts failed to offer empirical or other evidence to support this
heuristic. Significantly, these courts ignored existing evidence
which documents the likelihood that such limiting instructions are
ineffective, and certainly cannot be asserted as a panacea to the
risks created by the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice which
is likely to result from the admission of one or more convictions
to impeach. [260]
Second, the California Supreme Court was the only one of
these ten state supreme courts to expressly endorse by reference to
authority, other than the evidence rules, a laundry list of
exclusionary policy concerns. [261] On the other hand, that court
was also the only one of these courts to hold that these
exclusionary policies could be offset by the fact that the accused
by testifying waived these concerns, since he testified usually
after a trial judge ruling admitting his conviction to impeach.
[262] No explanation and no evidence was offered by the court to
support this obviously post hoc and junk science heuristic.
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Third, 4 of these ten state supreme courts, despite wide
spread admission of similar convictions documented earlier, adopted
a policy of using as a limiting or exclusionary balancing
consideration the fact that the conviction(s) was similar or
substantially similar to one of the current charges. [263] Two of
these courts expressly endorsed the policy concern that the
admission of a conviction not involving or implicating lying,
especially one similar to a crime currently being tried, would
produce significant unfair prejudice because it could impermissibly
impact the outcome of jury deliberations, since the jury was likely
to convict the accused of the current crime, not because it was to
convinced of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but because he was
a bad man. [264] Even three of the six state supreme courts whose
evidence rules authorized either the per se admission of irrelevant
to prove propensity to lie misdemeanors and/or felonies, approved
use by trial judges of this exclusionary policy consideration.[265]
6 of these seven state supreme courts who recognized the
potential for unfair prejudice if similar crime convictions were
admitted to impeach, accommodated that concern by nevertheless
sanctioning the admission of such convictions provided they were
"sanitized". [266]
"Sanitized" meant that a conviction for a
similar or identical crime could be referred to as a felony
conviction, and the date of the conviction disclosed to the jury,
but not the name, nature, or details of the felony. [267]
In
contrasts to the prevalent reliance on junk science heuristics, the
New Jersey Court made reference to and placed reliance upon
empirical studies to support its adoption of "sanitizing" similar
crime convictions. [268]
The Kentucky Supreme Court sanctioned the broader employment
of the tactic of sanitizing any admitted conviction by omitting
reference to the name of the underlying crime. [269] The Kentucky
Supreme Court, however, reverted immediately to another junk
science heuristic that whatever unfair prejudice that results from
the admission of a conviction to impeach, it is less in civil cases
than in criminal. [270]
The remaining approximately one-half of these sixteen
supreme courts, however, diminished exclusionary concerns,
including concerns with unfair prejudice, by omitting any reference
to or evaluation of the unfair prejudice that would result from the
admission of such same-similar crime convictions, ostensibly only
to impeach.
In addition, while the justices of the California
Supreme Court acknowledged this exclusionary policy factor, they
were willing to let the accused live(or literally die) with the
consequences of subordinating that policy, and sanctioning the
admission of such convictions, even in death penalty cases. [271]
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, despite interpreting a rule which
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required it to balance exclusionary concerns against probative
value to prove propensity to lie, nevertheless held that all a
trial judge need do is state the conclusion that the unfair
prejudice of a conviction(s) as a whole or individually did not
outweigh their probative value with regard to credibility. [272]

5.1.7
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's
Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach
Assessing The Case Outcomes Data -- Summary
The most troubling finding just reported abut the sixteen
supreme courts with overall more liberal rules than the federal
rule with regard to standards for admitting convictions to impeach,
is similar to the most troubling finding that was reported in the
prior section with regard to the state supreme courts who were
interpreting rules overall more restrictive than the federal rule.
There is evidence that these standards were not interpreted in an
evenhanded fashion by these state supreme courts. First, two of
these courts sanctioned exclusion of convictions to impeach a
prosecution witness, while ignoring the fact, or rejecting an
express claim that it had sanctioned admission to impeach the
accused with an identical or similar conviction, even under similar
circumstances, such as the age of the conviction. [273]
Second, some state supreme courts during the period of this
study so broadly sanctioned the admission of convictions to impeach
that they strayed far from the standards and policies of their
rules, and in effect re-ranked the state's rule in relation to the
federal and the standards of other states as interpreted by the
respective supreme courts. [274] For example, decisions by the
Rhode Island and Wisconsin Supreme Courts during the study period,
1990-2004, provide a basis for concluding that the two states which
had the same rule standards, did not have the twelfth most liberal
standard in admitting convictions to impeach, at least with respect
to criminal defendants, but in fact were among a handful of the
most liberal states in admitting convictions to impeach, even when
those convictions are irrelevant and even when they are very likely
to cause great unfair prejudice. [275]
Third, there are multiple cases decided by these courts in
which the admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial
convictions drove the accused from the stand, and thereby played a
significant role in forcing the accused to forego exercise of his
right to testify in his own defense. [276]
Significantly, the
trial record indicated that there was evidence in one of these
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cases, that admission of convictions ostensibly only to impeach was
done in context of a close case as to whether there was proof to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [277] Fourth and finally,
these overall more liberal rule in admitting or authorizing
convictions to impeach state supreme courts, were quick to dismiss
any constitutional complaints the accused made about their liberal
admission of his conviction(s) ostensibly only to impeach his
actual or potential trial testimony. [278]
6.1

Summary Comparisons of Outcomes(6.1.1)
Outcome Assessments(6.1.2)
Identifying The Most
Significant Effects of These
Outcomes/Outcome
Assessments(6.1.3)
Identifying The Most
Significant Causes of
These Outcomes/Outcome
Assessments(6.1.4)
& Recommendations(6.1.5)

6.1.1

Summary Comparisons of Outcomes

Eight of the nine state supreme courts with rule standards
on authorizing convictions to impeach that mimicked the current
federal rules's standards sanctioned or authorized the admission of
one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at least a trial
witness in 83% of their eighteen(15) decisions during the fifteen
year period of this study, 1990-2004. [279] While twenty of the
twenty-four state supreme courts with rule standards which were
overall more restrictive than the federal rule in admitting
convictions to impeach, sanctioned or authorized the admission of
one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at least a trial
witness in 55% of their seventy-one decisions during the study
period. [280] 16 of the 17 state supreme courts with an evidence
rule that overall more liberally than the current federal rule
admitted convictions to impeach sanctioned or authorized the
admission of one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at
least a trial witness in 82% of their sixty-one decisions during
the study period. [281]
This outcome comparison is a gross indicator that a state's
rule standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach may not be a
good predictor of how trial judges will apply, or the rate at which
its state supreme court will carefully evaluate, authorize, or
sanction the use of convictions to impeach. In this comparison,
for example, the state supreme courts reviewing trial judge
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decisions interpreting standards which mimicked the federal rule,
standards which were actually closer to the standards of the more
restrictive admission than the more liberal admission states,
nevertheless, authorized or sanctioned the admission of convictions
to impeach at a very high rate, and in fact at a rate equal to that
of states with more liberal admission standards. This was true
despite the fact that there was no significant difference in the
crime convictions that were sanctioned for use to impeach, and
despite the fact that most of the time in all three sets of state
supreme courts, the convictions sanctioned were irrelevant as proof
of a propensity to lie. [282]
When the accused was the witness to be impeached, state
supreme courts with rule standards authorizing convictions to
impeach that mimicked the current federal rule's standards
sanctioned or authorized the admission of one or more convictions
ostensibly to impeach in ninety-two percent(12 of 13) decisions
during the fifteen year period of this study, 1990-2004. [283] In
the state supreme courts' decisions interpreting
rules whose
standards were overall more restrictive than the federal rule in
admitting convictions to impeach, the justices sanctioned or
authorized the possible admission of one or more convictions to
impeach the accused in 69% (31 of 45)of the cases. [284] In the
state supreme courts' decisions interpreting rules whose standards
were overall more liberal than the federal rule in admitting
convictions to impeach, the justices sanctioned or authorized the
possible admission of one or more convictions to impeach the
accused in ninety-two percent(46 of 50) of the cases. [285]
Hence all three sets of state supreme courts sanctioned or
authorized the admission of convictions to impeach the accused at a
very high rate, and at a much higher rate than when they reviewed
cases involving the issue of the propriety of admitting convictions
to impeach other witnesses.
When the issue on appeal was the
propriety of admitting convictions to impeach other witnesses, the
three sets of supreme courts rate of sanctioning or authorizing the
admission of convictions to impeach was only sixty percent(3 of 5),
thirty-one percent(8 of 26), and thirty-seven percent(4 of 11)
respectively. [286] An even more startling contrasting result is
that in the twenty-six cases in which the issue was the propriety
of impeaching a prosecution witness or witnesses with prior
convictions, these same state supreme courts sanctioned or
authorized the admission to impeach in only twenty-seven percent(7
of 26) of the decisions. [287]
These outcomes in the eight state supreme courts
interpreting rule standards on authorizing convictions to impeach
that mimicked the current federal rules's standards was in apparent
conflict with the fact that the shared standards, at least with
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respect to qualifying convictions for possible admission solely
upon the basis that the underlying crime was punishable by more
than a year in prison, provided greater protection to the accused
than other witnesses. [288] These outcomes were also in apparent
conflict with the fact that in the twenty states supreme courts
interpreting rule standards overall more restrictive than the
federal rule, four courts were interpreting standards which imposed
greater
restrictions on admitting convictions to impeach the
accused than other witnesses, and none provided greater protection
to other witnesses than to the accused. [289] Only among the rules
interpreted by the sixteen state supreme courts in states with
overall more liberal standards than the federal rule regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach, were there at least two states
whose rule more liberally admitted convictions to impeach against
some accused or all criminal witnesses. [290] The rule of only one
of these states more restrictively authorized possible admission of
convictions to impeach only a sub-group of accused. [291] There
was even some evidence that state supreme courts would ignore the
fact that in contemporaneous decisions, they sanctioned or
authorized the exclusion to impeach a prosecution witness, with the
same or similar crime conviction which they sanctioned the
admission of to impeach the accused. [292] Irrelevant "felony"
convictions were admitted against the accused even when the appeal
record provided a basis for concluding that the physical and
eyewitness evidence did not clearly establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. [293]
By rule, state supreme courts interpreting evidence rules
identical to the federal rule or more restrictive than the federal
rule were barred from admitting to impeach any witness, convictions
for crimes which were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie.
Despite this most fundamental evidence admissibility principle,
seventy-eight and one-half percent of the state supreme courts in
both sets of states who interpreted their rules' standards during
the study period(22 of 28) admitted collectively scores of
convictions which logically were irrelevant to prove propensity to
lie. [294]
These state supreme courts turned a blind eye to
incompetent representation, failed to consistently require trial
judges to articulate why the conviction was relevant to prove
propensity to lie, failed to make their own independent assessment
of relevance, substituted their characterization of the crime as
meeting their ill-defined or undefined criteria of "dishonesty" or
"false statement", or embraced a variety of junk science heuristics
to justify or excuse this failure to adhere to this most basic
evidence admissibility requirement. [295] On this same issue, the
sixteen supreme courts interpreting rule standards which overall
more liberally admitted convictions to impeach, also admitted
scores of irrelevant convictions to impeach, but at least all but
three of them were authorized by their rules to admit at least
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certain categories of irrelevant convictions, at least against
certain categories of witnesses. [296]
Added concern for the quantity and quality of unfair
prejudice that will be caused by the admission of convictions
ostensibly only to impeach, is implicated when the accused is the
target witness, and the current trial charges include those which
are identical or similar to the crimes underlying the proffered
convictions. [297] Despite this added concern, 21 of these fortyfour supreme courts when given the opportunity to sanction or
authorize the admission of similar crime convictions ostensibly
only to impeach the accused, did so in 45 of 58(77.5%) the cases
when this issue was presented. [298] The admission of this high of
a percentage of similar crime convictions is even more startling
when by rule or in one state by decision of the same state supreme
court, all but two of these twenty-six courts were either
interpreting standards which required consideration of exclusionary
concerns, or the court itself imposed such a consideration. [299]
Lack of academic or other models or perhaps sheer outcome
driven determinations, are two plausible reasons for this almost
universal ignoring or denigration of heightened concern for unfair
prejudice, included the universal failure of these courts to
precisely define unfair prejudice or develop protocols for
measuring the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice risked by
the admission of the similar crime conviction ostensibly only to
impeach. [300] In any event this mass ignoring or minimizing of
exclusionary concerns by these courts, is a second gross indicator
that a state's rule standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach
may not be a good predictor of how trial judges will apply, or if a
state supreme court will carefully evaluate, authorize, or sanction
the use of a conviction to impeach.
6.1.2

6.1.2.1

Summary Comparisons of Outcomes Assessments
Comparing Key Assessment Findings from Three Sets
of States' Supreme Courts --- Building Towards
a Finding that the Effects of Demographics is State Supreme Courts Anarchy-Result
oriented Anarchy--re Use of Convictions to Impeach
Compare 3.1.2 with 4.1.2 & 5.1.2

The summary now focuses upon a comparative evaluation of the
crucial assessment findings from parts two through four, and
provides policy perspectives concerning those findings. First, it
is fair to say that the federal rule's standards for admitting
convictions to impeach, often thought of as a model for state
evidence rules, was not a strong influence on the state supreme
courts in any of the three groups of states herein studied,
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including the eight supreme courts which were interpreting
standards identical to those of the federal rule. [301]
Only
eleven of the forty-four supreme courts, including four of the
courts interpreting rules identical to the federal rule, expressly
stated at some point during the fifteen year study period that
their interpretations of their rules on admission to impeach would
be guided by official commentary, interpretations, or history of
the federal rule. [302] Three of these eleven states, however,
including two of the four courts interpreting rules identical to
the federal rule, made decisions during the study period
significantly
inconsistent
with
the
official
commentary,
interpretations, or history of the federal rule. [303]
These departures from the federal rule's commentary or
legislative history were always holdings by these courts, in
contrasts to the federal rule's official commentary, broadly
defining the qualifying terms "dishonesty" or "false statement" in
order to sanction or authorize the admission of convictions for
crimes such as theft or robbery to impeach. [304]
Hence the
federalism policy goal of trying to encourage a uniform national
standard on the admissibility of convictions to impeach, embraced
by the uniform law commissioners when they amended the uniform rule
to mimic the federal rules' standards was not achieved in the last
quarter century, and not even modest progress towards achieving
this goal as we reached the mid-point of the first decade of the
twenty-first century. [305]
6.1.2.2

Compare 3.1.3 & 4 with 4.1.3 & 4 & 5.1.3 & 4

Second, the decision data for each of the three categories
of state supreme courts was assessed to determine the likelihood
that the courts in each category would examine the trial record to
determine if the trial judge had made the appropriate rule standard
evaluation, and competently apply their rules' standards regulating
the admissibility of convictions to impeach. [306]
In total,
during the fifteen period of this study, the forty-four state
supreme courts held that lower court decisions on the admission of
convictions to impeach was uncorrected error in 32 of the 150(21%)
cases, and reversed for a new trial based on that error(s) in 17 of
those thirty-two cases(about 11% of the total cases. [307] Studies
have found that the rate of reversal by state supreme courts has
fluctuated over the decades, becoming progressively lower in more
recent time(less than ten percent) with the increase in appellate
litigation. [308] The three groups of state supreme courts rate of
finding such error was consistent with the relative scrutiny
required by their states' collective rules - the rate of finding
uncorrected error was almost five times as great in the group of
states with overall more restrictive admission rules than the
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federal rule, in comparison to those supreme courts with overall
more liberal admission rules than the federal rule. [309]
Twenty-seven of the thirty-two findings of uncorrected error
benefitted an accused, either because these courts found that the
accused(17) or a defense witness'(2) conviction(s) should have been
excluded as impeachment evidence, or that a prosecution witness'
conviction(8) should have been admitted to impeach. [310] This
finding when coupled with the previous finding of outcome
difference favoring the prosecution in state supreme court
decisions, provides a basis for an inference that in these
relatively heatedly contested state litigations, trial judges
tended to greatly favor prosecutors in making rulings on whether to
sanction impeachment of the accused or a witness of the accused, in
comparison to permitting the use of convictions to impeach a
prosecution's witness.
The next key finding based on the collective and comparative
assemblage and evaluation of the data, is that for the most part,
the forty-four state supreme courts took a sequence of related
steps greatly encouraging judicial anarchy with regard to
determining if a conviction should be admitted to impeach. First,
all three sets of states, despite a few exceptions that could have
served as models, failed to require trial judge's to place their
admission of convictions to impeach evaluations on the record, or
failed to competently use the standards of its rules as the basis
for review of the trial judge's decision. [311] The vast majority
of these courts in all three categories also failed to competently
perform the evaluation required by the appropriate standard(s) of
its rule to guide its own decision making. [312] Most egregiously,
hiding behind history and junk science heuristics, thirty-four of
forty-four of these courts(77%) failed in over half of these one
hundred fifty decisions(82/55%) to require trial judges or
themselves to consistently adhere to the most basic admissibility
standard, that evidence must be relevant on the issue, here as
proof of a propensity to lie, for which it is offered. [313] These
significant failures are the third gross indicator the rule
standards as enacted were not necessarily a good comparative basis
for determining state supreme court decision making.
This is
further driven home by the fact that a higher percentage of state
supreme courts with identical or more restrictive admission of
convictions to impeach standards than the federal rule, admitted
irrelevant convictions than state supreme courts with more liberal
standards than those of the federal rule. [314]
6.1.2.3

Compare 3.1.5 with 4.1.5 & 5.1.5

Third, twenty-seven of the forty-four supreme courts who
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made pertinent decisions during the study period, were interpreting
rules whose standards included a standard which made express
reference to convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement". Despite the fact that none of their rules expressly
defined these concepts, none of these courts generally defined
"dishonesty" or "false statement" in the decisions they made during
the study period, and only a few of them made reference to
precedent which they characterized as including such definitions.
[315] Nor did these courts adopt the narrow definition of these
concepts recommended in the federal rule's commentary. [316]
Instead, some courts in all three categories, without justification
or policy analysis, broadly defined these concepts to include
convictions for crimes which had no logical basis to serve as proof
of a propensity to lie. [317]
Third, state supreme courts
interpreting standards which employed a specific standard only for
crimes of dishonesty or false statement, a standard which more
liberally authorized admission of crimes so categorized, were
likely once a conviction was so characterized, to forego a rule
required balancing evaluation, and the identification and weighing
of exclusionary concerns. [318]
These sequential failures to
adhere or make clear standards with regard to "dishonesty" or
"false statement" is a fourth gross indicator that a state's rule
standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach don't work and
therefore may not be a poor predictor of how trial judges will
apply, or whether the state supreme court will carefully evaluate,
authorize, or sanction the use of convictions to impeach.
6.1.2.4

Compare 3.1.6 with 4.1.6 & 5.1.6

No matter which of the three groups of state rules on
convictions to impeach, the article confirmed that the standards of
most of the rules in each group sanctioned at least qualifying for
possible admission convictions based on their punishment, despite
the fact that the legislative decision to provide for a maximum
punishment of more than a year in jail is irrelevant to prove
propensity to lie. [319] Most of the state supreme courts in all
three groups, provided a significant boost to judicial anarchy on
this issue, when they were willing to ignore or excuse failure to
comply with the universal minimal admissibility requirement, even
though their state rules or the courts themselves recognized
compliance with the relevance rule was at least the first necessary
step to justify admission of any evidence, including admitting
"felony" convictions to impeach. [320]
In evaluating "felony" convictions for admission to impeach,
these courts often gave short shift to their rules' required
balancing evaluation and ignored or minimized exclusionary concerns
that were supposed to be identified, evaluated, and weighed against
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probative value during that balancing evaluation. [321] Failure to
appropriately evaluate and value exclusionary concerns set the
stage for about twenty of these forty-four state supreme courts in
thirty-five decisions to sanction the admission of "felonies" to
impeach the accused which were identical or very similar to one or
more of the charges currently being tried. [322]

6.1.3

6.1.3.1

Identifying Significant Effects on The
Justice System of The Comparative
Outcome & Outcome Assessment Findings of this
Study
Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
Assessment Findings - Effect #1
- Driving Accused from the Stand

There is some evidence derived from this case study that the
overall lack of adherence to a variety of rule and self-imposed
standards which limited the admission of irrelevant convictions,
multiple convictions, and convictions similar to the current trial
charges, ostensibly only to impeach the accused, have the effect of
driving the accused from the witness stand. [323] In as few as
thirty (28%) and as many as thirty-nine(36%) of the one hundred
eight cases in this study in which the accused was the witness to
be impeached, the accused did not testify. [324] A much higher
percentage of the accused, in the decisions of the state supreme
courts interpreting rules more liberally admitting convictions to
impeach than the federal rule, did not testify. [325] Hence in
these cases very often irrelevant evidence put the accused to the
dilemma of protecting his constitutional right to an impartial
trial, by foregoing his constitutional right to testify in his own
behalf. [326]
When the accused testimony is crucial to his theory of
defense, as was true in some of these cases, and when some of these
state supreme courts, following the meritless position of the
United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United States[327], also
employ a procedural rule which moots an appeal of denial of his
constitutional claims to an impartial jury and right to testify if
the accused fails to testify, the accused guilt or innocence may
not be fairly determined. [328]
6.1.3.2

Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
Assessment Findings - Effect # 2 Resigning Lawyers to Conceded Admissibility
of Irrelevant Convictions
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When standards limiting admission of convictions to impeach
are not consistently enforced or evaluated by state supreme courts,
it is also likely to resign lawyers to assuming a conviction when
offered will be admitted. This happened in several state supreme
court decisions from jurisdictions whose rules or statutes as
interpreted by their state supreme courts admitted convictions to
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. [329] At other times
the liberal admission rule may have contributed to an attorney
failing to make an appropriate argument to exclude past matters
that did not or should not have qualified even as a "conviction" in
the state. [330]
6.1.3.3

Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
Assessment Findings - Effect # 3 - Shifting the
Most Restrictive to Least Restrictive Rankings
of State Rules & the number of states whose
rules rank as more or less liberal than the
federal rule, but of course with caveat that
at least federal courts of appeals'
interpretations of the federal rule would
have to be evaluated before re-ranking based
on case law was fair comparison

The most significant effect of the comparative outcome and
outcome assessment findings of this study is that they evidence a
shift in the ranking of some of the states' admission of conviction
to impeach standards.
In total, seventeen supreme courts made
decisions significantly altering their rules' standards, and in
every case the change made it more likely that one or more types of
convictions would be more easily admitted to impeach at least one
category of witness. [331] Of the nine states sharing the same
standards-those which mimicked the federal rule, three of the
supreme courts, those of New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma
authorized significantly more liberal admission standards, and
standards which were not identical to each other. [332] Decisions
by the Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, and South Dakota Supreme Courts, and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals during the last decade and a half had the
effect of moving their overall more restrictive than the federal
rule standards for admitting convictions to impeach, to standards
which more liberally than the federal rule admitted convictions to
impeach. [333]
The Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, and Texas Courts, for
example, decided that almost any "felony" conviction was
universally admissible to impeach, or admissible to impeach even if
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie, and the Arkansas Court
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joined the Delaware Court in expressly sanctioning the admission of
convictions as substantive evidence to prove guilt, in the guise of
impeachment evidence. [334] These courts thereby jettisoned any
principled consideration of implicated exclusionary concerns, and
they were joined by the Maine Supreme Court who simply abandoned
its rule's balancing evaluation requirement to identify and
evaluate exclusionary concerns. [335]
Finally, decisions by the New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts already interpreting standards overall
more liberally admitting convictions to impeach than the federal
rule, made decisions greatly expanding the liberality of those
rules - The Rhode Island and Wisconsin Courts demonstrating a
willingness to admit almost any conceivable conviction to impeach
the accused. [336] This shift of thirteen states meant that at
the beginning of 2005, that from a minority of sixteen of fortyfour((36%), in fact a majority (25 of 44/58%) of the states whose
supreme courts made decisions during the study period in fact had
sanctioned or authorized standards more liberal than the federal
rule in admitting convictions to impeach. These shifts also had the
effect of swelling the number of distinct admission standards in
the states to well over thirty.
6.1.4

Accounting for These Effects --- Especially
Pattern of Significant Departures from the
States' Rule Standards---Identifying Causes

6.1.4.1
This article next identifies or reconfirms the identity of
those factors that plausibly account for this pattern of outcomes,
patterns identified by the assessment of those outcomes, and their
key effects, especially the significant departures from their
respective rules' standards by many of the state supreme courts.
The article has documented that among the reasons for these
patterns and effects are these courts; parochial decision making
process, failure to define crucial rule standards' concepts,
continue to rely upon history as policy, incessantly invoke an
array of junk science heuristics as substitute for logical
relevance, and finally simply seem hellbent on ignoring or
minimizing exclusionary policy concerns to facilitate the
government's ability to convict recidivists. [337]
A final reason can be gleaned when the history of enactment
of modern evidence codes is used to provide perspective about this
fifteen year pattern of state supreme court decisions. This factor
many be characterized as the exercise of judicial power. Modern
state evidence codes while approved by state legislatures, were
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documents often drafted by state supreme courts or drafted under
the supervision of those courts. [338] State supreme courts take
therefore more of a proprietary stance in the interpretation of
these rules. [339]
This proprietary posture can be seen most
pervasively in the fact documented herein that state supreme courts
with a wide range of admission of conviction to impeach standards
have asserted their authority to employ or continue to employ
guidelines they have created independent of the rules to supplant
or supplement tho standards of their respective rules. [340]
Unfortunately, these guidelines for the most part further fueled
the risk of judicial anarchy on this issue because they were most
often in the form of a non-exhaustive list of multiple factors for
trial judges to consider in no particular order, and most of them
were simply heuristics without evidential basis. [341]
These assertions of judicial rule making authority, even
embraced endorsement and use of junk science and anti-science
heuristics during the decade and one-half period of this study, as
well as the Solomon like tactic of splitting the baby, by admitting
irrelevant convictions to impeach, but "sanitizing" that admission.
[342] These heuristics and tactic were made part of the legal
standard by state supreme courts despite available evidence they
were inconsistent with reality, and recognition by several of these
courts that the tactic was ineffectual and unfair. [343]
This proprietary interests in the rules, however, was
abdicated by many of the state supreme courts by authorizing and
sometimes even encouraging every state trial judge in their state
to interpret the admission rule each using their own criteria - via
the great deference to trial judge decision without requiring the
trial judge to state the basis of that decision, reviewing those
decisions to determine if they were moderately competent
applications of the existing standards, and failing by their own
fiat to impose state wide evaluation criteria. [344] The Rhode
Island Supreme Court's decisions were the quintessential example of
such abdication. [345]
6.1.5

Recommendations

The basis of the following recommendations are the findings
and commentary on those findings summarized to this point in this
section of the article.
This final section of the article
identifies and defends recommendations for national reform of the
current process and substance of admitting convictions to impeach.
The procedural recommendations and the substantive reform
recommendation are independent of each other.
6.1.5.1

Procedural
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The recommended procedural reforms are sequential. First,
in order to admit a conviction record as a basis for impeachment,
all states should require the proponent to make a pretrial motion,
which would trigger an admission hearing, if the witness against
whom the admission is sought is a "party" witness. In a criminal
prosecution, the only prosecution witness within this definition of
party witness is the victim(s) of the alleged crime. [346] Second,
the hearing judge would be required to put on the record the
specific findings of fact that justify under each element of the
state's rule standard(s), as interpreted by the state supreme
court, their admission/exclusion decision. [347] No conviction
should be sanctioned for admission to impeach by a state supreme
court based on the intuitive-phantom balancing so often endorsed by
these courts as documented in this article. [348]
Third, the judge's decision should be followed, when the
decision is to admit one or more convictions to impeach a party
witness, with a required interlocutory appeal.
Fourth, the
appellate court hearing that appeal would be required to determine
de-novo - as a matter of law, if the trial judge competently
performed the second procedural reform just described. [349]
At the state supreme court level the evaluation of the
accuracy of the trial judge's interpretation of the state standard
would also be reviewed as a matter of law.
Far too often, too
many state supreme courts use the abuse of discretion standard to
justify deference to a trial judges's decision even when that judge
obviously failed to make even a good faith effort to employ the
standards of the rule, and multiple times failed to refer to or
place their interpretations of each sequential element of the
standards set out in their rules on the record. [350] Finally, the
harmless error rule, when applied to the admission against a party
of a similar crime conviction is inconsistent with the weight of
empirical evidence that there is almost always significant unfair
prejudice produced in a jury. Therefore that doctrine should not
be employed, or employed in only the most obvious of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt established by non-tainted admitted trial evidence
cases. [351]
Otherwise twice protected specific national
constitutional
and
state
constitutional
rights
expressly
guaranteeing an accused a right to an impartial jury, and the right
to testify on his own behalf are subordinated to a deliberate state
policy decision largely based on a court created, and frequently
legislative endorsed irrelevant and highly unfairly prejudicial
heuristic. [352]
6.1.5.2

Substantive Reform Recommendation
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Substantial
reform
of
the
standards
for
admitting
convictions to impeach to succeed must be radical. The crucial
findings of this study, just reviewed and summarized, and those of
the earlier rule focused article require no less than this level of
reform - all states must, as is currently true in the state of
Montana, abolish the use of conviction records as a form of
impeachment.
While it might be argued that a conviction record
for perjury should be an exception to this ban, a perjury
conviction record should only be admitted when there is a denial by
the witness that he previously lied under oath.
The only arguably
relevant conviction record therefore would serve its only
appropriate impeachment function warranted by their only salient
characteristic - as an excellent, yet unfairly prejudicial proof
source.
Under this proposal, however, the party calling the
witness can not complain about that unfair prejudice because the
first option was to admit that the witness had previously lied
under oath.
Obviously, this ban on conviction records is easy to apply
and therefore will not only produce the appropriate result, but
uniform results in the trial courts of all of the states.
It
eliminates all of the egregious major flaws in the current pattern
of federalism documented in this article including: state supreme
courts' focus on preservation and exercise of judicial power more
than adherence to the rule of law or sound policy, the related
failure of these courts to follow rule standards even when these
courts articulated the standards of their rules, the conscious
decision of some of these courts to admit convictions to convict in
the current case if the accused dared take the stand and claim to
be innocent, the wholesale admission of irrelevant conviction
records, multiple irrelevant conviction records, identical or
similar conviction records, ignoring or denigrating pertinent
exclusionary policies and constitutional principals, skewed
balancing attempts by trial and appellate courts, and qualifying
for admission to impeach a broad subset of convictions by giving
them a label as a flawed surrogate that the conviction is relevant
proof of a propensity to lie.
It is long past time for state
supreme courts, the courts with the greatest authority in the
states and collectively nationally, to stop sanctioning and
expanding the deliberate skewing of trial outcomes, and in criminal
cases denying specific constitutional rights. It is time to ban
the use of conviction records as "impeachment" evidence.
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Of course this means that all states should immediately abandon
qualifying convictions to at least potentially be admitted to
impeach on the ground that the crime charged was punishable by more
than one year in jail.
Of course this also means that states
should immediately abandon qualifying convictions to at least
potentially be admitted to impeach by reference to common law
concepts such as moral turpitude or any generic and undefined
concepts such
as crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement".
Common law and generic concepts open door to distortion to
accomplish admission goal.
40.

Id., at note 211 and accompanying text.

41. Pretrial notice, and a pre-trial hearing provide a procedural
avenue for proving a previously unadjudicated lie under oath.
Eliminating any reference to a record of criminal conviction means
that the new national standard becomes simply a very limited
procedural exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 608 and state
comparable rules - which allow questioning but not extrinsic
evidence to prove specific incidents of behavior relevant to prove
propensity to lie.
42.
State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813(Iowa, 1997); State v.
Lasner,14 P.3d 1282(N.M., 2000); State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789(N.M.,
1997); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712(N.D., 2002); State v.
Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439(N.D., 2002); State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d
638(N.D., 1991); State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d 433(Ohio, 2004); State
v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio, 1997); State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d
294(Okl. Cr. App., 2001); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414(Okl. Cr.
App., 1995); Three "M" Investments, Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827
P.2d 1324(Okl., 1992); State v. Banks, 810 P.2d 128(Okl. Cr. App.,
1991); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 115(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); Hardiman
v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990); State v. Cheeseboro,
552 S.E.2d 300(S.C., 2001); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d 795(S.C.,
1999); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177(Utah, 2000); and Ramirez v.
State, 994 P.2d 970(Wyo., 2000). Only the Alabama Supreme Court
did not make a pertinent admission of convictions to impeach
decision during the fifteen year period of this study.
43. State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816(Iowa, 1997); State v.
Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d
712, 715(N.D., 2002); State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 443(N.D.,
2002); State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d 638(N.D., 1991); State v. Bryan,
804 N.E.2d 433(Ohio, 2004); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, (Ohio,
1997); State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294, 318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001); State
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v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414, 427(Okl. Cr. App., 1995); State v.
Banks, 810 P.2d 1286(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); Turner v. State, 803
P.2d 1152, 1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); State v. Cheeseboro, 552
S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C., 2001); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d
795,800(S.C., 1999); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 184(Utah,
2000); Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)
44.
State v. Lasner,14 P.3d 1282, 1289(N.M., 2000)(court
sanctioned exclusion of a juvenile adjudication of guilt of the
misdemeanor crime of concealment of identity); Three "M"
Investments, Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324(Okl., 1992);
Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)
45. State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816(Iowa, 1997); State v.
Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d
712, 715(N.D., 2002); State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d 638(N.D., 1991);
State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d 433(Ohio, 2004); State v. Taylor, 676
N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio, 1997); State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294, 318(Okl.
Cr. App., 2001); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414, 427(Okl. Cr.
App., 1995); State v. Banks, 810 P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App.,
1991); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152, 1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991);
State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 184(Utah, 2000); Ramirez v. State,
994 P.2d 970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)
46.

Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)

47.
State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 715(N.D., 2002)(court
sanctioned trial judge's decision that three felony convictions
were all admissible to impeach the accused. Convictions were for
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a
firearm, and reckless endangerment); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d
82, 93(Ohio, 1997)(the attorney for an accused in a capital murder
trial assumed that the trial judge had previously ruled that the
accused could be impeached with a murder conviction. Ohio Supreme
Court, without making a critical comment, upheld the prosecution's
cross-examination of the accused to clarify that in fact the
decades old conviction was for two murders.); State v. Hooks, 19
P.3d 294, 318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001)(court approved the admission of
convictions for rape and assault with intent to do bodily harm
against a testifying accused in a murder trial); State v. Cheatham,
900 P.2d 414, 427(Okl. Cr. App., 1995)(court sanctioned trial
judge's decision that three felony convictions for crimes of
violence were admissible to impeach the accused should he testify
at trial. The accused decided not to testify); State v. Banks, 810
P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(two robberies, an armed
robbery, and burglary convictions); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152,
1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177,
184(Utah, 2000)(felony riot and theft); Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d
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970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)(court reviewed record which demonstrated
that the defense attorney on direct examination of his client, the
accused, charged with aggravated assault(with a knife), asked and
the trial judge allowed him to ask the accused to admit to prior
convictions to burglary, involuntary manslaughter, and armed
robbery convictions.
The state supreme court sanctioned this
"strategic" decision. All of the convictions were entered twenty
years before the trial.
None of these convictions were even
arguably relevant to prove propensity to lie, and mention of the
third conviction resulted in the prosecutor being allowed to ask
the accused if he used a knife during the robbery.) The one case
excluding multiple convictions to impeach the accused was Hardiman
v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)
48. State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 443(N.D., 2002)(authorizing
admission to impeach a prosecution witness with seventeen
convictions); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C.,
2001)(defense witness); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d 795,800(S.C.,
1999)(prosecution witness)
49. State v. Lasner,14 P.3d 1282, 1289(N.M., 2000)(prosecution
witness); Three "M" Investments, Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d
1324(Okl., 1992)(civil party entity's primary negotiating agent in
breach of contract case)
50.
State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997); State v.
Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 715(N.D., 2002)(historical presumption of
relevance of all felonies relied upon); State v. Randall, 639
N.W.2d 439, 444(N.D., 2002); State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d
638,640(n.1)(N.D., 1991)(conclusionary characterization of theft by
check as crime involving dishonesty); State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d
433, 458(Ohio, 2004)(assumption, without reference to the basic
relevance admissibility or standards of the admission of
convictions to impeach rule, that the conviction was properly
admitted); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio, 1997); State v.
Hooks, 19 P.3d 294, 318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001); State v. Cheatham,
900 P.2d 414, 427(Okl. Cr. App., 1995); State v. Banks, 810 P.2d
1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152,
1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(Court of Criminal Appeals approved,
admission of two armed robbery convictions to impeach the two
defendants);
State
v.
Johnson,
512
S.E.2d
795,800(S.C.,
1999)(shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty, but no evaluation of
why that makes it relevant as proof of a propensity to lie
generally or under oath specifically); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d
177, 184(Utah, 2000)(defense counsel with accused(charged with
murder of a police officer) on the stand, had him admit to
convictions for felony riot and theft); Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d
970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)(defense attorney asked client to admit to
three convictions all of which were irrelevant to prove propensity
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to lie. Only the Iowa Supreme Court in its only decision of the
survey period did not evaluate or authorize the admission in at
least one decision of a conviction which was irrelevant to prove
propensity to lie. )
51. State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)(receipt of stolen
property); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 715(N.D., 2002)
(unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a
firearm, and reckless endangerment); State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d
439, 443(N.D., 2002)(nine convictions of the crime of breaking into
a vehicle); State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d 638,640(n.1)(N.D.,
1991)(theft by check); State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d 433, 458(Ohio,
2004)(attempted robbery); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio,
1997)(decades old conviction was for two murders.); State v. Hooks,
19 P.3d 294, 318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001)(rape and assault with intent
to do bodily harm ); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414, 427(Okl. Cr.
App., 1995)(Accused convicted of felony murder. Court of Criminal
Appeals approved trial judge's decision to admit felony convictions
for shooting with intent to kill, carrying a concealed weapon,
after former conviction of a felony, and first degree manslaughter,
despite accused express appeal argument that these convictions were
irrelevant to prove propensity to lie. Rule required balancing
evaluation ignored by court); State v. Banks, 810 P.2d 1286,
1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(two robberies, an armed robbery, and
burglary convictions); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152, 1156(Okl.
Cr. App., 1991)(Court of Criminal Appeals approved, admission of
two armed robbery convictions to impeach the two defendants); State
v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d 795,800(S.C., 1999)(shoplifting); State v.
Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 184(Utah, 2000)(defense counsel had accused
admit to convictions for felony riot and theft); Ramirez v. State,
994
P.2d
970,
972-973(Wyo.,
2000)(burglary,
involuntary
manslaughter, and armed robbery convictions)
52. State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294, 318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001)( court
approved the admission of a conviction for assault with intent to
do bodily harm against a testifying accused in a murder trial);
State v. Banks, 810 P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(current
prosecution was for murder committed during an armed robbery.
Among the four convictions which the state supreme court sanctioned
for admission to impeach the accused were two robberies, both with
a firearm, and an armed robbery); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152,
1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(despite express arguments during a motion
in limine hearing, the trial judge admitted and the Court of
Criminal Appeals approved, admission of two armed robbery
convictions to impeach the two defendants currently being
prosecuted for armed robbery. Ironically, it was the same court
which showed in one of its first decisions during the study period,
some decisive concern for the unfair prejudice that results when
similar crime evidence is admitted ostensibly to only impeach the
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accused; Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)(court
reversed the conviction of the accused for drug possession on the
grounds that the trial judge had authorized for admission from
among several convictions, only the two convictions for possession
of contraband)
53.
State v. Lasner, 14 P.3d 1282, 1289(N.M., 2000); State v.
Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 444(N.D., 2002); State v. Farzaneh, 468
P.2d 638, 641(N.D., 1991)(North Dakota Evidence Code's standards
regulating admission of convictions to impeach based on borrowing
from uniform rules of evidence, and the uniform rules were amended
to adopt the federal rule's standards); Three "M" Investments, Inc.
v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324, 1326(Okl., 1992); State v.
Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C., 2001)
54. State v. Lasner, 14 P.3d 1282, 1289(N.M., 2000)(court adopted
federal rule definition of crimes committed by fraud or deceit;
State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C., 2001)(South Carolina
Supreme Court relied on federal appeals court interpretation of the
federal rule that held that criminal impersonation is a crime
involving dishonesty and false statement)
55.

State v. Lasner, 14 P.3d 1282, 1289(N.M., 2000)

56. Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Three "M" Investments, Inc.
v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324, 1326(Okl., 1992)(asserted
propriety of guidance by federal rule, but in State v. Banks, 810
P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991), the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals ignored the fact that the federal advisory
committee notes to the federal rule expressly asserted that the
crimes of dishonesty or false statement do not include general
theft crimes accomplished by taking the property from its owner,
without his consent.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that
convictions for robbery with a firearm, armed robbery, and burglary
were all crimes of dishonesty or false statement); State v.
Johnson, 512 S.E.2d 795,800(S.C., 1999)(Accused convicted by jury
of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, as well
as multiple counts of lewd acts with children under fourteen.
Trial judge denied, but both appellate courts held that accused
should have been allowed to impeach mother of one of the victim's
who testified for the government, with a conviction for
shoplifting. Trial judge, the state supreme court acknowledged,
relied upon federal authority that under the federal rule
shoplifting was not a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement.
Yet this state supreme court analyzed shoplifting
crime, and found, because it did involve either removing a label or
sales tag, or taking stolen item out of its container, that it did
involve dishonesty)
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57.
State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 443(N.D., 2002)(all of
prosecution witness' convictions should have been admitted, but
their exclusion was harmless error); Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d
222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)(accused. admission of conviction error,
and reversal on this basis); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d
795,800(S.C., 1999)(prosecution witness' conviction for shoplifting
should have been admitted, but its exclusion was harmless error).
58. See supra notes 50 - 51, and infra. notes 65 - 77, and 80, and
accompanying text.
The two decisions in which he court did appear
to make the rule required evaluation were: Three "M" Investments,
Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324, 1326(Okl., 1992), and State
v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C., 2001)
59.

See supra notes 50 - 51, and accompanying text.

60. In only five of these eighteen decisions, three of them by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, did these courts fail to
restate the rule.
61.
See Holley, supra note 1, at notes 17, 27, and 39, and
accompanying text.
62.

Id. at notes 29-30, and 238, and accompanying text.

63. State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816(Iowa, 1997); State v.
Lasner, 14 P.3d 1282, 1288-1289(N.M., 2000); State v. Farzaneh, 468
P.2d 638, 641(N.D., 1991); State v. Banks, 810 P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl.
Cr. App., 1991); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310(S.C.,
2001); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d 795,800(S.C., 1999)
64.
State v. Farzaneh, 468 P.2d 638, 641(N.D., 1991)(theft of
checks was a conviction that could have been properly characterized
as involving a crime of dishonesty or false statement, and was
therefore admissible to impeach the accused); State v. Banks, 810
P.2d 1286, 1292(Okl. Cr. App., 1991)(Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals ignored the fact that the federal advisory committee notes
to the federal rule expressly asserted that the crimes of
dishonesty or false statement do not include general theft crimes
accomplished by taking the property from its owner, without his
consent. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that convictions for
robbery with a firearm, armed robbery, and burglary were all crimes
of dishonesty or false statement); State v. Johnson, 512 S.E.2d
795,800(S.C., 1999)(Accused convicted by jury of multiple counts of
criminal sexual conduct with a minor, as well as multiple counts of
lewd acts with children under fourteen. Trial judge denied, but
both appellate courts held that accused should have been allowed to
impeach mother of one of the victim's who testified for the
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government, with a conviction for shoplifting on theory it involved
dishonesty.
South Carolina State Supreme Court analyzed
shoplifting crime, and found, because it did involve either
removing a label or sales tag, or taking stolen item out of its
container, that it did involve dishonesty. ]
65. State v. Lasner, 14 P.3d 1282, 1288-1289(N.M., 2000)(Accused
charged and convicted of first degree murder and aggravated
battery. Accused sought to impeach one of surviving victims who
testified at trial, with multiple juvenile adjudications including
one for concealing identity-a misdemeanor. After conclusionarily
asserting that concealing identity is a crime of deceit or fraud,
the court then asserted that the trial judge, despite the mandatory
admission language of 11-609(A)(2), had discretion via its 403 rule
to exclude the conviction.
It then sanctioned, in a highly
conclusionary manner, the trial judge's exclusion, asserting it was
not an abuse of discretion.
66. State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816(Iowa, 1997)
(Supreme Court erroneously asserted that trial judge must determine
if the prior conviction is one of dishonesty or false statement,
and even if she concludes that it was such a conviction, that the
probative value of the conviction to prove propensity to lie
outweighed its prejudicial effect; Id.. Accused on appeal conceded
conviction was for a crime of dishonesty or false statement, and
hence by rule, the conviction was admissible to impeach him. Iowa
Supreme Court simply failed to recognize that its rule, like the
federal rule, embodied two independent standards for the accused)
67.
See Holley supra
accompanying text.

note

1,

at

notes

18-26,

and

39, and

68. State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789(N.M., 1997); State v. Stewart, 646
N.W.2d 712(N.D., 2002); State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439(N.D.,
2002); State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d 433(Ohio, 2004); State v. Taylor,
676 N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio, 1997); State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294(Okl. Cr.
App., 2001); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414(Okl. Cr. App., 1995);
Three "M" Investments, Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324(Okl.,
1992); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 115(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); Hardiman
v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990); State v. Colwell, 994
P.2d 177(Utah, 2000); and Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970(Wyo.,
2000).
69.

See supra note 51, and accompanying text.

70.

State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 715-716(N.D., 2002)

71.

Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222, 225(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)
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72.
State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)(six factor
analysis); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 716(N.D., 2002)(five
factor analysis, omitting from the New Mexico list discussed infra
in the next text sentence the correlation with substantive 404
propensity rule policy factor); Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222,
224(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)(identical five factor analysis as North
Dakota Supreme Court, which Oklahoma court asserted it had
established in an earlier case).
73. State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 716(N.D., 2002).
74. See Holley, supra note 1, at notes 211 - 218, and accompanying
text.
75. State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)
76.
State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)(The New Mexico
Supreme Court proceeded to uphold admission of a receipt of stolen
property conviction to impeach, because the accused had recently
pled guilty, the offense was not similar to the current charges,
and credibility was a critical and central issue in this case. In
Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152, 1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991), on the
other hand, the court reasoned that because the two defendants
testified they were innocent of the armed robbery charge, it was
appropriate to admit two other robbery convictions against each
accused.
See also State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 449(N.D.,
2002)(North Dakota Supreme Court makes similar conceptual error by
asserting that the lack of other evidence to impeach, enhances
probative value of each and every felony conviction of the witness
to impeach the witness)
77. The record in these cases, and discussions with experienced
prosecutors and defense lawyers support the conclusion that when
defendants in criminal cases testify in their case-in-chief it is
almost always because the person and defense counsel have concluded
that among the most viable theories of defense, is one or more
theories for which the accused testimony is crucial.
78.

Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222, 224(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)

79.

Id.

80. State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)( Apparently the
fact that the crime was not similar, was found by implication by
the court to reduce the unfair prejudice --- but no attempt was
made to articulate the remaining quantity and quality of the unfair
prejudice that would result, especially given the express reference
to a gun, as the item stolen); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414,
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427(Okl. Cr. App., 1995). See also State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294,
318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001(court makes a highly conclusionary
assessment of unfair prejudice)
81.
These twenty-four jurisdictions were: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, and West Virginia. See Holley supra note 1 at 41 126, and accompanying text.
82. The four state supreme courts which did not make a pertinent
decision with regard to determining the admissibility of a
conviction to impeach during the period 1990-2004 were Alaska,
Michigan, Mississippi, and West Virginia.
83. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341(Ark., 2004); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20 (Ark. 2002);
Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544(Ark., 1993); Label Systems, Inc. v.
Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703(Con. 2004); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d
36(Con., 1998); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con., 1992); Walker
v. State, 790 A.2d 1214(Del., 2002); Archie v. State, 721 A.2d
924(Del., 1998); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624(Del. 1997); Webb v.
State, 663 A.2d 452, 461(Del., 1995); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d
821(Del., 1994); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740(Ga., 2000); Hudson
v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810(Ga., 1999); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d
462(Ga., 1999); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890(Idaho, 2001); State v.
Thompson, 977 P.2d 890(Idaho, 1999); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d
225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249(Idaho, 1997); People
v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill., 2001); People v. Atkinson, 713
N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638(Ill.,
1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316(Ill., 1990); Sphect v. State,
734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000);
State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540(Me.,
2000); State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108(Me., 1998); State v. Wright,
662 A.2d 198(Me., 1995); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108(Me. 1995);
Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8(Md., 1995); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d
870(Md., 1994); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581(Minn. 1998); State
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d
293(Pa., 1999); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858(S.D., 1993); State
v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d
428(Tx.Cr.App., 1995); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002);
State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495(Wa., 1996); State v. Mckinsey, 810
P.2d 907(Wa., 1991); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220(Wa., 1991)
84.
State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271(Ariz., 2001)(felony sexual
offenses); State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033(Con., 2002); State v.
Carter, 636 A.2d 821(Con., 1994)(manslaughter and carrying a pistol
without a permit); State v. Sauris, 631 A.2d 238(Con.,
1993)(multiple larceny and breaking and entering convictions);
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Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405(Del., 2004)(multiple felony
convictions for unlawful sexual assault); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d
653(Del. 2002)(kidnapping); Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 4243(Del., 1997)(court sanctioned trial judge's exclusion of multiple
convictions of three prosecution witnesses, including convictions
for
misdemeanor
criminal
mischief;
two
felony
juvenile
adjudications, and two felony drug trafficking offenses); McClure
v. State, 603 S.E.2d 224(Ga., 2004)(misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645(Ga., 2001)(possession
with intent to distribute cocaine); Ely v. State, 529 S.E.2d 886,
889(Ga., 2000)(misdemeanors of simple battery and possession of
marijuana); Hawes v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667(Ga., 1996)(criminal
contempt for abuse of process for falsely swearing); O'Neal v.
Kammin 430 S.E.2d 586, 587(Ga., 1993)(misdemeanor marijuana
possession); Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga., 1991); State
v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587 and 589(Haw.,2001)(shoplifting/theft);
Fuller v. Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho, 1991)(misdemeanor
conviction for failure to file an income tax return); People v.
Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001)(court held "mere evidence"(omitting
the name of the underlying crimes) impeachment with multiple felony
convictions for theft and burglary was reversible error); Martin v.
State, 736 N.E.2d 1213, 1221(Ind., 2000)(juvenile adjudication for
possession of stolen property); Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125,
134(Ind., 2000)(juvenile adjudication for car jacking); State v.
Diggs, 34 P.3d 63, 69(Kan., 2001)(aggravated indecent liberties
with a child and aggravated sexual battery); State v. Davis, 874
P.2d 1156, 1162(Kan., 1994)(felony possession of cocaine); State v.
Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635(Minn., 1995)(five felony convictions);
In the Matter of the Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency, 905
P.2d 148, 195(Mont, 1995)(sale of a controlled substance); State v.
Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(destruction of property of
another); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont.,1993)(burglary
and theft convictions); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa.,
2000)(two possession of weapons and two drug trafficking
convictions);
State
v.
Galmore,
994
S.W.2d
120(Ten.,
1999)(robbery); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten.,
1999)(convictions for burglary and larceny); State v. Mixon, 983
S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874,
881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 987(Vt.
1993); State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of
a controlled substance); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa.,
1997)(felony drug conviction)
85. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341(Ark., 2004)(accused did not
testify, but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id. at 344); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark.,
1993)(accused did testify; but the court did not expressly recite
its evidence rule's standards, Id.); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d
1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(accused did testify, but the court did
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not expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); Archie v.
State, 721 A.2d 924(Del., 1998)(accused did testify, and the court
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 927);
Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(accused did not
testify; Id.); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del.,
1994)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly recite its
evidence rule's standards, Id.); Hudson v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810,
813-814(Ga., 1999)(accused did testify, but the court did not
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 816); State
v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001)(accused did testify, and the
court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.);
State v. Thompson, 977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(accused did
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id., at
891 and 892); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d
225(Idaho, 1998)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d
1249, 1257-1258(Idaho, 1997)(accused did not testify{inference},
but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.);
People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill., 2001)(accused did testify,
and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards,
Id., at 880); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill.,
1999)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly recite its
evidence rule's standards, Id., at 534 and 535);People v. Williams,
670 N.E.2d 638(Ill., 1996)(accused did testify, and the court did
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 654, and
654-655); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316(Ill., 1990)(accused did
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id., at 326 and 349 - 350); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d
239(Ind., 2000)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Gray, 755 A.2d
540, 545(Me., 2000)(accused did not testify,
but court did
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v.
Lobozzo,
719
A.2d
108,110(Me.,
1998)(accused
did
testify(inference), but the court did not expressly recite its
evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me.,
1995)(accused did testify{inference}, and the court did expressly
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 201); State v. Warren,
661 A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(accused did testify, and the
court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at
1111); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995)(accused did
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id., at 10 and 11); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870,
875(Md., 1994)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 870 and 872); State
v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(accused did not testify,
but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards,
Id.); State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(accused
did testify, but the court did not expressly recite its evidence
rule's standards, Id.); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa.,
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1999)(accused did testify, but the court did not expressly recite
its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d
858, 860-861(S.D., 1993)(accused did not testify, and court did not
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 859 and
860); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D., 1991)(accused did
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id., at 40 and 41); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428,
440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(accused did testify, but the court did not
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 439 and
440); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002)(accused did not
testify, but the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id. at 1137 and 1138); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495,
498-499(Wa., 1996)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 497 and 498); State
v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(accused did testify, but
the court did not expressly recite its evidence rule's standards,
Id. at 907 and 908)
86. State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 275-76(Ariz., 2001)(accused did
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's
standards. The court held that the admission of the accused's two
fifteen year old convictions for felony sexually related offenses
was uncorrected and reversible error); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d
653, 665 (Del. 2002)(accused did testify, Id. at 656, and the court
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards. The court held
that the admission of the accused's conviction for kidnapping was
uncorrected, but not reversible error); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d
645(Ga., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 648. The court held
that the admission of the accused's conviction for possession with
intent to distribute was uncorrected, but harmless, and therefore
not reversible error); State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587 and
589(Haw., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 579, and the court did
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 578. The
court held that the admission of the accused's shoplifting
conviction during his trial on public drunkenness and resisting
arrest charges was uncorrected error, and revered the conviction
based on this error and related issues); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d
166,167(Ill., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 169, and the court
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 169 170. The court held that the admission of the accused's felony
theft and burglary convictions even if not named was uncorrected
and reversible error); State v. Davis, 874 P.2d 1156, 1162(Kan.,
1994)(accused did not testify, Id. at 1159, but the court did
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards. The court affirmed
trial court decision that a conviction for the felony of possession
of cocaine was not a conviction for a crime of dishonesty or false
statement, and was therefore inadmissible to impeach the accused,
but nevertheless affirmed the convictions of the accused in this
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case for aggravated burglary and multiple serious crimes against
the person); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(accused did
not testify, Id. at 1103, and the court did expressly recite its
evidence rule's standards. The court held that the defendant's
trial attorney(accused on trial and convicted of capital murder and
possession of an instrument of crime) provided ineffective
assistance when he told the accused that if he testified he could
be impeached with four convictions. Court held error was grounds
for reversal because by rule neither the two drug trafficking
convictions or the two possession of weapons convictions met the
only qualifying criteria that the underlying crime must implicate
"dishonesty" or "false statement"); State v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d
120(Ten., 1999)(accused did not testify. The court held it was
uncorrected, but not reversible error for the trial judge to have
authorized the prosecution to impeach the accused should he
testify, even if no reference to the name of the crime was
permitted, with a conviction for robbery when the accused was
currently on trial for robbery and other crimes); State v. Taylor,
993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten., 1999)(accused did not testify, Id. at 34,
and the court did not fully recite its evidence rule's standards.
The court held it was uncorrected but harmless error for the trial
judge to authorize prosecution impeach the accused should he
testify with convictions for burglary and larceny at a trial of the
accused for crimes of aggravated burglary and theft); State v.
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, 674-675(Tenn., 1999)(accused did
testify, Id. at 664, and the court did recite its evidence rule's
standards, Id. at 673. The court held it was reversible error for
the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused
with sexual battery conviction. The accused was currently on trial
for sexual battery, attempted rape, and attempted incest); Theus v.
State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(accused did testify,
Id. at 877, but the court did not expressly recite its evidence
rule's standards. The court held that it was uncorrected error for
the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach the
accused's trial testimony by referring to and having admitted his
arson conviction); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984,987(Vt.
1993)(accused did testify, Id. at 986, and the court did recite
its evidence rule's standards. The court held it was reversible
error for the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach
the accused with sixteen prior convictions); State v. Calegar, 947
P.2d 235, 240(Wa., 1997)(accused did testify, Id. at 236, and the
court did recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 237. The
court held the original trial judge's decision to authorize the
prosecution to impeach the accused with a possession of a
controlled substance conviction was reversible error; State v.
Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa., 1997)(accused did testify, Id. at
1177, and the court did recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.
at 1178. The court held that it was uncorrected and reversible
error for the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach
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the accused's trial testimony with a felony drug conviction).
87. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343(Ark., 2004){aggravated
robbery, kidnapping, and rape); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214,
1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(State supreme court sanctioned the trial
judge's decision to allow the state to impeach the accused with two
of five convictions); Archie v. State, 721 A.2d 924(Del.,
1998)(unspecified convictions); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821,
825(Del., 1994)(five convictions, including four felony convictions
and a misdemeanor theft conviction); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d
864, 880(Ill., 2001)(escape and unlawful use of a weapon by a
felon); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(two felony
burglary convictions); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill.,
1990)(rape and attempted murder); State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540,
545(Me., 2000)(fourteen convictions for forgery or unsworn
falsification);
State
v.
Lobozzo,
719
A.2d
108,110(Me.,
1998)(escape, possession of a firearm, and theft); State v. Wright,
662 A.2d 198(Me., 1995)(theft and burglary); State v. Warren, 661
A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and
armed robbery); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 11 and 12(Md.,
1995)(three theft convictions); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581,
583(Minn. 1998)(burglary, controlled substance, and criminal sexual
conduct); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft(a
bike) and theft by deception); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858,
860-861(S.D., 1993)(aggravated assault and escape could be admitted
if the accused testified); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D.,
1991)(two convictions for sexual contact with a chile); State v.
Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(attempted robbery and
robbery)
88.
State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 272(Ariz., 2001)(two "sexual
offenses"); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001)(reversible
error to make even mere fact reference to multiple convictions for
theft and burglary); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten.,
1999)(State Supreme Court ruled it was error for the trial judge to
authorize state to impeach the accused with eight unspecified
felony convictions, all of which the state was authorized to refer
to as felonies of dishonesty. Hence the court rejected the trial
judge's apparent attempt to reach a policy compromise, by striking
the specific name of the convictions, which was similar or
identical to the current charges(burglary convictions, burglary
charge; larceny conviction, theft current charge); State v. Ashley,
623 A.2d 984,986(Vt. 1993)(court ruled that the trial judge erred
in admitting perhaps all sixteen convictions to impeach the
accused,
including
convictions
for
burglary
and
thirteen
convictions for false pretense.)
89. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69
S.W.3d 20, 26(Ark. 2002)(named civil plaintiff); Label Systems,
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Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703(Con. 2004)(civil plaintiff
CEO); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998)(prosecution witnessvictim); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con., 1992)(prosecution
witness); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461 (Del., 1995)(prosecution
witness); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at 742(Ga., 2000)(civil
party witness); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d 462,463-465(Ga.,
1999)(prosecution witness); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa.,
1991)(prosecution witness)
90.
State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033(Con., 2002)(prosecution
witness);
State
v.
Sauris,
631
A.2d
238,
248(Con.,
1993)(prosecution witness); State v. Carter, 636 A.2d 821,831(Con.,
1994)(prosecution witness); Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405(Del.,
2004)(prosecution witness-alleged victim); Harris v. State, 695
A.2d 34, 42-43(Del., 1997)(three prosecution witnesses); McClure v.
State, 603 S.E.2d 224, 227-228(Ga., 2004)(prosecution witness; Ely
v. State, 529 S.E.2d 886, 889(Ga., 2000)(defense witnesses); Hawes
v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667(Ga., 1996)(prosecution witness);
O'Neal v. Kammin 430 S.E.2d 586, 587(Ga., 1993)(civil defendant);
Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga., 1991)(civil party in a
divorce proceeding); Fuller v. Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho,
1991)(civil plaintiff); Martin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1213(Ind.,
2000)(prosecution witness); Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125,
134(Ind., 2000)(prosecution witness); State v. Diggs, 34 P.3d 63,
69(Kan., 2001)(prosecution witness); State v. Lanz-Terry, 535
N.W.2d 635(Minn., 1995)(prosecution witness); In the Matter of the
Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency, 905 P.2d 148, 195(Mont,
1995)(co-claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding)); State v.
Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(defense witness); State v.
Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont.,1993)(prosecution witness)
91. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343-344(Ark., 2004); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20 (Ark.
2002); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993); State v.
Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d
521(Con., 1992); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del.,
2002); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(propensity
evidence admitted on theory that previously guilty now claiming
innocence of the same crime, must by lying); Webb v. State, 663
A.2d 452, 461(Del., 1995); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821,
825(Del., 1994); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at 742(Ga., 2000);
State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d
225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257-1258(Idaho,
1997); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams, 670
N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316,
324(Ill., 1990); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000); State
v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 1998); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d
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1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me.,
1995); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995); State v.
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993); Com. v. Pursell, 724
A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860861(S.D., 1993); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991); Norris
v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995);State v. Rivers,
921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907,
908(Wa., 1991); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991). For
documentation of why these convictions fail to satisfy even the
basic relevance test see Holley, supra note 1 at notes 194-199, and
accompanying text.
92. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343(Ark., 2004){aggravated
robbery, kidnapping, and rape); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions
Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20, 26(Ark. 2002)(check
kiting/felony theft); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark.,
1993)(drug possession); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 37(Con.,
1998)(larceny); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521, 529(Con.,
1992)(conspiracy to commit murder); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214,
1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(two drug distribution convictions); Fennell
v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(delivery of a controlled
substance);
Webb
v.
State,
663
A.2d
452,
461(Del.,
1995)(shoplifting); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del.,
1994)(five convictions, including a felony conviction for arson and
a misdemeanor theft conviction); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at
742(Ga., 2000)(sexual battery); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890,
894(Idaho, 2001)(conspiracy to commit robbery); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(lewd and lascivious conduct); State
v. Muraco, 968 P.2d 225(Idaho, 1998)(lewdness with a minor); State
v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257-1258(Idaho, 1997)(immoral acts with a
child); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001)(escape
and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon); People v. Atkinson, 713
N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(two burglary convictions); People v.
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(aggravated battery);
People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 1990)(rape and attempted
murder); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000)(confinement);
State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 1998)(theft, escape, and
possession of the firearm); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me.,
1995)(theft and burglary); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 11101111(Me. 1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and for armed
robbery); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995)(thefts);
State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(distribution of
cocaine); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(burglary,
possession of a controlled substance, and criminal sexual conduct);
State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(criminal sexual
assault); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft(a
bike) and theft by deception); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858,
860-861(S.D., 1993)(aggravated assault and escape); State v. Loop,
477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D., 1991) (two convictions for sexual contact with
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a minor); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App.,
1995)(murder); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa.,
1996)(attempted robbery and robbery); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d
907, 908(Wa., 1991)(receipt of stolen property); State v. Ray, 806
P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991)(theft in this case and misdemeanor theft
and shoplifting based on the overruling of a prior decision by the
court)
93. State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 40(n.13)(Con., 1998)(court makes
reference to its own precedent to approve trial court tactic of
admitting felony convictions(in this case arson) to impeach a
prosecution witness, but prohibiting reference to the name of the
underlying felony)
94. Id. The judge's jury instructions expressly made reference to
the admission of the accused felony conviction to impeach; followed
by an admonition to use that fact only to evaluate the credibility
of the accused as witness. With regard to the case evidence see
infra note 95, and accompanying text.
95. State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 272-273(Ariz., 2001)(trial judge
authorized the prosecutor to only ask accused if he testified if he
had been previously convicted of two felonies.
The judge's
decision was caused by the fact that the two prior offenses were
felony sexual offenses, and the accused was currently on trial for
a felony sex offense.
The judge therefore felt a fair policy
resolution was to "sanitize"(no reference by name) the convictions
that he nevertheless thought remained relevant to impeach as
unspecified felonies. Immediately after the prosecution completed
cross-examining the accused, two jurors passed notes asking about
the specific name/nature of the two prior felony convictions, and
one expressly asked were the convictions for sexual offenses.
96. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343-344(Ark., 2004)(court
authorized state to impeach accused if he would have testified at
his rape trial with a conviction for rape); Pryor v. State, 861
S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993)(Accused prosecuted for drug dealing.
Court held that a drug possession conviction was admissible by the
prosecution to impeach the accused because he testified and claimed
he was innocent of the current charge.); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d
624, 625(Del. 1997)(delivery of cocaine); Desmond v. State, 654
A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994){accused on trial for and convicted of
almost thirty crimes, including three theft charges.
Delaware
Supreme Court sanctioned admission of a misdemeanor theft
conviction to impeach the accused's trial testimony); Hudson v.
State, 521 S.E.2d 810, 816(Ga., 1999)(court sanctioned admission of
an aggravated assault conviction as impeachment evidence against
the accused at a trial for murder); State v. Thompson, 977 P.2d
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890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(Accused convicted of sexual battery of a
minor, and assault. State supreme court sanctioned the admission
to impeach the accused with the fact of but not the name of his
conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct); State v. Muraco, 968
P.2d 225,226(Idaho, 1998)(court sanctioned admission of a
conviction for lewdness with a minor to impeach an accused on trial
for lewd conduct with a minor child); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d
1249,1258(Idaho, 1997)(court sanctioned admission of immoral acts
with a child conviction, to impeach an accused currently standing
trial for multiple sexual offenses, including lewd acts with a
minor); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(accused
tried and convicted in the current trial of burglary, was impeached
with his two prior convictions for the same crime); People v.
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(accused tried and
convicted in the current trial of murder, attempted murder, and
aggravated battery with a firearm, was impeached with his prior
conviction for aggravated battery); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316,
324, 350(Ill., 1990)(accused tried and convicted of two counts of
murder and two counts of rape in the current trial. Trial judge
authorized and state supreme court sanctioned use of prior
convictions for attempted murder and rape); State v. Warren, 661
A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(Accused convicted by jury of gross
sexual assault.
Trial judge admitted and state supreme court
affirmed the admission of accused's convictions for assault with a
dangerous weapon and for armed robbery to impeach); Jackson v.
State, 668 A.2d 8, 11 and 12(Md., 1995)(prosecutor characterized
theft as crime of dishonesty, and Maryland Court of Appeals made
deceit characterization. Three theft convictions used to impeach
the accused, currently being prosecuted for theft); State v. Ihnot,
575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(Defense attorney expressly argued
that admission of a felony conviction for criminal sexual conduct,
in the current trial for the same charge, was so unfairly
prejudicial that it would prevent accused from testifying. Accused
did not testify at trial, and presented no other evidence); State
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(Accused prosecuted and
convicted of first degree murder and rape of a fourteen year old
girl. State Supreme Court sanctioned the admission of a felony
sexual assault conviction against the accused) State v. Loop, 477
N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991)(Court sanctioned admission of sexual contact
with a minor to impeach the accused in a case in which the accused
was charged with sexual contact with a child.); Norris v. State,
902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(murder conviction when the
accused was on trial for capital murder); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d
495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(Accused charged with robbery. State Supreme
court sanctioned trial judge's decision to admit attempted robbery
and robbery convictions. Trial court sought, and state supreme
court sanctioned, attempt to temper the unfairly prejudicial impact
of the admission of these identical to current charge crimes having
prosecutor omit their names and generically characterize them as
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felonies); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(receipt
of stolen property prosecution. Court sanctioned admission of a
receipt of stolen property conviction to impeach the accused). See
also State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 40(Con., 1998)(Connecticut
Supreme Court expressly restated without criticism trial judge's
decision to sanction the impeachment of the accused with a robbery
conviction when he testified in his own defense at his current
robbery prosecution. Jury was not told the name of the crime, but
the accused admitted on direct examination of having been
previously convicted of a felony.
Accused appeal attorney,
apparently felt that there was no strong basis to appeal the
admission of this identical crime conviction). For documentation
of why all convictions, and particularly similar crime convictions
do in fact cause unfair prejudice see Holley, supra note 1 at 211 218, and accompanying text.
97.
State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 275-76(Ariz., 2001)(current
charges were for sexual assault and sexual abuse. Two fifteen year
old convictions of the accused that the state supreme court ruled
should have been excluded, were for felony sexually related
offenses); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645,(Ga., 2001)(accused tried
for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and court held
that it was uncorrected but not reversible error for the prosecutor
to make reference to a prior conviction for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166,167(Ill.,
2001)(felony theft and burglary convictions even if not named
should not have been admitted to impeach the accused currently
charged with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle); Com. v.
Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(accused trial charges included
possession of an instrument of crime.
Court ruled that it was
uncorrected error for the trial judge to authorize admission
among other crimes of two possession of weapons convictions); State
v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120(Ten., 1999)(court held it was error to
authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused should he testify,
even if no reference to the name of the crime was permitted, with a
conviction for robbery when the accused was currently undergoing
trial for robbery and other crimes); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d
33, 35(Ten., 1999)(court held it was error for trial judge to
authorize admission to impeach with convictions for burglary and
larceny at a trial of the accused for crimes including burglary and
theft); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, 674-675(Tenn.,
1999)(court held it was error for trial judge to authorize
admission to impeach the accused with sexual battery conviction.
The accused was currently on trial for sexual battery, attempted
rape, and attempted incest)); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874,
881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(court ruled that the accused's arson
conviction should have been excluded as a basis to impeach the
accused on trial for possession and delivery of cocaine); State v.
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Ashley, 623 A.2d 984,987(Vt. 1993){court ruled that perhaps all
sixteen prior convictions were improperly admitted, and must be
excluded at the retrial on serious sexual offenses); State v.
Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of a controlled
substance by prescription fraud, and state sought to admit a
possession of a controlled substance conviction)
98. Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002); State v.
Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(State supreme court
sanctioned the admission of a criminal sexual conduct felony
conviction to impeach the accused should he choose to testify
during the trial of the current charge for criminal sexual conduct.
Defendant's attorney did argue that the criminal sexual conduct
charge was so unfairly prejudicial that it would prevent accused
from testifying.
Trial judge ruled that conviction would be
admitted to impeach. Accused did not testify at trial.
99. State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(court reviewed
trial judge's findings at hearing which resulted in trial judge's
conclusion that he would admit the conviction to impeach the
accused.
Trial judge reasoning so flawed that it arguably
constituted violation of due process(note intermediate Minnesota
appellate court ruled that trial judge's ruling violated state and
national constitution's guarantees that the accused has a right to
testify at her trial)
100.
State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(State
Supreme court sanctioned trial judge's decision to admit attempted
robbery and robbery convictions on theory that the judge tempered
the unfairly prejudicial impact of the per se admission of these
convictions in the current robbery prosecution, by omitting their
names.
101.
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, and 674-675(Tenn.,
1999)(sexual battery conviction approved by trial judge to impeach
the accused witness who was currently charged with sexual battery,
attempted rape, and attempted incest)
102.
103.

Id.
Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240(Ind., 2000)

104. State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 273-274(Ariz., 2001)(federal
rule's legislative history relied upon in the context of evaluating
admissibility considerations when a conviction which is offered to
impeach is more than ten years old); State v. Sauris, 631 A.2d 238,
248-249(n.14)(Con., 1993)(federal rule standard is rough bench mark
for determining if a conviction is too old to be admitted); Archie
v. State, 721 A.2d 924, 927(n.7)(Del., 1998)(reliance upon notes
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from the federal congress, judiciary center, and the advisory
committee to the effect that the federal rules should be considered
as part of the comments prepared by the Delaware Study Committee on
the Delaware Rules of Evidence); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d
8,12(Md., 1995); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 879(Tx. Cr. App.,
1993)
105.
Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 13(Md., 1995); Theus v. State,
845 S.W.2d 874, 879(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(Court expressly asserted
that the federal courts interpretation of the federal rule will be
some guidance to the court in interpreting the state evidence rules
when the state evidence rule is similar, even if not identical in
all respects to the prior enacted comparable federal rule). See
also State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1050(n.30)(Con., 2002)(federal
standard "not our own, but serves as a rough bench mark in
evaluating whether the trial judge abused discretion in making
admission of conviction to impeach evaluation)
106. Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 13(Md., 1995). With regard to
the federal rule commentary see discussion supra note 21, and
accompanying text.
107.

Id. at 12-13.

108.
See supra fourteen cases cited in footnote 86; Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20,
26(Ark. 2002)(court reversed at least in substantial part based on
this error); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998)(court reversed
based on this error); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con.,
1992)(court did not reverse based on this error); Archie v. State,
721 A.2d 924, 927(Del., 1998)(court held trial judge had committed
error in limiting scope of prosecution's impeachment of the accused
with prior convictions, by prohibiting reference to the name/nature
of the offenses underlying those convictions.
Court did not
reverse based on this error); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461
(Del., 1995)(court reversed based on this error); Ely v. State, 529
S.E.2d 886, 889(Ga., 2000)(court did not reverse based on this
error); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d 462,463-465(Ga., 1999)(court
reversed based on this error); Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727
(Ga., 1991)(court reversed based on this error); State v. Bristow,
882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(court reversed based on this
error); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991)(court had
already reversed conviction on another grounds)
109. Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(court held
that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to make the
required balancing evaluation before strongly indicating that he
thought a kidnapping conviction was admissible to impeach the
accused); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002);
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Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994); McClure v. State,
603 S.E.2d 224, 227-228(Ga., 2004); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890,
894(Idaho, 2001); State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108, 110(Me., 1998);
State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198, 200(Me., 1995); State v. Giddens,
642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(see discussion infra note ___ and
accompanying text) State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860-861(S.D.,
1993); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860-861(S.D., 1993)(trial
judge conclusionarily stated that he thought the name of the
convictions of aggravated assault and escape should be admitted if
the accused testified because he felt that the convictions are more
probative than they are prejudicial.
The South Dakota Supreme
Court only required that this conclusion appear in the record.)
State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 34(Tenn., 1999)(court noted but did
not evaluate the reasons why the trial judge first ruled that seven
identical crime convictions were inadmissible because of the danger
of unfair prejudice, but subsequent prosecution research for some
unstated reason convinced that judge to admit all seven burglary
convictions to impeach as crimes the jury could be told were crimes
involving dishonesty).
The failure to assess the basis of the
trial judge's change of heart, occurred despite the fact, that less
than six months earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that
it was good practice for trial judges to place on the record their
reasons for finding that a conviction was relevant to impeach,
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661,674(Tenn., 1999); State v. Ashley,
623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt. 1993)(court failed to identify where in the
trial record the judge performed the analysis required by the rule
to determine the admissibility of sixteen convictions it admitted
to impeach the accused. The Vermont rule expressly required the
trial judge to make such findings on the record.); State v.
Calegar, 947 P.2d 235, 237-240(Wa., 1997); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d
1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)
110. See the authority discussed in the text and notes immediately
following this note, and see also infra notes 112 - 113, 123 - 134,
143 - 146; 148 - 150, 158 - 169. For cases in which these state
supreme courts did competently perform the evaluation required by
their rules, or established procedures to encourage such reviews,
or both, see infra. note 118 - 119, 138 - 139, 153 - 154, and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 91, and accompanying text. For state supreme
court decisions from these courts recognizing that there was doubt
about the relevance or no relevance to prove propensity to lie
simply because a conviction was for a crime punishable by more than
a year in jail, see infra notes 153 -154, and 170, and accompanying
text.
112. Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645, 648(Ga., 2001)(case overruled
was Kyler v. State, 508 S.E.2d 152(Ga., 1998).
Court also
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acknowledged that trial judge had authorized prosecution to admit
in its case-in-chief, and the supreme court did not question, an
identical crime conviction as a "similar transaction". See also
Francis v. State, 463 S.E.2d 859,861(Ga., 1995)(The court ruled it
was harmless error for the trial judge to give the jury an
instruction authorizing the jury to use a conviction of the
accused, properly admitted to counter specific testimony given by
the accused, as a basis to generally infer propensity to lie.
Harmless error finding was based in part on the fact the judge did
subsequently tell the jury the appropriate use of the conviction)
113. Hudson v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810, 814-816(Ga., 1999)(by the
court's own acknowledgement, the conviction, prior to the
prosecution's question, was inadmissible for any purpose.
The
Georgia impeachment rule required the accused to put his character
at issue. It is difficult to understand how multiple justices on
the state's highest court could so badly misconstrue their own
rule)
114. With regard to the Montana Supreme Court's policy advocacy,
see infra notes 138 - 139, and accompanying text. See also State
v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1050(n.32)(Con., 2002)(contrary to appeal
claim of accused, state supreme court found that trial judge at
least asserted that he understood an element of his evaluation was
to conduct a balancing evaluation)
115.
People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181(Ill., 2004)(three
consolidated cases); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill.,
2001); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001); People v.
Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)
116. People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181, 191(Ill., 2004)(in these
three consolidated cases, trial judges had deliberately ignored
recent state supreme court rulings condemning avoiding the rule's
balancing standard by per se admitting any felony conviction to
impeach, but admitting only the "mere fact" of conviction without
identifying the underlying crime); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d
166(Ill., 2001)
117. People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181, 191-192(Ill., 2004)(three
consolidated cases, and state supreme court in all three cases,
despite acknowledging that the trial judges defied the court's
mandate to apply the rule standard and balance exclusionary
concerns against probative value before a conviction was admitted
to impeach, nevertheless found reasons to not reverse any of the
current convictions on this basis)
118.

State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 274(Ariz., 2001)(restating rule
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standards, adding its multi-factor totality approach, and listing
approximately nine specific factors from that approach); State v.
Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1049(Con., 2002); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d
36, 41(Con., 1998)(inherent authority of trial courts is
particularly applicable to screen felony convictions by evaluating
and balancing unfair prejudice against probative value before
admitting to impeach. But in a recent decision, Label Systems,
Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 718(Con. 2004)the court
asserted that with regard to this standard, the normative rule that
the proponent of evidence has the burden of proving its
admissibility, was reversed, and therefore the opponent of
admitting a conviction to impeach, had the burden to prove there is
sufficient unfair prejudice to justify its exclusion); State v.
Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 578(n.7) and 588(Haw., 2001); People v.
Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001)(restatement of balancing
standard, and review of record to determine if trial judge followed
it); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 169-171(Ill., 2001)(reviewing
in detail the rule standard, its evolution, and policy basis);
People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); State v.
Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120,122(Ten., 1999)(balancing test must be made
by focused on rule policies and not speculation about significance
of the potential testimony of the accused); State v. Mixon, 983
S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999)(the Tennessee Supreme Court cited,
with apparent approval, a jurisdiction specific secondary source's
assertions, that trial judges should state for the record their
assessment of the relevance of the crime underlying the conviction
to prove propensity to lie); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt.
1993)(The court resorted to its own guidelines developed prior to
the adoption of the current substantive rule as the basis for
determining the admissibility of convictions to impeach. The Court
relied on the reporter's notes to the rule which expressly stated
that its intent was not to displace the court's guidelines. The
Court failed to recognize, however, that its former guidelines were
inconsistent and far more imprecise that the analysis required by
the rule. These guidelines were developed in cases, including a
1981 decision all prior to the 1989 rule. At the same time, the
court noted that the purpose of the amendment was to provide two
different balancing standards, one applicable to convictions for
crimes of untruthfulness and falsification which was to ease
admission, and the other to make the admission of other
preliminarily qualifying convictions more difficult. Court then
proceeded to reach a decision that was contra to its own
restatement of the purpose of the newly enacted rule. The Vermont
Supreme Court identified its guidelines as including consideration
of the number of convictions, the age of the convictions, and the
importance of the accused testifying and the prosecution's need to
impeach that testimony with the convictions. The court omitted
policy evaluation of why these factors should be used instead of
focus on policy factors and sequence of those factors found in the
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current specific rule, and in other evidence rules, most
pertinently rule 403. Here for example rule content and structure
would require the trial judge and subsequently the state supreme
court to first focus on whether each crime qualified as a crime of
untruthfulness or falsification. Neither apparently performed even
this first step.
Neither made the required assessment of the
unfair prejudice that would result from the admission of each
conviction to impeach. Hence the state supreme court took a gross
approach to determining admissibility or exclusion of all sixteen
convictions on an all or nothing premise); State v. Calegar, 947
P.2d 235, 237(Wa., 1997)(court cited with approval its own decision
which added on to the analytical evaluation required by the
standards of its rule, the court's six policy factors to be
evaluated in determining the admissibility to impeach of a "felony"
conviction. This state supreme court decided upon the following
apparently non-sequential and non-prioritized heuristics: length of
defendant's criminal record, the remoteness of the prior
conviction, the nature of the prior crime, the age and
circumstances of the defendant, the centrality of the credibility
issue, and the impeachment value of the prior conviction); State v.
Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(State supreme court
expressly held that proponent of conviction has burden of proof to
satisfy standards of rule to gain admission of a conviction for
purpose of impeachment.
Court cited with approval its earlier
decision which required trial judges to state on the record the
factors which favored the admission and the factors which favored
exclusion of the conviction to impeach.
Court characterized
adherence to this protocol as imperative to assure a proper record
for appellate court review of the trial judge's decision. Court
also required that trial judges place on the record their
evaluation of the next crucial step, balancing of exclusionary
policy concerns against the probative value of the conviction as
evidence of a propensity to lie. This step was required when the
basis of preliminary qualifying the conviction for admission to
impeach was that it was punishable by a maximum term of more than a
year in jail); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 499(Wa., 1996)(State
supreme court faithful to standards for admission of convictions to
impeach as established by its rule as evidenced by reference to
sequential inquiries required by rule, and requiring trial courts
in exercising their discretion to follow that sequence on the
record including the ultimate balancing phase of the standard. But
see Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 879(n.6)(Tx. Cr. App.,
1993)(court refused an express defense attorney request that it
correct this trial judge, and require all trial judges to put on
the record the balancing evaluation required by rule. The court
reasoned that because the Texas rule did not expressly require such
record making, it would not require it.) ]
119.

The six

states not admitting any such convictions during the
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study period were Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, Tennessee, and
Vermont. See supra note 91, and accompanying text.
120. With regard to the Kansas Supreme Court's rule and policy
evaluations see supra note 86, and infra note 142. With regard to
the Montana Supreme Court's prohibition and the court's advocacy of
the policy supporting the prohibition, see infra notes 138 - 139,
and accompanying text.
121.
State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 41-46(Con., 1998); People v.
Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People v. Atkinson, 713
N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498499(Wa., 1996)
122.
State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996).
discussion infra. notes 148 - 149, and accompanying text.

See

123.
State
v.
Dobson,
602
A.2d
977,
982-983(Con.,
1992)(sanctioning trial judge ruling that a prosecution witness'
narcotics felony conviction could be used to impeach her, provided
no reference was made to the name of the crime. Court endorsed
general resort to this tactic, whenever the felony conviction was
for a crime not having direct relevance to credibility); State v.
Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521, 529(Con., 1992)
124.

Id.; State v. Carter, 636 A.2d 821,831(n.21)(Con., 1994)

125.

State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 44-45(Con., 1998)

126.
Id.
See discussion infra notes 229, 255 - 256, and
accompanying text.
127. Label Systems, Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 717(Con.
2004)(court cited with approval its precedent sanctioning the
admission to impeach the accused with a conviction for breaking and
entering that was more than a decade old, endorsing the
conclusionary characterization of minimal unfair prejudice that
resulted from its admission)
128.

State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 42(Con., 1998)

129. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v.
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
130. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v.
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Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
131. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v.
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
132. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,537(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams,
670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316,
324(Ill., 1990)
133. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,537(Ill., 1999)(accused claim of
innocence rested principally on his testimony and therefore his
credibility.
Therefore the two prior burglary convictions were
crucial to assessing that credibility. Not a single justice on the
Illinois Supreme Court gave an indication that they realized that
this was an admission of use of the evidence for the prohibited
substantive purpose of proving guilt, by proving lying about his
current claim of innocence because he was guilty of the same crime
twice before); People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996);
People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 1990)
134. People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(accused tried
and convicted in the current trial of burglary, was impeached with
his two prior convictions for the same crime); People v. Williams,
670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(accused tried and convicted in the
current trial of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery
with a firearm, was impeached with his prior conviction for
aggravated battery); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill.,
1990)(accused tried and convicted of two counts of murder and two
counts of rape in the current trial. Trial judge authorized and
state supreme court sanctioned use of prior convictions for
attempted murder and rape)
135. The fourteen state rules being interpreted by the state
supreme courts were those of Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Montana, *South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. See discussion Holley, supra note 1
at notes 42, 44, 48-49, 52, 74-78, 82, 88-90, 95-98, 100-102,
105 - 110, and 120 - 121, and accompanying text.
136. See Holley supra note 1, at notes 42, 47 - 49, 52, 74, 83,
89-90, 98, 102, 106, and 121, and accompanying text.
137.
The 10 states were Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont. See discussion
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Holley, supra note 1 at notes 44, 51, 74, 88, 105, 110, and 121,
and accompanying text.
138. See Holley supra note 1 at notes 42-43, and accompanying
text. The four other states were Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, and West
Virginia.
139. In the Matter of the Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency,
905 P.2d 148, 153(Mont., 1995); State v. Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041,
1044(Mont. 1994)(the admission of any conviction as "inherently
prejudicial"); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont., 1993)
(court cited with approval in earlier decision in which it had
asserted that with regard to eyewitnesses, evidence of previous
misconduct of such a witness was wholly unrelated to the person's
ability to observe, recall, or testify to the relevant occurrences.
Court also held that Gollehon's right to confrontation was not
violated by the trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses' past criminal conduct.)
140. State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587-589(Haw., 2001)(court made
its own assessment, and asserted that petty theft is not per
se(apparently reference to element analysis) a crime of
"dishonesty".
Hence court eventually ruled only if specific
circumstances of the theft, by their very nature, made conviction
at least relevant and perhaps have added probative value may the
conviction be admitted to impeach. Court reviewed record and found
no specific finding by trial judge that circumstances of theft were
relevant to prove propensity to lie.
Court than made its own
evaluation of the record and found that the only "evidence" at
pretrial hearing was that theft involved shoplifting from a church.
Hence conviction should not have been admitted to impeach); State
v. Maier, 977 P.2d 298, 308(Mont., 1998); State. v. Martin, 926 P2d
1380 (Mont., 1996)(Court ruled that the trial court properly
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the accused wife as to
whether she had provided false alibi testimony, but by prohibiting
it from inquiring whether she had been convicted of perjury). See
also State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 231, 249(Haw., 2001)(court ruled that
conduct that was basis for a pending charge of forgery by making
false identifications by the accused so that he could assume the
name of another real person was admissible because its rule barring
conviction evidence did not preclude its use)
141. State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572(Haw., 2001); Fuller v. Wolters,
807 P.2d 633(Idaho, 1991); State v. Diggs, 34 P.3d 63(Kan., 2001);
State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540(Me., 2000); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d
33,35(Ten., 1999); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002)
142.
State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 586 and 589(Haw.,
2001)(rejecting attempt to admit accused's theft/shoplifting
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conviction as involving dishonesty or false statement); Fuller v.
Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho, 1991)(sanctioning exclusion of
misdemeanor failure to file income tax return); State v. Diggs, 34
P.3d 63, 69(Kan., 2001)(affirmed exclusion of a prosecution
witness' convictions of aggravated indecent liberties with a child
and aggravated sexual battery, when by rule only convictions
involving crimes of dishonesty or false statement could be admitted
to impeach. Court did not undertake a policy analysis. Instead it
referred to one of its earlier decisions in which it had held that
these convictions did not involve dishonesty or false statement);
State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33,35(Ten., 1999)(court ruled it was
error for the trial judge to authorize the state to impeach the
accused with eight unspecified felony convictions, all of which the
state referred to as felonies of dishonesty. The court rejected
the trial judge's apparent attempt to reach what that judge viewed
as an appropriate policy compromise which on the one hand admitted
all of the convictions to impeach, but on the other required
striking the specific names of the convictions which was similar or
identical to the current charges(burglary and theft convictions and
current charge).
143.
State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135, 1137(Vt., 2002)(Accused
convicted after jury trial of three crimes, larceny from the
person, attempted assault, and robbery.
Vermont Supreme Court
sanctioned admission to impeach the accused with convictions for
attempted fraud and false pretense. Court made no reference to the
elements of either crime, or to the facts in the particular case
that were proof of those elements as the basis to justify its
characterizations of these crimes); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984,
986(Vt. 1993).
144. State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540, 544-545(Me., 2000)(on appeal the
accused expressly asserted that the trial judge abused its
discretion by failing to apply the proper balancing test required
by the state's evidence rule, and by failing to recognize that the
admission of all fourteen convictions(nine of them for forgery and
five of them for unsworn falsification) significantly compounded
the unfair prejudice.
State supreme court held that the
convictions were not so similar to the current charge as to be
unfairly prejudicial. The court concluded that there was no abuse
of discretion, even if the error was properly preserved for normal
appellate review.
Without reference to empirical or any other
evidential basis, the court implied that the only unfair prejudice
it was willing to recognize as a significant danger when prior
convictions are admitted to impeach, was when the conviction was
"similar" to the current charge(s). This view is not provided for
in the language of the state's rule. The court implicitedly found
in this case that the potential admission of fourteen convictions
would not cumulatively cause any significant unfair prejudice to
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the defendant had he chosen to testify.
This view contradicts
evidence available to the court, and is not provided for in the
language or in the policy underlying the state's rule); State v.
Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn., 1999); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d
1135, 1137(Vt., 2002)(Accused convicted after jury trial of three
crimes, larceny from the person, attempted assault, and robbery.
Vermont Supreme Court agreed with trial judge conclusion at end of
required balancing that the probative value to prove propensity to
lie of two conviction, one for attempted fraud and one for false
pretense, was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
The Court's assessment re probative value of these convictions as
proof of propensity to lie was conclusionary only. Court's unfair
prejudice assessment was also purely speculative, since it did not
know the nature of the testimony of the accused, or provide
criteria for evaluating how the jury was to assess that testimony
or the accused guilt in light of the admission of these two
criminal convictions.
Court made no reference to pertinent
empirical research on the likely magnitude of unfair prejudice that
would result from admission of two prior criminal convictions)
145.
State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn., 1999)(Accused
decided not to testify. But these policy considerations should
have been evaluated by the state supreme court, especially since
the court proceeded to make a harmless error evaluation that failed
to take into account these policy considerations.)
146. These six states were Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Washington
147.
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(its 1992
opinion expressly cited with approval for proposition that
"dishonesty" means the act or practice of cheating, deceiving,
defrauding, lying, or stealing).
148. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69
S.W.3d 20, 28(Ark. 2002)(court asserted that crime of check kiting
is "clearly" crime of dishonesty. Court defined crime by reference
to definition in Black's Law Dictionary, but made no reference to
felony theft elements of the offense as they appeared in the
Arkansas Penal Code that was the actual basis for the conviction.
That dictionary definition contained no culpability concept. That
definition included reference to concept of "hoping".
That
definition ties "hoping" to a mind set of the accused at the time
of the submission of the check that it was possible that funds will
be deposited before the check is "deposited". Hence court failed
to recognize that by its own definition, it is not clear that such
a person "knows" that there will be inadequate funds in the bank,
but only he is aware of that risk(recklessness).
Court used
conclusionary language "clearly" without even attempting an element
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analysis to demonstrate that crime is one involving "dishonesty".
Most crucially court made no attempt to identify the appropriate
culpable mental state for the crucial objective element of
"inadequate funds".
Hence there is a conceptual flaw in the
court's implication that the accused is aware his conduct was
dishonest);
Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461 (Del., 1995)(the
Delaware Supreme Court, without an explanation, has defined crimes
of dishonesty to include misdemeanor shoplifting, and ruled that
the crime's admission was mandatory to impeach a prosecution
witness:
Desmond
v.
State,
654
A.2d
821,
825(Del.,
1994)(characterization of misdemeanor theft as crime of dishonesty
sanctioned by state supreme court); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293,
310(Pa., 1999)(theft and theft by deception. Court holding was in
the context of an appeal in a case in which the trial had occurred
prior to the 1998 adoption of the current evidence rule regulating
the admission of convictions to impeach.
The court made no
reference to the rule.
Court did make reference to its own
standard as modified in its 1987 decision in Com. v. Randall, 528
P.2d 1326(Pa., 1987). In that case, the supreme court purported to
adopt the federal rule standard with regard to the accused in a
criminal case, requiring automatic admission of crimes of
"dishonesty" and "false statement".
In apparent ignorance,
however, of the restrictive definition of those concepts in the
commentary to the federal rule, the court found the admission of a
burglary conviction to impeach the accused was justified.); State
v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(State supreme court
cited its own precedent to conclusionarily assert, apparently as a
settled matter, that all crimes that involve theft, such as the
robbery and attempted robbery convictions in this case, per se
involve "dishonesty", and therefore are per se admissible to
impeach any witness.); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa.,
1991)(State supreme court reaffirmed position established in its
precedent which held that crimes of theft per se involve dishonesty
and are therefore under its evidence rule per se admissible to
impeach. Court then held that theft related crimes such as receipt
of stolen property were also crimes of dishonesty, and therefore
per se admissible to impeach any witness.
149. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69
S.W.3d 20, 28(Ark. 2002)(check kiting); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d
452, 461 (Del., 1995)(misdemeanor shoplifting); Desmond v. State,
654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994)(misdemeanor theft); Com. v. Pursell,
724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft and theft by deception); State
v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(all crimes that involve
theft, such as the robbery and attempted robbery); State v.
Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(theft and theft related
crimes such as receipt of stolen property)
150.

See Holley supra note 1 at 192 - 199, and accompanying text.
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151. Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(capital murder
conviction affirmed. Among appeals issues raised by accused and
rejected by Pennsylvania Supreme Court was claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for "drawing the sting" strategy of asking accused
about prior convictions for theft(a bike) and for theft by
deception.
Supreme Court ruled that the strategy was not
ineffective because both convictions were for crimes falsi, and
therefore could have been introduced by the prosecution to impeach.
State Supreme Court cited to its own 1973 decision as authority
for this proposition.
No reference by the court to the 1998
evidence rule. Hence court apparently assumed that since rule had
no definitions of "dishonesty" or "false statement" its prior
decisions interpreting these concepts remained good law. No policy
analysis by the court on this issue)
152.
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(expressly
quoting its 1992 decision in Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198,
1204(Del., 1992) for the proposition that "dishonesty" encompasses
five distinct concepts, and one of those concepts was stealing);
State v. Mitchell, 817 P.2d 398, 406(Wa., 1991); State v. Mckinsey,
810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(State supreme court reaffirmed
position established in its precedent which held that crimes of
theft per se involve dishonesty and are therefore under its
evidence rule per se admissible to impeach. Court then held that
theft related crimes such as receipt of stolen property were also
crimes of dishonesty, and therefore per se admissible to impeach
any witness. The dissent in the case noted that the impact of the
court's broad definition of crimes of dishonesty to include all
theft and theft related crimes was a defacto and per se
impermissible amendment of the rule, and thereby made the
Washington rule in fact one of the most liberal rules in the
country for admitting prior convictions to impeach, Id. at 908-910)
153.
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(Delaware
Supreme Court concluded without any policy analysis, but with
approving text reference to an Iowa Supreme Court decision which
had held that kidnapping was not a crime involving dishonesty);
Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 42-43(Del., 1997)(court held in the
context of a trial judge's exclusion of multiple convictions of
three prosecution witnesses, that convictions for misdemeanor
criminal mischief, two felony juvenile adjudications, and two
felony drug trafficking offenses were not offenses involving
"dishonesty" and "false statement"); State v. Davis, 874 P.2d 1156,
1162(Kan., 1994)(court affirmed trial court decision that a
conviction for the felony of possession of cocaine was not a
conviction for a crime of dishonesty or false statement, and was
therefore inadmissible to impeach any witness including the
accused); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(two drug
trafficking convictions and two possession of weapons convictions);
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State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of a
controlled substance); and State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa.,
1997)(felony drug conviction)
154. State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,237(Wa., 1997)(court expressly
rejected government's proffered junk science surrogate for
relevance of a crime to prove propensity to lie, that convictions
equate to criminal personality, and all criminal personalities have
a greater propensity to lie, Id. at 238); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d
1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(Court went on to apply standards to
conviction it was reviewing, and reconfirmed its repudiation of the
reality hypotheses that all persons convicted of drugs are
secretive and sneaky. Instead, the court ruled that such
convictions have little to do with veracity.)
155. These eighteen states were Arizona; Arkansas; Connecticut;
Delaware; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Indiana; Kansas; Maine; Maryland;
Minnesota; Montana; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Texas; Vermont; and
Washington. The two states whose standards for "felonies" was no
more restrictive than that of the federal rule were Illinois and
Tennessee; See Holley supra note 1 at notes 96-97, 105-110, 121,
and accompanying text.
156. See Holley supra note 1, at notes 41-125, and accompanying
text.
157.

See supra notes 84 and 91 - 92, and accompanying text.

158.

See supra notes 84, 91 - 92, and 119, and accompanying text.

159.
See supra notes 85 and 90 , and accompanying text.
further discussion of this discrepancy infra note 175,
accompanying text.

See
and

160.
Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)(court
acknowledged that attending doctor testified that he found no
evidence of injury or rape. Court sanctioned admission, of a prior
rape felony conviction, as well as two other felony convictions to
impeach the accused. Accused did not testify to his version of the
alleged rape); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1111(Me. 1995);
State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993) ]
161.
162.

State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, and 674-675(Tenn., 1999)
Id.

163. Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(court
relied on fatuous fact that relevance is not mentioned in its
impeachment with convictions rule and therefore does not apply.
Irrelevant evidence is by logic and evidence code basic structure
88

inadmissible and nothing in passage of federal rule or state rules
mimicking federal rule supports conclusion that and legislature
sought to declare a variant on the world is flat fiction, by
displacing that basic admissions requirement, otherwise applicable
to all other evidence offered for admission. See also Norris v.
State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(Court adopted
prosecution red herring argument that convictions are relevant to
prove likelihood of lying because a capital murder defendant who
testifies has a "motive to lie". A person on trial for capital
murder has a motive to lie to avoid death penalty when such a
person testifies at guilt stage of trial.
But every criminal
defendant, and every party, and even other witnesses often have the
very same motive to lie when they testify because the outcome of
the trial is personally significant.
The jury knows every person
with an interests in the outcome has a motive to lie, and the
introduction of a prior conviction is unnecessary to bring home
that point. Besides this "motive to lie" factor does not add an
iota of relevance to the prior conviction as proof of propensity to
lie-the standard required by the rule).
164.
Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993)(Accused
prosecuted for drug dealing); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624,
626(Del. 1997).
See also discussion supra note 133, and
accompanying text in which the Illinois Supreme Court took the same
unjustifiable position. See also Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874,
880(Tx. Cr. App., 1993) in which court fell into the trap of
converting credibility issue outcome importance into heightened
relevance for any conviction offered to impeach any witness whose
testimony was important. This illogical conclusion includes two
conceptual errors-false attribution of heightened probative value
of the conviction to impeach, and failure to recognize that in such
circumstance the only policy concern that is strengthened is the
exclusion policy of increased unfair prejudice; See also discussion
supra notes 76 - 77, and accompanying text.
165.

Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)

166. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004); Pryor v.
State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993); Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d
405, 408(Del., 2004)(perfunctory and conclusionary reference to
balancing evaluation. Sanctioned exclusion of all felony improper
sexual conduct felonies of a prosecution witness); Walker v. State,
790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(court reviewed record and
found that trial judge decided to allow the state to impeach the
accused with two of five felony convictions. The two convictions
the trial judge admitted were the two oldest convictions,
approximately ten years old, and both indicated that the accused
was a drug dealer); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del.,
1994); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001); State v.
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Thompson, 977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999); State v. Lobozzo, 719
A.2d 108, 110(Me., 1998)(State supreme court, without reference to
standards of its rule or application of those standards to the
facts of this case, in a highly conclusionary fashion, merely
asserted that all three convictions for theft, escape, and
possession of a firearm, were relevant to the credibility of the
accused.
This conclusion of the court is not justified by
evidence, policy, or reason, and is a clear example of a state
supreme court failing to follow the admissibility standards of its
own rule with regard to use of convictions solely to impeach.
Further the state supreme court completely omitted any reference to
the rule's requirement that the trial judge, even if she found that
the conviction had relevance to prove propensity to lie, was
required to balance, using a balanced scale, that probative value
against the possibility of unfair prejudice to the accused); State
v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1111(Me. 1995)(all such serious crime
convictions are relevant and admissible to prove propensity to
lie); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994); State v.
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993); State v. Ihnot, 575
N.W.2d 581, 583, and 586(Minn. 1998); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d
40(S.D., 1991); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App.,
1995)
167.
Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)(state
supreme court asserted that despite its rule, its practice was to
admit any felony conviction, including similar crime convictions to
impeach an accused who testified at his trial.
Court made no
reference to and no attempt to evaluate the quality and quantity of
unfair prejudice that resulted from the admission of such
convictions); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994);
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 664-665(Del. 2002)(court failed to
evaluate, admissibility under what it acknowledged was a balancing
evaluation which should have considered the quantity and quality of
unfair prejudice, of the accused past conviction for assault,
despite facts that one of the crimes for which the accused was
presently charged was assault, and the court had decided to remand
the case for a new trial); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho,
2001)(Accused was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed.
Trial judge admitted and supreme court upheld admission of
conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery to impeach the testimony
of the accused.
Court erroneously asserted that robbery is
relevant to prove propensity to lie, and completely ignored
considerable unfair prejudice the admission would cause because of
the implication of use of force re robbery.); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(Supreme court upheld trial judge's
admission to impeach the accused of the fact of a felony
conviction, but prohibited prosecution from making reference to the
nature of the crime.
The Idaho rule expressly sanctioned this
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compromise.
Idaho Supreme Court failed to evaluate unfair
prejudice and jury confusion that was likely to result when only
the fact of conviction of a felony is admitted.); State v. Muraco,
968 P.2d 225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md.,
1994); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198, 200(Me., 1995)(court
sanctioned trial court's justification to admit two convictions to
impeach the accused that the underlying crimes were not crimes of
violence.
In the very same year, the Maine Supreme Court
sanctioned admission of convictions of crimes of violence to
impeach the accused, without comment or evaluation of the likely
unfair prejudice that would result from the admission of such
convictions. See State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me.
1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and armed robbery convictions
admitted by trial court to impeach the accused, and that decision
affirmed by the state supreme court); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d
581, 583, and 586(Minn. 1998)(court sanctioned admission ostensibly
only to impeach of a prior felony conviction for a sexual offense
against a minor. This was also the charge in the current case.
The court, despite expressly making reference to Minnesota evidence
rule's Advisory Committee's assessment that there is inherent
prejudice in admitting felony convictions theoretically to impeach
which are not probative on propensity to lie, and that the
prejudice in such situations is heightened if the potential witness
is the accused.
Court proceeded to ignore the stated policy
evaluation of the committee.); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858,
860-861(S.D., 1993)(trial judge in granting the prosecution's day
of trial motion to use convictions to impeach the accused should he
testify, conclusinarily stated that he thought the name of the
convictions of aggravated assault and escape should be admitted if
the accused testified because he felt that the convictions are more
probative than they are prejudicial); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d
40(S.D., 1991)(two sexual contact with a minor convictions admitted
in current prosecution for same offense.)
168. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004); State v.
Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(court upheld admission to
impeach the accused, charged with assault, of a conviction for
distribution of cocaine, even after going through steps in
sequential analysis required by the rule, and completing a policy
analysis of the first step - relevance of the conviction to prove
propensity to lie. The trial judge relied on historical common law
heuristic-devoid of a scintilla of evidential support, that if a
crime can be characterized as infamous it therefore can be
secondarily characterized as vile and it therefore follows that it
is contrary to acceptable conduct, and it therefore follows that a
person convicted of such a crime is more likely to commit perjury
it called as a witness. The majority opinion of the supreme court
asserted that it had in an earlier decisions embraced meritless
common law position that all violations of the law involve some
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element of dishonesty, and that this principle applied to sale but
not possession of drugs.); State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593,
603(Minn., 1993)(Accused convicted of first degree murder for rape
and strangulation death of a fourteen year old girl. Trial judge
admitted a conviction for criminal sexual assault to impeach the
accused, who testified, denying guilt. Trial judge admitted the
conviction in part because he chose to ignore the text and policy
underlying the Minnesota evidence rule, unilaterally reinstated the
historical rule that without policy support admitted all prior
felony convictions, and thereby asserted that the conviction was
admissible to impeach because it gave the jury a basis to make a
determination of the appellant's credibility. State supreme court
sanctioned this decision by asserting that its precedent recognizes
that the evidence rule by implication must be premised on accepting
the meritless proposition that any felony conviction is relevant to
prove propensity to lie); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991);
Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)
169.

See supra note 96

and accompanying text.

170. State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 273-276(Ariz., 2001)(court began
by making the same conceptual error made by so many of these state
supreme courts---the substitution of a heuristic for real evidence.
Here the court began by assuming that felonies were major crimes,
and all persons convicted of such offenses, even as in this case
those considerably more than ten years old, were, based on a third
level inference, more likely to lie.
The court, however, did
continue its analysis and evaluated other
considerations. The
court held that the importance of the testimony and therefore the
credibility of the accused's testimony was not an adequate
justification for admitting an old and identical conviction which
otherwise based on sound policy evaluation should be excluded
because of its potential for causing unfair prejudice); State v.
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999)(State supreme court next
reviewed record to substantively evaluate whether the trial judge
adhered to the evaluation protocol it had just outlined.
It
concluded that the trial judge had failed at each step of the
protocol. The trial judge had failed to evaluate and place that
evaluation on the record of the relevance/probative value of the
sexual
battery
conviction
to
attach
the
accused/witness'
credibility. The court found in the record evidence to warrant
concluding that the trial judge simply assumed that any felony
conviction could be used to impeach any witness, including the
accused in a criminal trial. Nor did the trial judge evaluate the
substantial similarity(here identity) of the crime that was the
basis of the conviction and the charged crimes and the resulting
unfair prejudice.); State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235(Wa., 1997)(court
reviewed record to find the basis for the trial judge's decision to
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deny accused motion to exclude his conviction.
Trial judge,
without any basis in the standards of the state rule, held that the
conviction was relevant to impeach because a prior conviction could
provide incentive to lie because if the accused was convicted at
this trial it could influence the severity of the sentence he
received.
Of course this reasoning substitutes for an actual
evaluation of logical nexus as proof of propensity to lie a
heuristic which would make "relevant" to lying all convictions.
State supreme court rejected this reasoning); State v. Hardy, 946
P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(Court began its analysis for
example, by focusing on standard for evaluating if the proffered
felony conviction, which was not for a crime of dishonesty or false
statement, was relevant for its only legitimate purpose under the
rule --- to cast doubt on the likelihood that the witness was
telling the truth. The court placed the burden on the proponent of
the conviction to prove it had probative value to prove propensity
to lie, because the court took the presumptive policy position that
few such crimes are probative of veracity. Court went on to apply
standards to conviction it was reviewing, and reconfirmed its
repudiation of the reality hypotheses that all persons convicted of
drugs are secretive and sneaky. Instead, the court ruled that such
convictions have little to do with veracity.)
171. State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997) ]
(state supreme court took policy position that the admission of
prior conviction evidence was inherently prejudicial when the
witness is a defendant in a criminal case because the jury will
focus on the inappropriate substantive issue of the accused
propensity for criminality. The state supreme court supported its
policy position by reference to two of the empirical studies. See
Holley, supra note 1 at 36, 38, 204 - 218, and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 109 - 113, and 121 - 134, and accompanying
text.
173.

See supra notes 91 - 92, and accompanying text.

174.

See supra note 96, and accompanying text.

175.
In Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002), the
court blamed the accused for not testifying to properly preserve
his claim that the trial judge had driven him from the stand and
thereby unfairly prejudiced the merits by authorizing the
prosecution to impeach his potential trial testimony with two
decade old drug trafficking convictions.
The court made no
reference to the fact that just five years earlier it had
sanctioned the trial judges exclusion of prior convictions to
impeach three prosecution witnesses, including two offenses for
felony drug trafficking; Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 42-43(Del.,
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1997); State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995),
compared to State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998); State
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993). But see State v. Askew,
716 A.2d 36, 37(Con., 1998)(Connecticut Supreme Court gave some
significance to fact that the trial judge decided to admit a felony
robbery conviction of the accused while at the same time excluding
a felony larceny conviction of the victim, which allowed the
prosecutor to characterize the accused as an admitted convicted
felon, while at the same time maintaining that the jury had no
reason to question the character and therefore the credibility of
the victim)
176.
State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998); State v.
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993). Compare and contrasts with
State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995)
177.

State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995)

178.

Id.

179.

State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998)

180.

Id.

181.

State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.3d 191,197(n.4) (Minn., 1995)

182. See supra notes 91 - 92, 96, 121 - 134, 163 - 166, and 168
and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 333;
identifying the ten states.
183. These seventeen states were: California; Colorado; Florida;
Kentucky; Louisiana; Massachusetts; Missouri; Nebraska; Nevada; New
Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; Oregon; Rhode
Island; Virginia; and Wisconsin. For the explanations of why these
states's rules overall more liberally admitted convictions to
impeach see
Holley, supra note 1, at notes 127 - 163, and
accompanying text.
184.
The state supreme court which did not make a pertinent
decision with regard to determining the admissibility of a
conviction to impeach during the period 1990-2004 was Missouri.
185. People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002); People v.
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999); People v. Barnett, 954
P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal.,
1994); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal., 1992); People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d
1273, 1292(Cal., 1991); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and
971(Cal., 1991); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 1993);
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Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990); Miller ex rel.
Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 125 S.W.3d
274,(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and
144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000);
Com. v. Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); Com. v. Smith,
686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300,
314(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass.,
1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993); Com. v.
Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Com. v. Feroli, 553
N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220,
1236(Nev., 1998); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev.,
1996); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993); State v.
Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085,1087(N.J., 1993); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d
483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J.,
1990); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002); People
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d
472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,
1192(N.Y., 1990); State v. Brown, 584 S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C.,
2002); State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994); State v.
Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991); Castellucci v. Batista, 847
A.2d 243(R.I., 2004); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I.,
2003); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000); State v.
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731
A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d
696,699(R.I. 1999); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670(R.I., 1999);
State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996); State v. Martinez,
652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219,
223(R.I., 1994); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I.,
1992); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I.
1992); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990); State v.
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d
290, 296(R.I., 1990); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475(Wis.,
2004); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991)
186. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224(Cal., 2002); People v. Clair,
828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992); Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455(Fla.,
1993); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879(Kent., 1992); Brown v. Com.,
812 S.W.2d 502(Kent., 1991); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589(N.H.,
2003){N.H.); State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996);
State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992); State v. Pratt,
853 P.2d 827(Or., 1993); State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183(R.I., 2003);
Williams v. Comm., 450 S.E.2d 365(Va., 1994)
187. People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002)(accused
did testify, Id. at 605); People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531,
635(Cal., 1999)(accused did testify, Id. at 634); People v. Turner,
878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(accused did testify, Id. at 557); People
v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(accused did not
testify(inference), Id. at 874); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273,
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1292(Cal., 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 1291); People v.
Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal., 1991)(accused did testify,
Id. at 959); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col.,
1993)(accused did not testify, Id. at 1366); Cummings v. People,
785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990)(accused did not testify, Id. at 922-923);
Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(accused
did testify, Id. at 138); Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass.,
2000)(not clear if accused did testify, Id. at 695); Com. v.
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999)(accused did testify, Id.);
Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(not clear if
accused did testify, Id.. Small basis for inference that he did
not testify); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass.,
1996)(accused did testify, Id.); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255,
257(Mass., 1996)(accused did not testify, Id.); Com. v. Whitman,
617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993)(accused did testify, Id. at 627);
Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(accused did
testify, Id. at 84); Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass.,
1990)(accused did not testify, Id.); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d
1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(accused did not testify, Id.); Wesley v.
State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 1996)(accused did not testify,
Id. at 798); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(accused
did testify, Id. at 1105); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085(N.J.,
1993)(accused did not testify, Id. 1087); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d
483, 495(N.J., 1990)(not clear if accused did testify, Id., but by
implication because important appellate issue was did accused have
the requisite culpable mental state, provides a basis for inferring
that accused did not testify); State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816,
837(N.J., 1990)(not clear if accused did testify, Id., but by
implication based on complexity of the appellate record and because
important appellate issue was did accused have the requisite
culpable mental state, provides a basis for inferring that accused
did not testify); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y.,
2002)(accused did not testify, Id. at 964); People v. Gray, 646
N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995)(accused did not testify, Id. at 445); People
v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(accused did not
testify, Id. at 473); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,
1192(N.Y., 1990)(accused did not testify, Id.); State v. Brown, 584
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(not clear if accused did testify);
State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994)(accused did not
testify, Id. at 799{by implication}); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897,
898(Or., 1991)(accused did not testify, Id.); State v. Rocha, 834
A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(accused did not testify, Id. at
1266); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000)(accused
did testify, Id. at 450); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038,
1056(R.I., 2000)(not clear if accused did testify, Id.); State v.
Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(accused did testify,
Id. at 728); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)
(not clear if accused did testify, Id.); State v. Lombardi, 727
A.2d 670(R.I., 1999)(not clear if accused did testify, Id. at 676);
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State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996)(accused did
testify, Id. at 1350); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I.,
1995)(accused did testify, Id.); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219,
223(R.I., 1994)(accused did testify, Id. at 224); State v. Simpson,
606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 1992)(accused did not testify, Id. at
679); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I.
1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 1104}; State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d
1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(accused did testify, Id. at 1038); State v.
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(not clear if accused did
testify, Id.); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 296(R.I., 1990)(not
clear if accused did testify, Id. at 295); State v. Gary M.B., 676
N.W.2d 475(Wis., 2004)(accused did testify, Id. at 479); State v.
Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 534}
188. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(accused did
not testify, Id. at 260. Accused was convicted of first degree
murder. He was sentenced to death. His death sentence meant the
case was heard on automatic appeal by the state supreme court.
That court held that the trial judge abused its discretion in
admitting to impeach the accused if he had testified at trial his
prior rape and murder convictions. Court, however, found that the
error were harmless); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent.,
1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 886. The court held trial judge
abused discretion by authorizing prosecution to impeach the accused
with eighteen year old burglary conviction. Court had already held
that the conviction should be reversed on other grounds); Brown v.
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502(Kent., 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 503.
The court held, without explanation, that it was reversible error
to admit the accused's twenty-two year old felony conviction for
storehouse breaking at his current trial for rape and incest to
impeach him, because it was extremely prejudicial); State v. Ross,
405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 160.
The court held that the trial judge had made an uncorrected, but
harmless error in authorizing the prosecution to impeach the
accused's trial testimony with his nineteen year old sodomy
conviction)
189. People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999)(two theft
convictions); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(receipt of
stolen property and burglary convictions); People v. Morris, 807
P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal., 1991)(assault with intent to commit
rape, attempted rape, kidnapping, and car theft); People v. Lesney,
856
P.2d
1364,1367(Col.,
1993)(affirming
use
of
multiple
convictions to impeach the accused should he have testified); Com.
v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(assault and
battery, assault with a dangerous weapon-a hanDgun, two assaults
with a dangerous weapon-a knife, possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d
983, 988(Mass., 1997)(robbery, assault with intent to rob, and
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larceny of a motor vehicle); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300,
314(Mass., 1996)(unlawful possession of a firearm, defacing a
firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition); Com. v. Gallagher,
562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(breaking and entry and larceny, and
receipt of stolen property); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220,
1236(Nev., 1998)(state supreme court affirmed admission against the
accused of two murder convictions at the accused current murder
trial); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 1996)(robbery
and assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d
1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine, possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, and theft); State v. Harvey, 581
A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990);(rape and three other convictions);
People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(four felony
convictions);
People
v.
Gray,
646
N.E.2d
444(N.Y.,
1995){misdemeanor trespass and cocaine trafficking); People v.
Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(One of the two felony
convictions "involved" narcotics, and the other was a robbery
convictions. The seventeen misdemeanor convictions were entered
over the course of a dozen years.
Trial judge ruled that the
prosecution could allude to the number, dates, and apparently names
of all of the convictions, but not to the underlying facts.);
People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990){two personal
and two corporate pollution related convictions); State v. Garcia,
743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(misdemeanor convictions for
possession of stolen property and for possession of a contraband
substance); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I.,
1999)(five convictions); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I.
1999)(four convictions); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 676(R.I.,
1999)(three convictions); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958,
960(R.I., 1995)(six convictions); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677,
680-681(R.I., 1992)(four convictions-possession of marijuana,
conspiracy to murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault
with intent to kill); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05
and 1116(R.I. 1992)(seven convictions); State v. Gary M.B., 676
N.W.2d 475, 478-479(Wis., 2004)(five convictions admitted by
generic reference in the direct testimony of the accused to five
convictions. No mention of names of underlying crimes, or of fact
that all of them were at least a decade old, and the three
contested convictions were entered almost a quarter century prior
to the trial. These three convictions were for relatively minor
offenses including uttering a check, disorderly conduct, and
assault)
190.
People v. Barnett, 954 P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998)(court
sanctioned admission of two felony escape convictions to impeach a
defense witness); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal.,
1992)(misdemeanor theft conviction to impeach a defense witness);
Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center,
25 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004)(civil plaintiff); Castellucci v.
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Batista, 847 A.2d 243, 251(R.I., 2004)(civil defendant)
191.
People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(voluntary
manslaughter conviction of a prosecution witness); Foster v. State,
614 So.2d 455, 457 and 460(Fla., 1993)(prosecution "witness". At
his murder trial a state witness testified to her first hand
knowledge of the circumstances leading to the killing, and that she
saw the accused kill the victim. Over a decade and one-half later
accused received a re-sentencing hearing.
At that hearing he
sought to impeach the 1975 testimony of that witness, who by the
time of the rehearing was deemed unavailable, by her 1989
convictions.
The trial judge excluded that conviction.
State
supreme court affirmed the exclusion of admission of these
convictions without significant policy analysis); Zola v. Kelley,
826 A.2d 589, 596(N.H., 2003)(plaintiff in civil case.
Court
sanctioned exclusion of her drug conviction ); State v. Newell, 679
A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(misdemeanor convictions for reckless
conduct and simple assault of prosecution witness); State v. Pratt,
853 P.2d 827, 834(Or., 1993)(additional theft conviction of a
prosecution witness); State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 205(R.I.,
2003)(prosecution witnesses' convictions for disorderly conduct,
driving while intoxicated, filing a false police report, malicious
damage, possession of marijuana, operating on a suspended license,
reckless driving, and resisting arrest); Williams v. Comm., 450
S.E.2d 365,375(Va., 1994)(prosecution witness and alleged coperpetrator, with that person's conviction for assault and battery)
192.

See Holley, supra note 1, 142 - 144, and accompanying text.

193. People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002); People v.
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999); People v. Barnett, 954
P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal.,
1994);People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal., 1992); People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d
1273, 1292(Cal., 1991); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and
971(Cal., 1991); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 1993);
Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990); Miller ex rel.
Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 25 S.W.3d 274,
285(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002);
Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000); Com. v. Smith, 686
N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255,
257(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass.,
1993); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Leonard
v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d
1102, 1109(N.J., 1993); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085(N.J.,
1993); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v.
Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990); People v. Hayes, 764
N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002); People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d
444(N.Y., 1995); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y.
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1994); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990); State
v. Brown, 584 S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002); State v. Sidberry,
448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897,
898(Or., 1991); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I.,
2003); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000); State v.
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731
A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d
696,699(R.I. 1999); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670,676(R.I.,
1999); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996); State v.
Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2
219, 223(R.I., 1994); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I.,
1992); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I.
1992); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990); State v.
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d
290, 296(R.I., 1990); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 478479(Wis., 2004); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991) ]
194. Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002); Com. v.
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d
1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(state supreme court acknowledged that by
element analysis the misdemeanor of obstructing a police officer
was irrelevant to prove propensity to lie.
The court thereby
ignored the fact that if specific conduct underlying a crime is the
only basis for finding that it is relevant to prove propensity to
lie, there is no logical basis to justify authorizing reference to
the fact or the name of the resulting conviction, and the Rhode
Island Supreme Court also ignored the majority rule that bars the
use of extrinsic evidence to prove an individual act(s) relevant to
prove propensity to lie. See FRE 608.
195. People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002(Assault
with a deadly weapon on a police officer); People v. Carpenter, 988
P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999)(two theft convictions); People v.
Barnett, 954 P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998)(felony escape convictions);
People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(receipt of stolen
property and burglary convictions); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d
938,946(Cal., 1992)(misdemeanor theft conviction); People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(assault with intent to
commit murder); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal.,
1991)(burglary); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal.,
1991)(assault with intent to commit rape, attempted rape,
kidnapping, and car theft); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d
1364,1367(Col., 1993); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col.,
1990)(aggravated assault); Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v.
Marymount Medical Center, 25 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004)(attempted
burglary); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass.,
2002)(assault and battery, assault with a dangerous weapon-a
handgun, two assaults with a dangerous weapon-a knife, possession
100

of a controlled substance with intent to distribute; Com. v.
Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000)(armed burglary); Com. v.
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999)(possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in a school zone); Com. v.
Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(robbery, assault with
intent to rob, and larceny of a motor vehicle); Com. v. Drumgold,
666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 1996)(unlawful possession of a firearm,
defacing a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition); Com. v.
Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996)(thirty year old
conviction for illegal possession of a sawed off shotgun); Com. v.
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993)(assault with intent to
rape); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(breaking
and entry and larceny, and receipt of stolen property); Com. v.
Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990)(armed robbery conviction);
Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(two murder
convictions); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev.,
1996)(robbery and assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Mann, 625
A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(sexual assault); State v. Brunson, 625
A.2d 1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine, possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute, and theft); State v. Harvey,
581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990)(rape and three other convictions);
State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990(murder); People
v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(assault, sexual
abuse, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping; People
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995){misdemeanor trespass and
cocaine trafficking); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473474(N.Y. 1994)(One of the two felony convictions "involved"
narcotics, and the other was a robbery conviction. Seventeen
unspecified misdemeanor convictions); People v. Mattiace, 568
N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(two personal and two corporate
pollution related convictions could be admitted against the accused
to impeach him should he testify at trial.); State v. Brown, 584
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(malicious wounding); State v.
Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994(State supreme court upheld
trial judge's admission to impeach the accused, charged with
murder, of unrelated guilty pleas for sale and delivery of
cocaine); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(sexual
abuse);
State
v.
Rocha,
834
A.2d
1263,1266-1267(R.I.,
2003)(obstructing a police officer); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448,
449-50(R.I.,
2000)(possession
of
cocaine
with
intent
to
distribute); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I.,
2000)(possession of stolen property a contraband substance); State
v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(breaking and
entering a home with a knife with the intent to commit armedrobbery, assault with intent to rob, assault with a deadly weapon-a
knife, assault with a dangerous weapon-a sharp instrument, and
assault with intent to commit murder with a sharp instrument);
State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)(larceny, entry into a
building with the intent to commit a felony, possession of a
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controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance.); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670,676(R.I.,
1999)(possession of burglary tools, breaking and entering, and
possession of marijuana); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I.,
1996)(kidnapping); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I.,
1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to rob,
delivery of a controlled substance, entering a building with
felonious intent, larceny, and possession of a controlled
substance); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 223(R.I., 1994)(receipt
of stolen property with a value of less than $500.); State v.
Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 1992)(four convictionspossession of marijuana, conspiracy to murder, assault with a
deadly weapon, and assault with intent to kill); State v.
Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 1992)(criminal
contempt, driving to endanger, death resulting, driving under the
influence, leaving the scene of an accident, threatening phone
calls, and the assault with a dangerous weapon conviction); State
v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering);
State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(misdemeanor
conviction for illegal possession of a knife admitted in current
prosecution for murder by stabbing victim with a knife); State v.
Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 296(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering
conviction); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 478-479(Wis.,
2004)(assault, disorderly conduct, two domestic abuse-assaults, and
uttering a bad check); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis,
1991)(misdemeanor reckless use of a weapon)
196.
People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572, 584, 606(Cal.,
2002)(Accused on trial and eventually convicted of several crimes
including murder and attempted murder of a police officer.
On
appeal, an issue raised by the accused was that the trial judge
erred in admitting, ostensibly to impeach his trial testimony, his
four year old conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a
police officer.
Accused expressly argued on appeal that this
conviction for a crime of moral turpitude should be excluded
because its admission would cause significant unfair prejudice
because it was similar to one of the charges for which he was
currently being tried. The California Supreme Court rejected the
accused appeal on the independent ground that the accused trial
attorney invited the error by questioning a witness related to the
conviction and by expressly requesting the trial judge to rule that
the conviction was admissible to impeach the accused. The Court,
however, went on for to assert that even if defense attorney had
not invited the error, the conviction was admissible substantively
because the court, simply conclusionary asserted, the conviction
was admissible even if somewhat similar.
The court made no
reference to any balancing of exclusionary evidential concerns,
including the resulting unfair prejudice.); People v. Sandoval, 841
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P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(Accused convicted by jury of four counts
of first degree murder.
Court sanctioned the authorization to
impeach his trial testimony his prior conviction for assault with
intent to commit murder); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col.,
1990)(Accused on trial and eventually convicted of two counts of
first degree murder. Court sanctioned possible impeachment of the
accused with his prior conviction for aggravated assault); Com. v.
Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000)(Accused tried and convicted
by jury of murder in the first degree.
State supreme court
sanctioned trial judge's decision that the state could impeach the
accused, should he testify, with a ten year old conviction for
armed burglary); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass.,
1997)(Jury found accused guilty of murder in the first degree on
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Court sanctioned trial
judge's ruling that the accused should he have testified could have
been impeached with three felony convictions, including a
conviction for assault with intent to rob); Com. v. Stewart, 663
N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996)(court sanctioned admission of thirty
year old conviction for illegal possession of a sawed off shotgun
when the current trial charges against the accused included assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d
625, 629(Mass., 1993)(assault with intent to rape conviction
admitted in a murder prosecution in which the prosecution's theory,
as explained to the jury, was that the killing was motivated by an
accompanying sexual assault of the victim); Leonard v. State, 958
P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(state supreme court affirmed admission
against the accused of two murder convictions at the accused
current murder trial); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798(Nev.,
1996)(Accused on trial for and convicted by jury of robbery with a
deadly weapon, and two counts of murder with a deadly weapon.
Supreme Court sanctioned admission of accused convictions for
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon) to impeach him should he
testify); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(Accused on
trial for and convicted of two counts of sexual assault and
criminal sexual contact. Court sanctioned admission on retrial of
a prior conviction for sexual assault.
Court ordered that the
identical conviction could be "sanitized" by only permitting the
existence and date but not the name of the sexual assault
conviction to be admitted on retrial); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d
1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine and possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute convictions authorized for
admission by the court(although court ordered no reference to the
name or nature of the convictions) in a prosecution in which the
accused was charged and convicted for the same offenses); State v.
Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990(murder is strongly
probative of credibility, and therefore admissible against the
accused in his current trial for murder); People v. Hayes, 764
N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(Accused on trial on charges of
rape, coercion in the first degree, burglary, and unlawful
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imprisonment in the second degree, and assault in the third degree.
Court sanctioned trial judge's ruling that the prosecutor could
make reference on the retrial to the existence and nature of
convictions for assault, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault,
and aggravated kidnapping); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,
1192(N.Y., 1990)(Accused was convicted of one count of criminal
possession of a forged instrument based on company personnel,
including accused, preparing document attributing source of waste
to a company who was not the waste provider(false hazardous waste
manifest). Court approved trial court's admission of two personal
and two corporate pollution related convictions to impeach the
accused should he testify at trial.) But see discussion infra note
__-__ discussing the state supreme court created heuristic
amelioration doctrine of "sanitization"); State v. Brown, 584
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(malicious wounding conviction
admitted to impeach accused on trial for murder); State v. Busby,
844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(accused was convicted by a jury of
first degree sexual assault.
Court sanctioned decision of the
trial judge to admit accused prior conviction for sexual abuse for
purposes of impeachment if he should testify at trial); State v.
Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(Accused charged and
convicted by jury of possession of cocaine, disorderly conduct,
obstruction of a police officer, and resisting arrest. The State
Supreme Court held that trial judge did not abuse its discretion in
admitting a nolo plea to an identical charge of obstructing a
police officer); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I.,
1999)(Accused was on trial for and eventually convicted of robbery,
during the course of which he used a sharp instrument.
State
supreme court sanctioned the trial judge's admission of multiple
conviction of the accused to impeach his trial testimony.
The
convictions admitted included: fourteen year old convictions for
breaking and entering a home with a knife with the intent to commit
armed-robbery and assault with intent to rob); State v. Walsh, 731
A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)(Accused currently on trial for multiple
charges was eventually convicted of those charges including
possession of cocaine. The court sanctioned admission to impeach
the accused with multiple convictions, including a conviction for
possession of a controlled substance.); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d
670,676(R.I., 1999)(accused tried and convicted in current
prosecution for possession of cocaine. Court sanctioned admission
of three convictions to impeach the accused, including a conviction
for possession of marijuana); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958,
960(R.I., 1995)(Accused was convicted by a jury of first degree
murder and assault with a dangerous weapon. State supreme court
sanctioned trial judge's decision to authorize the prosecutor to
use and the prosecutor asked accused by name about convictions for
assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to rob);
State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 1992)(A
jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder in 1988. On
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appeal, the accused raised the issue that the trial judge erred in
denying in part his motion in limine to exclude from use to impeach
his trial testimony, a fifteen year old conviction for assault with
a dangerous weapon); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I.,
1990)(conviction for illegal possession of a knife admitted in
current prosecution for murder by stabbing victim with a knife)
197. Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 594(N.H., 2003)(New Hampshire
Supreme Court reviewed decision of the U.S.Supreme Court in Green
v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 527(1989).
Court acknowledged that
federal appellate courts' decisions on the federal evidence rule
could be used for guidance in interpreting similar state rules, but
that state supreme court was final authority of appropriate
interpretation of state rules). See also State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d
996, 999(n.5)(Fla., 1998)(employing as a policy reason for
following a United States Supreme Court non-constitutional ruling
interpreting the federal rule of evidence authorizing convictions
to impeach, that the comparable Florida state rule was modeled upon
and substantially similar to the federal standard)
198. State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1387, 1388(R.I., 1990)(state
supreme court miscast its own 1987 evidence rule with regard to
admitting convictions to impeach by asserting that the rule did not
establish an admissibility standard, unlike the federal rule, but
only established a new procedure for considering the admission of
convictions to impeach); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696(R.I.
1999)(court noted that the federal rule may have given decisive
significance to the fact that three of the convictions were older
than ten years old, but expressly decided that it would give no
significance
to
the
age
of
the
convictions
on
their
relevance/probative value to prove propensity to lie)
199. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(court did not
reverse based on this error-harmless error doctrine employed); Com.
v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992)(court reversed
conviction primarily on other grounds); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d
502(Kent., 1991)(court reversed based on this error); Zola v.
Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 596(N.H., 2003)(court reversed based on this
error); State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992)(court did
not reverse based on this error-harmless error doctrine employed)
200. Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 286(Ky., 2004)(judge must have conducted
appropriate balancing evaluation because he inquired about the
nature of the underlying offense, and postponed his final ruling on
admissibility until the target witness' testimony)
Com. v.
Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(state supreme
court implicitedly sanctioned the trial judge's decision which
permitted the prosecutor to wait to trial to announce intention to
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impeach the accused, with several convictions, should he testify ).
Even more importantly the court sanctioned the decision of the
trial judge, without reference to the basis of his conclusion, to
authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused with multiple
convictions all of which were totally irrelevant to prove
propensity to lie.); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,
1192(N.Y., 1990)(Court asserted without specific reference to the
record of that hearing, that the trial judge considered multiple
factors in reaching the admissibility conclusion. Court did not
identify what factors trial judge employed); State v. Garcia, 743
A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(court, despite the balancing evaluation
required by rule, asserted it lacked authority to reverse the trial
judge's discretionary ruling, thereby effectively eliminating the
balancing evaluation required by rule. The court made no attempt
to do what rule required - determine if the trial judge had a
justifiable basis for first finding that the conviction was
relevant to prove propensity to lie, and if it was relevant was its
probative value substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice
that would result); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I.,
1995)(court acquiesced in the trial judge's decision to admit six
irrelevant convictions to impeach the accused, on the ground that
the record proved the judge had performed the required balancing
because in the record was that judge's conclusionary statement that
he did not think that any of the convictions were too remote or too
prejudicial to warrant exclusion. Court cited to a precedent in
which, as in this case, the defendant claimed that trial judge had
failed to make the evaluation properly with regard to determining
if each conviction is probative to prove propensity to lie, and
even if it is, was its probative value substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice. The court held that all a trial judge need do is
state the conclusion that the unfair prejudice of such convictions
as a whole and or individually does not outweigh their probative
value.); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(Court
apparently accepted as a substitute for the rule required balancing
evaluation a conclusionary finding that the trial judge did the
balancing without a single reference to indicate that the judge
even attempted to assess the unfair prejudice that would result if
the jury learned that the accused on trial for murder by stabbing
the victim with a knife, had another conviction based on his
illegal possession of a knife); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542
and 543(Wis, 1991)(The court made reference to some of the factors
that trial judges should employ in conducting the balancing
evaluation, but failed to demonstrate that the trial judge used
such factors, and did not specifically apply these guidelines to
the facts of the current case). See also cases discussed, infra
note 209)
201.
See infra. notes 206, 208 - 211, 223 - 224, 265,
accompanying text.
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and

202.

See supra note 193, and accompanying text.

203. Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a)(2005)
204. Massachusetts, New York, and Missouri by rule authorized the
per se admission of all such convictions, but the Missouri Supreme
Court did not render a pertinent decision during the fifteen year
study period. North Carolina, authorized the per se admission of
all such misdemeanor convictions if the maximum punishment exceeded
sixty days. The New Jersey Rule, authorized the admission of all
such convictions, but only if they passed a general balancing
evaluation which pitted their propensity re credibility against
exclusionary concerns they implicated.
The Louisiana rule
authorized per se admission of all such irrelevant misdemeanor
convictions in criminal cases, and in civil cases all such
convictions punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than six
months, but only if they passed a evenly weighted balancing
evaluation.
The Rhode Island and Wisconsin rules, which impose
identical standards, authorize admission of all such irrelevant
misdemeanor convictions but only if they pass a balancing
evaluation tilted towards admission.
Oregon authorized the
possible admission of such a conviction but only against the
accused, and only if he was a recidivist, and only if the
conviction and current charge related to assaultive behavior in a
domestic setting. Finally, Virginia authorized admission of such
irrelevant misdemeanor convictions but only in civil cases against
non-party witnesses.
205. Three states, Florida, Nebraska, and New Hampshire had the
same rule as the federal rule-excluding these misdemeanors), while
four states's rules, California, Colorado, Kentucky, and Nevada
banned use of all misdemeanor convictions to impeach.
206. State v. Tolbert, 849 So.2d 32(La, 2003)(court held that its
criminal rule, which authorized admission of any conviction,
including any misdemeanor(case involved issue of whether the
alleged victim's municipal misdemeanor convictions were admissible)
conviction to impeach, was nevertheless subject to exclusion by
application of the evidence code's general policy balancing rule.
Hence, upon objection to admission, the probative value to prove
propensity to lie must be assessed and the conviction could be
excluded if that value was substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice and other exclusionary policy concerns.
The court
expressly recited list of exclusionary policy concerns in its
policy rule-in addition to unfair prejudice-misleading the jury,
confusion of the issues, undue delay, and waste of time); People v.
Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(two personal and two
corporate pollution related misdemeanor convictions could be
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admitted against the accused to impeach him should he testify at
trial. Court asserted without specific reference to the record of
the pretrial hearing, that the trial judge considered multiple
factors in reaching the admissibility conclusion. Court did not
identify what factors trial judge employed)
207.

People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994) ]

208.
State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(State
supreme court ruled that the trial judge did not abuse its
discretion in admitting misdemeanor convictions for possession of
stolen property and for possession of a contraband substance);
State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483(Wis., 2004)(court
sanctioned the admission of misdemeanor conviction for disorderly
conduct, and probably misdemeanor uttering a check and assault.
209. State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483-488(Wis., 2004)(trial
record proved trial judge uttered only a single sentence that could
be fairly characterized as an evaluation of the admissibility of
the convictions at issue. No reference to balancing or to even the
identification of a single implicated exclusionary concerns) ]
210.
Id. at 484.
Court further compounded reliance on junk
science by endorsing as reality prosecutor's assertion that three,
quarter of a century old convictions for minor offenses, were a
part of a pattern of convictions because they happened over a span
of three years and the accused was subsequently convicted twelve
years latter of two domestic assault convictions, and this
"pattern" was independent proof of a person more likely to lie.
211. Id. at 486. With regard to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
ringing endorsement of this specious inference see infra note 259,
and accompanying text.
212.

See supra note 205, and accompanying text.

213. State v. Porter, 455 N.W.2d 787,795(Neb., 1990)(The appeal
theory of the defense by inference conceded that normally such a
conviction was admissible to impeach. The defense objection was
based on an erroneous understanding of the use of an uncounseled
guilty plea as a conviction)
214. State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(Accused was
convicted by a jury of first degree assault. At trial, his defense
theory was self-defense. On appeal, he claimed it was error for
the trial judge to exclude two past misdemeanor convictions of the
alleged victim for reckless conduct and simple assault, as well as
the conduct underlying those offenses. The state supreme court
evaluated the two convictions and concluded that neither the
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adjudications or the conduct underlying was relevant to prove
propensity to lie) See also State v. Norgren, 618 A.2d 505,
507(N.H., 1992)(supreme court acknowledged that misdemeanor
criminal mischief, simple assault, and criminal threatening
convictions did not qualify under its rule as crimes of
"dishonesty" of "false statement". Court did not restate or make
any reference to a developed definition of these concepts)
215.
People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 392(n. 11)(Cal., 1997),
(misdemeanor convictions lack reliability as proof per se of the
required conduct to prove the elements); People v. Wheeler, 841
P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(Court expressly recognized that prior to
1982 amendment misdemeanor convictions were per se excluded, and
that the generic evidence policy rule, required that before a
felony conviction could be admitted to impeach its probative value
to prove propensity to lie had to be balanced against its potential
for unfair prejudice, and if the latter substantially outweighed
the former, the conviction must be excluded. State supreme court
ruled that the effect of the constitutional amendment was to
authorize the admission of relevant underlying conduct, but not the
fact of, a misdemeanor conviction to impeach, i.e. relevant to
prove propensity to lie.
216.

People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,944(Cal., 1992)

217.

Id.

218. See Holley supra note 1 at notes 127 - 163, and accompanying
text.
219.

Id..

220.
See Holley supra note 1, at notes 133, 142 - 144, and
accompanying text. New Jersey's Supreme Court was interpreting a
generic balancing standard, applicable to all witnesses, and the
Rhode Island and Wisconsin Supreme Court were interpreting a
standard titled towards admission for all witnesses, including the
accused.
221. Compare supra notes 185 - 186 with "misdemeanor" conviction
cases identified in 206 - 217, and accompanying text.
222.
State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(State
supreme court made reference to its 1976 decision in which it had
held that its general evidence policy balancing rule applied to its
rule on the admissions of convictions to impeach, and therefore
convictions were not per se admissible for that purpose. Instead,
the court ruled in that case, that its policy rule required trial
judges to make a balancing evaluation. That rule the court held,
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required that the evaluation focus upon whether the probative value
of the conviction to prove propensity to lie, was substantially
outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury,
or confusion of the issues. The court expressly recognized that
the overriding policy concern that warranted this balancing
evaluation was to provide discretion to provide a fair trial and do
justice.); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1387-1388(R.I., 1990);
State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542 and 543(Wis, 1991)
223.
These seven states were: California, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Oregon.
People v.
Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d
862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal.,
1992)(Court expressly recognized that prior to 1982 amendment
misdemeanor convictions were per se excluded, and that the generic
evidence policy rule, required that before a felony conviction
could be admitted to impeach its probative value to prove
propensity to lie had to be balanced against its potential for
unfair prejudice, and if the latter substantially outweighed the
former, the conviction must be excluded); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d
705,719(Cal, 1992); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879, 886-887(Kent.,
1992); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); State v.
Tolbert, 849 So.2d 32(La, 2003)(discussed supra note 5-22); Com. v.
Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143(Mass., 2002); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d
589, 594-595(N.H., 2003); People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836,
839(N.Y., 1992); State v. Pratt, 853 P.2d 827, 833-834(Or.,
1993)(Court reviewed history of its rule since its enactment in
1981, noting that originally the rule required, but only with
regard to the accused as witness, that trial judges balance the
probative value of a felony conviction to prove propensity to lie
against the unfair prejudice the admission would cause. The court
next noted that a 1986 ballot initiative amended the rule, by
eliminating the balancing requirement.
Court asserted that the
purpose of the amendment was to assure that any felony conviction
of an accused would be admitted to impeach his testimony.
The
court next ruled that such convictions were still subject to be
excluded on the specific policy ground recognized in its pervasive
policy balancing rule that the convictions probative value was
substantially outweighed by the fact that it was cumulative.)
224. These six states were Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Virginia.
People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d
1364,1367(Col., 1993); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col.,
1990)(implication of opinion was that the only basis to bar accused
impeachment with his prior conviction for aggravated assault was to
timely prove the conviction was error, or as in this appeal to
claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to make
this claim.); McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209(Fla, 2000); State
v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 741(Neb., 1999); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d
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1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(Accused a racist prisoner, stabbed to death
a black inmate. Jury convicted him in 1989 of murder, and he was
sentenced to death. Accused filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in 1992, which was not heard and denied until 1996. Trial
judge indicated that it would sanction the admission of two prior
murder convictions for purpose of impeachment, and possibly for
substantive purpose. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld
that decision as within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Court made no reference to a
balancing evaluation, and upheld
admission of two same crime convictions.); State v. Brown, 584
S.E.2d 278, 282(N.C., 2002)(court claimed it lacked the authority
to give trial judges the right to evaluate if exclusionary concerns
should result in exclusion of qualified convictions(crimes
punishable by more than sixty days in jail.
Court expressly
rejected accused argument that the pervasive evidence policy
evaluation rule equivalent to federal rule 403, required that the
admission of the conviction to impeach should depend upon whether
its probative value to prove propensity to lie, was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Court held that the North
Carolina legislature had rejected adoption of a balancing
evaluation as an express policy decision. Court did not assert,
however, that the legislature had decided to defy logic and
eliminate the minimum admission requirement that the evidence must
be relevant to the issue for which it is offered); Williams v.
Com., 450 S.E.2d 365(Va., 1994).
But see infra note 5-79
and
accompanying text in which three of these six courts adopted a
mitigation doctrine of "sanitizing" the convictions admitted to
impeach as a means of ameliorating the unfair prejudice that could
result from the admission by name of such convictions)
225. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841
P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589,595(N.H.,
2003); State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(Accused was
convicted by a jury of first degree assault. At trial, his defense
theory was self-defense. On appeal, he claimed it was error for
the trial judge to exclude two past misdemeanor convictions of the
alleged victim for reckless conduct and simple assault, as well as
the conduct underlying those offenses. The state supreme court
evaluated the two convictions and concluded that neither the
adjudications or the conduct underlying was relevant to prove
propensity to lie)
226.
People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(Accused
convicted by jury of four counts of first degree murder. Court
without reference to any substantive evaluation merely endorsed the
trial judge's illogical assumptions that such a conviction was not
only relevant to prove propensity to lie, but that its probative
value on that issue outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice.)
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227.
Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 594-595(N.H., 2003)(The court
relied on the "Reporter's Note" to its specific rule which made
express reference to its general exclusionary policy balancing
rule, implying the court concluded that the general rule would
apply when the more specific and more exclusionary balancing rule
favoring the accused did not apply)
228. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841
P.2d
938,941(Cal.,
1992);
Com.
v.
Sommers,
843
S.W.2d
879,887(Kent., 1992); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent.,
1991); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143-144(Mass., 2002); Zola
v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589,595(N.H., 2003); People v. Dokes, 595
N.E.2d 836, 839(N.Y., 1992); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542 and
543(Wis, 1991)(The court made reference to some of the factors that
trial judges should employ in conducting the balancing evaluation.
See also supra notes 71 - 76, 118, 125, 143 for identification of
states whose rules mimicked the federal rule, and states whose
rules were overall more liberal than the federal rule also
resorting to their own guidelines.
229. People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(exclusionary
concern laundry list); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent.,
1992)(age of the conviction); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135,
144(Mass., 2002)(how many times prosecutor made reference to the
admitted conviction of the accused); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d
589,595(N.H., 2003)(The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied these
heuristics to the plaintiff's drug conviction, and identified three
of them, all of which, court concluded, pointed in the direction of
exclusion which the court concluded was the appropriate decision.
Court pointed to fact that conviction was almost ten years old, and
reasoned that the conviction had minimal probative value to prove
propensity to lie, and was likely to cause unfair prejudice because
the jury could decide the merits in part because of disapproval of
the plaintiff); People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836, 839(N.Y.,
1992)(similarity of the conviction to the current charge, the
relevance of the conviction to the accused credibility, the age of
the accused at the time of the conviction-"bad acts", and the
disposition of the charges. Court also acknowledged other factors
could be used in the evaluation); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d
531,543(Wis., 1991)(was the conviction one for a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement)
230. See discussion supra notes 189, 193 - 196, and accompanying
text.
231. State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(identical
crime conviction admitted); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448(R.I.,
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2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999)(five
similar crime convictions admitted to impeach the accused); State
v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I. 1999)(two similar crime
convictions admitted); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 672 and
676(R.I., 1999)(Accused convicted by a jury of possession of a
controlled substance-cocaine. Court sanctioned the admission, to
impeach the defendant's trial testimony, of three fourteen year old
convictions - breaking and entering, possession of burglary tools,
and possession of marijuana); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958,
960(R.I., 1995)(court sanctioned admission of six defendant
convictions, including an identical conviction for assault with a
dangerous weapon and a similar conviction for assault with intent
to rob); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992)(court
sanctioned the trial judge's admission of seven convictions to
impeach the accused, including one similar crime conviction); State
v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering).
232.
State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993); State v.
Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531, 542(Wis, 1991)
233.
People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 966(N.Y., 2002)(court
credited itself for not creating per se rules that would bar the
admission of convictions likely to cause substantial unfair
prejudice including convictions for sex crimes, and crimes
identical or similar to a crime or crimes currently being tried.
); People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444,445(N.Y., 1995)(court lauded
itself for failing to establish guidelines for the balancing
evaluation it created. While trial judges must balance, what and
how they balance is up to each of hundreds of trial judges across
the state, and it is the responsibility of intermediate appellate
courts to review these decisions because they have authority to
review factual findings)
234. Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991)(court did not
list a comprehensive set of factors that trial judges could or
should employ in performing the balancing evaluation)
235. See discussion of similar behavior by the New York Court of
Appeals, discussed supra note 233, and see also infra notes 338 345 and accompanying text.
236. Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992); Com. v.
Rivera, 682 N.E.2d 636, 646(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666
N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625,
628(Mass., 1993); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J.,
1993); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 965-966(N.Y., 2002); People
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444,445(N.Y., 1995). See also illustrating how
state supreme courts who were true to their per se admission rule,
justified that loyalty by resort to this same fiction, McFadden v.
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State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1216(Fla, 2000)(Court also endorsed, again
without reference to any evidence, a related and mitigating
heuristic - that when a person is convicted of a felony but the
trial judge withholds final adjudication, the judge has determined
that the person for whom final adjudication is withheld is not
likely again to commit crime, and is therefore no more likely to
lie under oath.)
237. Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135,144(Mass., 2002); Com. v.
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); State v. Brunson, 625
A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(Court added a third heuristic which
further favored admission of convictions against an accused who
sought to testify at his trial. The court asserted that such a
person has an added motive to lie to avoid another conviction. The
court did not explain why such a person had a greater motive to
avoid a second or multiple conviction, as opposed to a person
seeking to avoid a first conviction. Risk of significant losses
are also possible for parties in civil cases. The court did not
acknowledge this reality); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I.
1999); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 681(R.I., 1992)(The state
supreme Court asserted that convictions can be admitted to impeach
even if they do not relate to dishonesty or false statement. The
court did not explain on what basis such convictions would be even
relevant to prove propensity to lie). The court relied on prerule historical precedent and statute to continue the view that
unless the trial judge makes a specific finding that a conviction
should be excluded, any conviction is admissible to impeach any
witness); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992); State
v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis, 1991) ]
238.
People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556 and 557(Cal.,
1999)(state supreme court endorsed multiple junk science heuristics
in this opinion. First the court asserted that the admission of
convictions pierces a false aura of veracity.
239.
text

See Holley supra note 1, at

240.

Id. at

notes 194-199 and accompanying

notes 210 - 218, and accompanying text.

241. State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1091(N.J., 1993); State v.
Harvey, 581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v. Pennington, 575
A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990; State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098,
1117(R.I. 1992)(State supreme court employed junk science heuristic
that it is reasonable to assume that one who has been convicted of
a serious crime has demonstrated anti-social tendencies and
therefore a jury may properly place less credence in that person's
testimony then that of a law abiding witness.
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242.
People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,606(Cal., 2002)(accused
convicted of five felonies including the attempted murder of a
police officer. State Supreme Court began by indicating that it
was significant to the resolution of the issue of the admissibility
of a conviction to impeach, that the attorney for the accused
agreed that it was accurate to characterize the accused conviction
for assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer as an offense
of "moral turpitude". The court did not explain at this point why
this was significant); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,944(Cal.,
1992); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(The court
reviewed that precedent which held that even after the 1982
constitutional amendment via referendum which sought apparently to
authorize per se the admission of any felony convictions to
impeach, only felonies involving moral turpitude qualified for
possible admission), People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949,972(Cal.,
1991)(court eyeballed four crimes, and justices asserted that the
elements evidenced a general readiness to do evil, and based on
this third level inference they were each therefore admissible with
regard to impeachment.); Williams v. Comm., 450 S.E.2d 365,375(Va.,
1994)(court extended the
application of this heuristic to
"misdemeanor" convictions, even though its rule seemingly barred
admission of misdemeanors to impeach. Court did rule that neither
misdemeanor assaults nor batteries were crimes of moral turpitude
for purpose of impeachment.)
243. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 260(Cal., 2002); People v.
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999); and People v. Clair, 828
P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(court identified as one of the most crucial
factors in the balancing evaluation, a heuristic surrogate for the
appropriate logical relevance inquiry, in a criminal case when the
witness is not the accused - is the conviction relevant as proof of
dishonesty); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal.,
1991)(state supreme court endorsed, without evaluation, the trial
judge's list of balancing factors favoring admission of convictions
against the accused, including a finding that the burglary
conviction was theft related and therefore bore on dishonesty).
244. Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274,285(Ky., 2004)
245.
Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993)(Court
equated the probative value of violent crimes to disprove
credibility with that of convictions for crimes of dishonesty)
246. See Holley, supra note 1 at notes 192 - 199, and accompanying
text.
247.
People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(court
endorsed two related junk science heuristics - the age of the
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conviction and whether the accused has led a crime free blameless
life since the conviction as factors in the balancing evaluation);
People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999)(state supreme
court held that because the accused spent most of fifteen years
since the two felony theft related convictions in prison, they were
not too remote to demonstrate to be
used for impeachment.
Apparently California Supreme Court simply piled another junk
science heuristic upon the others employed in its premise. Accused
must have opportunity as free citizen to commit another crime or
his prior crimes continue to have the same relevance as the day
they were committed with regard to proving he has a propensity to
lie. Court lost focus completely on its previous point as to issue
to which their admission must be at least relevant - propensity to
lie, and how lapse of time could lessen whatever relevanceprobative value these particular convictions had to prove
likelihood of lying); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521, 557(Cal.,
1994)(state supreme court evaluated as a factor in determining the
admission of the conviction to impeach the age of the conviction.
It concluded a thirteen and eleven year old convictions for receipt
of stolen property and burglary were not too old to be used to
impeach the testimony of the accused because the accused had spent
most of the intervening years in prison); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d
705,719(Cal, 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal.,
1991)(court approved the age of the conviction as a factor and
concluded that the burglary conviction was not too remote to be
used to impeach because the accused had not thereafter led a
blameless life); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949,972(Cal.,
1991)(state supreme court affirmed the trial judge's decision to
admit all of accused prior felony convictions ostensibly only to
impeach his trial testimony. The court held that convictions of
seven and nine years of age at the time of the current trial were
not too remote.); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992);
Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991)(Court cited to
federal rule and presumptive ten year rule as guidance. Court did
not expressly adopt that presumption. Court cited with approval,
but without explanation or reference to their rationale, two
decisions, one admitting a thirteen year old conviction and one
excluding a seventeen year old conviction); State v. Brunson, 625
A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(The court did not specify what passage
of time would even presumptively begin to dissipate the probative
value of a conviction, but did indicate that the aging of the
conviction could be tempered by subsequent convictions, and service
of jail time)
248.

Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879, 887(Kent., 1992)

249.

Id.
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250. See Holley supra note 1 at notes 208 - 218, and accompanying
text.
251.
People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999)(state
supreme court sanctioned trial judge's decision to allow
prosecution to impeach the accused with two fifteen year old felony
theft
related
convictions);
People
v.
Lesney,
856
P.2d
1364,1367(Col., 1993)(affirming use by the co-defendant of multiple
convictions to impeach the accused should he have testified. All
of convictions were over ten years old. Court still sanctioned
apparent per se admission of all of these convictions); Miller ex
rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 125 S.W.3d
274(Kent., 2004)(court sanctioned anonymous admission of twelve
year old attempted burglary conviction to impeach one of the
plaintiffs in a civil case); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d
502,503(Kent., 1991)(Court cited with approval, but without
explanation, its precedent admitting a thirteen year old
conviction); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass.,
1996)(Court sanctioned admission to impeach the accused of a thirty
year old possession of a sawed off shotgun conviction); People v.
Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(Court sanctioned the
trial judge's admission of seventeen misdemeanor convictions which
were entered over the course of a dozen years); State v. Rodriquez,
731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(court sanctioned admission of
fourteen year old convictions for breaking and entering a home
with a knife with the intent to commit armed-robbery, assault with
intent to rob, and assault with a deadly weapon-a knife; as well as
two ten year old convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon-a
sharp instrument, and assault with intent to commit murder with a
sharp instrument); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I.
1999)(court sanctioned the admission to impeach the accused with an
eleven year old conviction for possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05
and 1116(R.I. 1992){court sanctioned the admission to impeach the
accused with a thirteen year old conviction)]
252.
State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I. 1999); State v.
Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992)(state supreme court
employed
junk
science heuristic
that
multiple
conviction
demonstrates disdain for the law, and therefore makes all/almost
all conviction in the sequence, no matter how old, arguably
relevant to attack credibility.
The court expressly endorsed
heuristic that continued disobdience to the law is a logical basis
for inferring that the person is more likely to disregard his oath
and more likely to lie on the stand)
253. Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002);
Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Com. v. Smith,
686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963,
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964(N.Y., 2002)(trial judge had admitted four irrelevant and highly
prejudicial convictions, but court pointed to fact that the trial
judge had excluded an attempted assault conviction and a twenty
year old trespass conviction); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,
1192(N.Y.,
1990)(Following,
what
the
state
supreme
court
characterized as a lengthy pre-trial hearing, the trial judge
concluded that three of seven of accused and corporation prior
convictions could not be used by prosecution to impeach him, but
that two personal and two corporate pollution related convictions
could be admitted for this purpose. Accused did not testify).
254.
People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 260(Cal., 2002)(Current
murder trial resulted in a conviction and death sentence. Court
ruled that the improper admissions to impeach the accused with his
convictions for murder and rape were harmless, in part because
another conviction was admissible) Few other supreme courts had
relied on this
heuristic, and the court did not cite to any
evidence to support this novel notion.
255. Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d
625, 629(Mass., 1993); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964(N.Y.,
2002); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990);
Castellucci v. Batista, 847 A.2d 243, 251(R.I., 2004); State v.
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(Trial judge found and state
supreme court concurred that credibility was a significant issue at
trial, and it then resorted to the anti-science/junk science
heuristic inference that this factor favored admission of any
conviction, including this misdemeanor conviction, to impeach the
accused).
256.
See discussion supra notes 76 - 77 explaining why these
factors logically favor exclusion and not admission.
257.
See e.g. People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y.,
2002)(Accused, on trial for multiple offenses, including sexual
assault, at a pre-trial hearing argued that the admission,
ostensibly only to impeach, of his convictions, many of them
similar to the current charges, would impair his right to a fair
trial because of the unfair prejudice that would result. The trial
judge ruled that the accused could be impeached with four
convictions, all four similar to at least one of the current
charges. The judge ruled that the prosecutor could make reference
to the existence and nature of convictions for assault, sexual
abuse, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The
judge excluded an attempted assault conviction and a twenty year
old trespass conviction. Accused did not testify at trial, and was
convicted of all charges except assault.
The intermediate
appellate court reversed the trial judge, and held that the trial
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judge had abused his discretion, because of the danger of unfair
prejudice which resulted when the similar convictions were
authorized to impeach the accused. That court focused on the risk
of such unfair prejudice particularly caused by the trial judge
authorizing reference by the prosecution to the nature of the
conviction as opposed to the mere existence of convictions. The
appellate court had also reversed because the trial judge's
decision had contributed to keeping accused from testifying, and
therefore denied him the only witness who could substantiate his
consent theory.
Despite these detailed findings, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court, an
action it never took when the appellate court affirmed the
admission of any conviction to impeach the accused during the
entire decade and one-half period of this study)
258. Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002);(Court also
employed in its evaluation whether and the number of prosecution
references to the admitted conviction[s]); Com. v. Whitman, 617
N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80,
85(Mass., 1990); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999);
State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347,1357(R.I., 1996), and State v.
Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 223(R.I., 1994)
259.
State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999)(court
expressly acknowledged that the trial judge did not undertake the
balancing evaluation that the state supreme court expressly
acknowledged was the standard of its rule)
260.

See Holley supra note 1 at note 219, and accompanying text.

261. People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992)(the court
acknowledged that a 1982 constitutional amendment had obliterated
some of its detailed working rules developed to guide the balancing
evaluation. The court did not specify which working rules in its
view were obliterated by the constitutional amendment); People v.
Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(Court cited with approval
McCormick's and Wigmore's treatise for a laundry list, of which it
did not specify each element, of policy reasons supporting limiting
use of convictions to impeach any witness, including the special
substantive propensity conviction concern when the witness is the
accused).
262.

People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556 and 557(Cal., 1999)

263.
With regard to the widespread admission of similar
convictions see supra notes 52, 96, and 196, and accompanying text.
Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); Com. v. Pauling,
777 N.E.2d 135, 143-144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d
983,988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass.,
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1996); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996); Com. v.
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993); Com. v. Feroli, 553
N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085,
1088(N.J., 1993); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993);
State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis, 1991)
264.
Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); Com. v.
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993)
265. McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1217(Fla, 2000)(court's
holding was that the trial judge committed reversible error by
treating as a conviction for purpose of the state's impeachment
rule, an unadjudicated guilty plea. The court went on to note that
the trial judge committed further error by allowing the prosecutor
to identify the nature of the underlying offense which was the same
as the current charge, as well as the fact that the victim was the
same)
The court, however, was not always faithful to this
heuristic, see e.g. Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 790(Fla.,
1992); State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 741, 748(Neb., 1999); State v.
Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 165(N.C., 1992)
266.
Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 143,145(Fla., 1991);
Brown v.
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502, 503(Kent., 1991); State v. Jackson, 601
N.W.2d 741, 748(Neb., 1999); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088
and 1090 and 1092-1093.(N.J., 1993)l; State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d
158, 165(N.C., 1992); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis,
1991))
267.
Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 143,145(Fla., 1991); Brown v.
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502, 503(Kent., 1991)(prohibited identification
of the specific felony for which the person was convicted, unless
the witness denied the conviction; State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d
741, 748(Neb., 1999)(interprets rule to authorize admission only of
the fact of conviction for a felony and the number of such
convictions, but to exclude reference to the name, nature,
sentence, and details of the crime and conviction); State v.
Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(The court found that
the prosecution's interests in attacking the credibility of an
accused who testified with a felony conviction was adequately
vindicated by admission of the grade and date of such convictions.
Court added guideline that when the accused was also convicted of
non-similar convictions the prosecution options were to seek to
admit by name those convictions only, or to seek to admit
"sanitized" statements of all of the convictions; State v. Ross,
405 S.E. 2d 158, 165(N.C., 1992)(court, which did not adopt a
balancing standard, recognized both the propriety of sanitizing a
conviction and employing as a balancing factor which favored and in
this case should have resulted in exclusion of the convictions to
impeach - the policy consideration that the jury was likely to use
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such convictions for the impermissible substantive purpose of
convicting the accused}; State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475,
487(Wis., 2004)(court majority found significant fact that judge
did not authorize reference to names or date of entry of three
decades old convictions);
State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542543(Wis, 1991)(the court did not make express reference to
"sanitized", but did assert that the proper procedure was to limit
the inquiry only to the facts that the witness was convicted of a
crime, and the number of convictions)
268. State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088-1089(N.J., 1993)(Court
first cited an empirical study to note that criminal defendants
with criminal records are less likely to testify than those without
such records. Subsequent to that reference, the court cited to an
empirical study, first for the proposition that the study findings
included a finding that jurors stated that a prior conviction did
not affect their view of the credibility of the accused. Second,
court cited to a finding of that study that the highest conviction
rate by these same sampled jurors occurred when the prior
conviction was for a crime identical or similar to the current
crime being tried. Court noted that other empirical studies had
reported similar findings. State supreme court failed to recognize
the significance of its first finding-jurors do not view any
particular conviction as a logical reason to believe that a witness
is more likely to lie.
The state supreme court also cited to
several commentators for their consensus conclusion that the
admission of prior convictions including their admission only to
impeach, would unfairly prejudice the accused, if he was the
witness, and that such unfair prejudice would occur even if the
judge gave a limiting instruction)
269. Miller ex rel.
Center, 125 S.W.3d
anonymous admission
conviction to impeach

Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical
274, 285-286(Ky., 2004)(court sanctioned
of twelve year old attempted burglary
one of the plaintiffs in a civil case)

270.
Id.(apparently the court had never contemplated the
significance of the outcome and aftermath of Green v. Bock Laundry,
490 U.S. 527(1989). See also Holley, supra note 1, at note 38, and
accompanying text.
Referring to evidence that the quantum and
quality of unfair prejudice has to be evaluated on a specific
witness type, and that unfair prejudice is likely to rank second
for civil party witnesses right after the potential for unfair
prejudice when the accused is the witness impeached with a prior
conviction.
271.
People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572, 584, 606(Cal.,
2002)(accused on trial and eventually convicted of several crimes
including murder and attempted murder of a police officer, and
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sentenced to death.
Trial judge admitted his four year old
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer.
The court conclusionarily asserted that the conviction was
admissible even if somewhat similar)
272.
State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995)(court
acquiesced in the trial judge's decision to admit six irrelevant
convictions to impeach the accused, on the ground that the record
proved the judge had performed the required balancing because in
the record was that judge's conclusionary statement that he did not
think that any of the convictions were too remote or too
prejudicial to warrant exclusion); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,
1039-1040(R.I., 1990)
273. People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(court found that
it was reasonable, hence no abuse of discretion, for the trial
judge to conclude that the admission of the voluntary manslaughter
conviction would have been highly prejudicial, and so remote that
it diminished the relevance of the conviction, apparently one the
court conceded was for a crime of moral turpitude, to prove
propensity to lie. Court did not identify a basis to justify the
highly prejudicial finding, or more importantly why no trial judge
during the approximately decade and one-half of this study had ever
made and it had never confirmed such a finding when a range of
felony convictions were admitted to impeach the accused.); State v.
Werner, 831 A.2d 183, at 204 & 205(R.I., 2003)(court referred to
its precedent for principle that age of convictions can mitigate
unfair prejudice that could result from their admission, and
subsequently sanctioned exclusion in this case on the grounds
employed by the trial judge - the convictions were "stale" and the
nature of the offenses were not strongly probative of lying. Hence
court accepted at face value trial judge's balancing evaluation,
and most egregiously failed to reconcile, despite having the issue
expressly raised on appeal, that in recent decisions it had
rejected the same reasoning relied upon by this trial judge, when
it was asserted by the defendant to exclude one or more of his
convictions)
274. See supra notes 207 - 210, 223, 230 - 234, 252, 259, 272, and
accompanying text.
275.
See supra notes
accompanying text.

208

-

211,

231,

252,

and

259,

and

276. Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(Jury found
accused guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Accused did not testify after the
trial judge ruled that the prosecution could impeach him with his
convictions for robbery, assault with intent to rob, and larceny of
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a motor vehicle); Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass.,
1990)(Accused convicted at his second(first ended in mistrial
because of hung jury) by a jury of two counts of first degree
murder by reason of deliberate premeditation and felony murder.
Accused made a pretrial motion to exclude his conviction from use
by the prosecution should he testify at trial, and took the
position, which he in fact followed, that unless the convictions
were excluded he would not testify at trial); People v. Hayes, 764
N.E.2d 963, 964(N.Y., 2002)(Accused did not testify at trial, and
was convicted of all charges except assault); People v. Mattiace,
568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(Following what the state supreme
court characterized as a lengthy pre-trial hearing the trial judge
concluded that three of seven of accused and corporation prior
convictions could not be used by prosecution to impeach him, but
that two personal and two corporate pollution related convictions
could be admitted for this purpose. Accused did not testify.
277.
Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990)(Accused
convicted at his second(first ended in mistrial because of hung
jury) by a jury of two counts of first degree murder by reason of
deliberate premeditation and felony murder.
278.
Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135,143(Mass., 2002)(highly
conclusionary analysis); State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 799800(N.C., 1994)(no analysis of the constitutional issue); State v.
Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(Accused was convicted by a jury
of first degree sexual assault. Accused did not testify during the
trial.
State supreme court ruled that in order to have his
constitutional claim that the admission of a prior sexual abuse
conviction denied him his constitutional right to an impartial jury
trial.
State supreme court ruled on appeal the accused was
required to make an offer of proof at trial, describing what he
would have testified to had his convictions been excluded. Accused
failed to make the offer of proof, and therefore state supreme
court refused to evaluate the merits of his constitutional claims)
279. See supra notes 43 - 44, and accompanying text. Seventy-two
percent of these decisions involved impeaching the accused in a
criminal case.
280. See supra notes 83 - 84, and accompanying text. Sixty-three
percent of these decisions involved impeaching the accused in a
criminal case.
281.

See supra notes 185 - 186, and accompanying text.

282.

See infra note 294, and accompanying text.

283.

See supra notes 45 - 46, and accompanying text.
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284.

See supra notes 85 - 86, and accompanying text.

285.

See supra notes 187 - 188, and accompanying text.

286.
See supra notes 48 - 49, 89 - 90, and 190 - 191, and
accompanying text.
287.
See supra notes 48 - 49, 89 - 90, and 190 - 191, and
accompanying text.
288.
See Holley, supra note 1 at notes 25, 26, and 39, and
accompanying text.
289.

Id., at notes

44, 52, 102, and 105, and accompanying text.

290.

Id., at notes

140, and 148 - 150, and accompanying text.

291.

Id., at notes

148 - 150, and accompanying text. ]

292.

See supra notes 175 - 181, and accompanying text.

293.

See supra note 160 and 277, and accompanying text.

294.

See supra notes 50 - 51, 91 - 92, and accompanying text.

295.

See supra notes 50 and 91, and accompanying text.

296.

See supra notes 192 - 195, and accompanying text.

297.

See Holley, supra note 1, at note 216, and accompanying text.

298. See supra notes 52, 96-97, 188, and 196, and accompanying
text.
299. See supra notes 52, 58, 80, 144 - 145, and 206 and 223, and
accompanying text. See also infra note 321 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 73 - 74, 76, 94, text following note 124, 127
- 128, text immediately proceeding and accompanying note 132, 133 134, 145, 167 - 169, 230, 240, 258 - 260, 266, 270, text proceeding
and accompanying 271, 272, 275, and accompanying text or note
respectively. But see contra notes 108, 161 - 162, 171, and 264,
and accompanying text.
301.
See supra notes 53 - 56, 103 - 107, 197 - 198, and
accompanying text.
302.

See supra notes 53, 103, and 197, and accompanying text.
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303.

See supra notes 56, and 107, and accompanying text.

304.

See supra notes 56, 107, and accompanying text.

305.

See Holley, supra note 1, at note 1,

and accompanying text.

306.
See supra notes 57 - 60, 108 - 134, and 199 - 200, and
accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 42, 57, 86, 108, and 199, and accompanying
text.
308. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L.
Rev.
2030(2000);
Note:
46
Case
W.
Res.
L.
Rev.
1,
17(n.73)(1995)(Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Statistical Tables 1993 Tables at 6 tbl. B-5. Interpreted as
containing state and federal statistics on direct appeals, and
reporting ultimate overall reversal rate of 7.4%, while capital
appeals rate was 50%); Note: Courting Reversal: The Supervisory
Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 Yale L.J. 1191(1978)(1870-1970
overall reversal rate of 38.5%)
309.

See supra notes 57, 108, and 199, and accompanying text.

310. See supra notes 46, 48, 57, 86, 89, 90, 108, 188, and 199,
and accompanying text.
311.

See supra notes 58, 109, 118, 200, and accompanying text.

312.

See supra notes 58, 110, 201, and accompanying text.

313.
See supra notes 50 - 51, 91 - 92, 111, 193, 202, and
accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 50 - 51, 91, 111, 193, 202, and accompanying
text.
315.
See supra notes 62 - 63, 137, 140 - 141, and 212, and
accompanying text.
316. See discussion supra notes 54 - 56, 64, 105 - 107, 143, 148 149, 151 - 153, and 212 - 214, and accompanying text.
317. See supra. notes 64, 143, and 148 - 151,
213 - 214, and accompanying text.
318.

But see 153, and

See supra notes 144 and 145, and accompanying text.
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319.

68, 157, and 221 and accompanying text.

320.
See supra notes 69 - 70, 158, 231, 236 - 256, and
accompanying text.
321.
See supra notes, 70 - 79, 166 - 167, and 259 - 272, and
accompanying text.
322.

See supra notes 52, 169, 196, and 298 and accompanying text.

323.

See supra notes 98 - 99, 276 - 277, and accompanying text.

324.
See supra notes 45 - 46, 85 - 86, and 187 - 188, and
accompanying text.
325.
In all thirteen decisions from state supreme courts whose
rules mimicked the federal rule and in which the issue was the
propriety of impeaching the accused, the accused testified in all
13 cases - see supra notes 45 - 46. In eleven of the forty-five
decisions(25%) made by state supreme courts interpreting rules more
restrictive than the federal rule in admitting convictions to
impeach, the accused did not testify - see supra notes 85 - 86. In
as many as twenty-eight(56%), and as few as nineteen(38%) decisions
made by state supreme courts interpreting rules that were more
liberal overall than the federal rule in admitting convictions to
impeach, the accused did not testify - see supra notes 187 - 188.
In nine of the cases from these supreme courts, it was not clear
from the opinions if the accused had testified.
326.
Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 344(Ark., 2004)(accused
expressly asserted that the trial judge's decision to permit the
prosecution to impeach him with three felony convictions, all of
which were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie, but which
included a conviction for a crime, rape, identical to a current
charge, kept him from testifying at trial. The justices of the
Arkansas Supreme Court deemed that contention unworthy of analysis,
but instead responded by noting the accused was given right to
choose to testify or to decline to testify); Walker v. State, 790
A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002)(the court dismissed the accused express
constitutional claim that the trial judge's decision to admit
multiple convictions to impeach his potential trial testimony drove
him from the stand, thereby denying him his express constitutional
right to testify on his own behalf. Instead, the state supreme
court blamed the accused for not testifying to properly preserve
this claim); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 901(n.7)(Or.,
1991)(Accused was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual
assault.
Accused did not testify during the trial.
On appeal
accused alleged that he did not testify because the trial judge had
ruled he could be impeached with his conviction for sexual assault
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should he testify, and that the ruling violated both his
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf and his right to
an impartial jury. Oregon Supreme Court did make an evaluation of
whether the accused right under the state's constitutional
provision assuring a right to an impartial jury was violated. The
court concluded that the jury did not hear about the conviction for
the same offense since the accused did not testify. Therefore, of
course, it could not have been prejudiced by that information. The
court asserted that the accused theory was that anytime that a jury
heard that the defendant was previously convicted of sexual abuse
and he was currently charged with sexual abuse it would convict the
accused. The court expressly declined to assume that the accused
was denied an impartial jury.
327. 469 U.S. 38(1984). The standards of the federal rule and
those of most states on admitting convictions to impeach makes no
reference to the accused having to testify, and the substantive
focus of those standards provide no basis for implying that whether
the accused testifies impacts the merits of the evaluation of
whether a conviction should be admitted to impeach. Procedural
justifications suggested by the United States Supreme Court in
Luce, such as the judge might have changed his mind about the
admissibility of the conviction to impeach, when stripped of any
nexus to the actual standards of the rule, are so easily overcome
and specious that it is difficult to understand what ever prompted
their identification. See discussion infra., notes 346 - 349, and
accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 102, 123, and 134, and accompanying text.
See also Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(accused
failure to testify moots appeal of decision of trial judge to admit
a same crime conviction); State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996,1001(Fla.,
1998)(state supreme court held that accused must take stand and
testify to preserve appellate review of claim of error with regard
to trial judge's authorizing use by prosecution of prior
convictions for burglary and petty larceny. The accused did not
testify at trial); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897,900(n.6)(Or.,
1991)(state supreme court expressly acknowledged that had the
accused testified he would still have the right to claim on appeal
that his two constitutional rights identified in this appeal were
violated.
Failure to testify, coupled with failure to make an
offer of proof, court concluded made it impossible to determine if
accused constitutional right to testify was impaired.
329.
Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Mass., 1996)(Jury
found accused guilty of murder in the first degree with deliberate
premeditation.
During the cross-examination of the accused at
trial, the prosecution offered and the judge approved the admission
to impeach the accused of his prior convictions for unlawful
127

possession of a firearm, defacing a firearm, and unlawful
possession of ammunition. Accused lawyer failed to object to the
admission of any of these convictions); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d
82, 93(Ohio, 1997)(the attorney for an accused in a capital murder
trial assumed that the trial judge had previously ruled that the
accused could be impeached with a murder conviction); State v.
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(lawyer for defendant
erroneously conceded that misdemeanor convictions for possession of
a contraband substance, and possession of stolen property had some
relevance to prove that the accused wasn't trustworthy); Miller v.
State, 67 P.3d 1191,1192(Wyo., 2003)(prosecuting attorney failed to
argue that the victim's prior cocaine possession conviction was
irrelevant to issue on only issue for which it was offered - as
proof of propensity to lie.
State rule required balancing
evaluation.
No reference made to that balancing evaluation);
Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)(court reviewed
record which demonstrated that the defense attorney on direct
examination of his client, the accused, charged with aggravated
assault(with a knife), asked and the trial judge allowed him to ask
the accused to admit to prior convictions to burglary, involuntary
manslaughter, and armed robbery convictions.
The state supreme
court sanctioned this "strategic" decision. All of the convictions
were entered twenty years before the trial.
None of these
convictions were even arguably relevant to prove propensity to lie)
330. State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996, 1001(Fla., 1998)(prosecutor
asserted and trial judge authorized admission of two prior nolo
pleas to impeach the accused during his robbery trial. Accused did
not take the stand, and was convicted. The state supreme court
refused to reverse the conviction despite the fact, by its own
admission, the trial judge had made an obvious legal error in his
ruling, because an express provision of the evidence code forbade
use of nolo pleas in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Trial
judge and defense counsel apparently were both ignorant of this
specific provision); State v. Cole, 703 A.2d 658, (N.H.,
1997)(state supreme court did not evaluate if two court martial
convictions for similar sexual offenses qualified as felonies.
Court ruled that the judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to make a pre-trial ruling. Court failed to acknowledge obvious
prejudice that would result if these convictions were admitted.
Court relied in part on a finding that the accused attorney failed
to specify that prejudice would result, and the quantity or quality
of resulting prejudice. Accused attorney only made reference to
the impact on the trial if these convictions were admitted as a
basis for needing to know prior to trial if the convictions would
be admitted.)
331. See supra notes 70 - 77, 182, 223, 232, 234 - 235, 241, 259,
and 267, and accompanying text.
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332.

See supra notes 70 - 77, and accompanying text.

333. See supra notes 91 - 92, 96, 121 - 134, 163 - 166, and 168,
182, and accompanying text.
334.

See supra notes 163 - 166, 168, and accompanying text.

335.

See supra note 166, and accompanying text.

336.

See supra notes 208 - 211, 231, and, and accompanying text.

337.
See summary findings supra notes 283 - 292, 300 - 305, 313,
315 - 316, 318 - 321, and accompanying text. But see supra 309
finding that the result of most of findings of error by these state
supreme courts did benefit the accused.
338.

See infra notes 333 - 343, and accompanying text.

339. See e.g. McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Fla, 2000);
Label Systems, Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 718(Con.
2004)(legislature apparently delegated authority to the judges of
the superior courts to adopt a comprehensive evidence code. In
1999, when these judges exercised this authority, with regard to
the standard for determining the admissibility of convictions to
impeach, they adopted the common law standard developed by the
state supreme court); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240(Ind.,
2000)("Confinement" identified in the Indiana rule as one of eight
crimes conviction for which was admissible to impeach any witness.
The Indiana Supreme Court did not explain why "confinement" was
identified as a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement
which nevertheless should be used as a basis for impeachment. The
court subsequently did make reference, however, to the policy
decision that its 1994 adoption of the current impeachment with
convictions evidence rule as part of a comprehensive adoption of an
evidence code, rejected adoption of the federal rule, and preserved
the evolved state common law version of the rule. The court did
not explain why it chose to retain the common law, rather than
adopt the federal rule or other more recent approaches to this
issue); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt. 1993)(The court then
resorted to its own guidelines developed prior to the adoption of
the current substantive rule as the basis for determining the
admissibility of convictions to impeach). See also supra note 116
with regard to the Illinois Supreme Court as "creator" of Illinois
Rule-Standards in its case decisions; and 222 supra with regard to
the New Jersey Supreme Court as author of the impeachment with
convictions
balancing
evaluation
standards.
340.

See supra notes 72 - 78, 116, 118, 124 - 128, 222, 226, and
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228 - 229, and 232, and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 72, 76 - 77, 125 - 128, 177 - 178, 216 - 217,
230, 232, 236 - 238, 241 - 243.
342. See supra notes 50, 72, 76 - 77, 80, 91, 94 - 95, 124 - 128,
133 - 134, 208, 216 - 217, 220, 230, 232, 265 - 269, 241 - 245, 247
- 250, 252 - 256, 258 - 259, 265 - 269, and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 46 - 47, 86, 94 - 95, 126 - 127, 133 - 134,
208, 210, 216 - 217, 230, 232, 239 - 240, text following note 241,
246, 250, 252 - 254, 256, and 260, and accompanying text.
344.

See supra notes 307, 311, and 313, and accompanying text.

345.
State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1356(R.I., 1996)(court
reiterated, without explanation, its deference to the trial judge's
decision with regard to this issue. In truth, the court could not
offer a plausible explanation, because neither it nor any other
state supreme court asserting this great deference standard can
justify such deference on this issue.
The articulation of the
correct rule standards, and how to lawyer on that standard is a
matter of law, and the job of the top court in the state to
articulate and determine that state judges are adhering to the
court's rule protocol. The conviction to impeach rule standards
are at their core free of current case specific fact sensitivity.
No deference to the trial judge's decisions, unless and until
viable standards are stated in the rule as interpreted by the state
supreme court, and the state supreme court does a minimally
competent monitoring to assure there is a systematic good faith
effort to apply those standards,is therefore justified.
346. A North Dakota Supreme Court decision is illustrative of why
the minimum protection should extend to decisions to admit
convictions against any party witness, including those in civil
cases. The court cited as authority the federal Advisory Committee
Notes to the 1990 amendments to the federal rule and a secondary
authority, that because it is unlikely that the jury will use prior
convictions of a prosecution witness as propensity evidence, the
trial courts should only rarely exclude any and every felony
convictions of such witnesses when offered by the accused for
impeachment purposes; State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 446(N.D.
2002).
The court's position ignored, however, as do the
authorities referred to by the court, that such convictions, which
are irrelevant to prove propensity to lie, are likely to distract
the jury, and when as in this case, the prosecution witness is the
victim of the crime, admission is likely, as in Green v. Bock
Laundry, 490 U.S. 527(1989)(civil plaintiff), to result in unfair
prejudice thereby creating the risk that the jury will acquit the
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accused or find for the defendant in a civil case because the
victim or the plaintiff is cast by the jury as a bad person But
Id. at 448, the court recognized this possible danger, but asserted
that the government failed to argue that this danger was present in
this case. The state supreme court failed to review the record to
determine that the trial judge had identified these concerns which
by rule were supposed to be considered, or why the state supreme
court in its own evaluation failed to evaluate and condemn a
decision which authorized the admission of seventeen irrelevant to
prove propensity to lie convictions to impeach the alleged victim
of an attempted murder)
347. See cases discussed supra note 118.
FRE 609(b)(2005) also
requires an on the record specific fact finding of the basis to
admit a conviction to impeach when it is over ten years old.
348.

See supra notes 321, and accompanying text.

349. See e.g. Idaho Supreme Court decisions making reference to
its rule standard which expressly required a de-novo appellate
review of the issue of whether the conviction is relevant to prove
a propensity to lie; State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890(Idaho, 2001)
350. See e.g. Wilson v. Sisco, 713 A.2d 923, 924(Del. 1998)(State
supreme court held that the correct standard of review of the trial
judge's interpretation of the meaning of an element of the evidence
rule regulating admission of convictions to impeach is a de-novo
review of a matter of law. The assertion and use of this standard
by the Delaware Supreme Court can be contrasted with its
inappropriate use several times of the abuse of discretion
standard in cases decided within a few years of Wilson.
351.
See e.g. State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692, 696(N.D.,
1995)(sanctioned admission of similar crime convictions(here drug
possession and an escape conviction). The dissenting judge, Id. at
697, strongly argued that harmless error rule should be used very
sparingly when the trial judge has erroneously admitted felony
convictions to impeach the accused.
He asserted that such
admissions are intrinsically prejudicial. Judge noted in only two
prior decisions had the court used harmless error doctrine as basis
to refuse to reverse a conviction when such prior convictions were
erroneously admitted ostensibly solely for purpose of impeaching
the accused); and State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn.,
1999)(despite ruling trial judge had erroneously authorized the
prosecution to impeach the accused's potential trial testimony with
seven felonies for crimes of dishonesty, the court conclusionarily
asserted that the facts in the trial record demonstrated that the
error was harmless. Accused did not testify at trial)
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352.
See supra notes 98, 278, and 326 - 327, and accompanying
text.
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